Defendant Teubel moves for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and to dismiss all cross-claims. Defendant Goodman moves for the same relief. Defendant Mid-Hudson Family Health Services Institute ("Mid-Hudson") cross-moves to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint and to dismiss all cross-claims.

The relevant facts are not in dispute on these motions. The plaintiff is the widow of Velibor Videnovic, who had a coronary artery bypass graft surgery performed in 2000. On October 2, 2003, at the age of sixty-five, Mr. Videnovic experienced a transient ischemic attack and was treated at the emergency room at Northern Dutchess Hospital. On October 6, 2003, three days after his release from the hospital, Mr. Videnovic underwent a duplex carotid artery ultrasound evaluation as an outpatient at Northern Dutchess Hospital. The test results revealed obstruction in Mr. Videnovic's carotid arteries. Thereafter, on October 7, 2003, Mr. Videnovic underwent a CT scan of his abdomen. Mr. Videnovic was seen at Mid-Hudson on October 13, 2003 by P.A. Flanagan, who ordered an MRA and a neurosurgical consultation with Dr. Goodman. The MRA was performed on October 22, 2003 and Mr. Videnovic was seen by Dr. Goodman on October 28, 2003. The MRA results revealed a ninety-nine percent stenosis of the left carotid artery and an eighty percent stenosis of the right carotid artery. Dr. Goodman ordered an angiogram which was performed on November 5, 2003, the results of which confirmed the earlier test results. Dr. Goodman saw Mr. Videnovic on November 11, 2003 and scheduled surgery to alleviate the stenosis on November 21, 2003. On November 19, 2003, Mr. Videnovic had a stroke and subsequently died on November 22, 2003. The plaintiff asserts that each of the defendants departed from the medically accepted standard of care in their treatment [*2]of Mr. Videnovic principally by delaying the diagnosis and treatment of the stenosis.

It is well settled that in order "to obtain summary judgment, it is necessary that the movant establish his or her cause of action or defense sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment' in his or her favor (CPLR 3212[b]), and he or she must do so by tender of evidentiary proof in admissible form." (Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Associated Fur Mfrs., Inc., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067 [1979].) Parties opposing a motion for summary judgment are obliged to lay bare their evidentiary proof in admissible form in order to show that their allegations are capable of being established at a trial. (Albouyeh v. County of Suffolk, 96 AD2d 543 [2d Dept. 1983] aff'd 62 NY2d 681 [1984].) Bare conclusory allegations, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated assertions are insufficient. (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980].)

It is well settled that the requisite proof in a medical malpractice action are a deviation or a departure from accepted practice and evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of the patient's injury. (Ramsay v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 24 AD3d 645, 646 [2d Dept. 2005].)

"In a medical malpractice action, the party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing the absence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant physician was negligent. (citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986].)" (Taylor v. Nyack Hospital, 18 AD3d 537, 538 [2d Dept. 2005].)

Each of the defendants has established, on a prima facie basis, the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice regarding Velibor Videnovic's treatment. (Williams v. Sahay, 12 AD3d 366, 368 [2d Dept. 2004].)

In response, the plaintiff has submitted the affirmation of his expert, a licensed physician and a diplomat of the American Board of Internal Medicine ^[FN1]. Plaintiff's expert concludes, inter alia, that the treatment by the defendants was "by all logical standards, absurdly lethargic and a clear departure from accepted standards of medical care in these circumstances." The doctor does not articulate what the accepted standard of medical care would be in the circumstances presented herein. Instead, the expert offers the conclusory assertions that the timeline of Mr. Videnovic's treatment "was completely unacceptable and an almost inexplicable departure from the standard of care." The expert's affirmation is notable for the absence of any articulation of an expert opinion as to what an acceptable standard of care would be in circumstances such as those presented by the facts in this action. The assertion that the treatment intervention performed by the several defendants was not timely stems more from the inopportune occurrence of a stroke two days before the scheduled surgery than it does from any objective medical analysis of the standard of care employed. The defendants have submitted evidence that Mr. Videnovic was symptom-free following his initial emergency room visit and that each defendant promptly reacted to create a treatment plan to address Mr. Videnovic's underlying medical condition. The expert's unsupported, conclusory allegations of malpractice are insufficient to defeat the defendants' respective motions for summary judgment. (Fhima v. Maimonides Medical Center, 269 AD2d 559, 560 [2d Dept. 2000].) Therefore, it is ordered that the defendants' motions for [*3]summary judgment are granted and the plaintiff's complaint against each defendant and all cross-claims against each defendant are hereby dismissed.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: May 2, 2007

Poughkeepsie, New York

ENTER

Hon. James D. Pagones, A.J.S.C.

TO:[*4]

050107 decision&order