[*1]
People v Maloy (Patrick)
2007 NY Slip Op 50936(U) [15 Misc 3d 138(A)]
Decided on May 7, 2007
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on May 7, 2007
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : RUDOLPH, P.J., LIPPMAN and OWEN, JJ
2005-1666 OR CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Patrick C. Maloy, Appellant.


Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Village of Goshen, Orange County (Thomas J. Cione, J.), rendered September 21, 2005. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of speeding.


Judgment of conviction affirmed.

It is the People's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court in which the offense was tried is the proper venue (People v Greenberg, 89 NY2d 553, 555-556 [1997]; People v Moore, 46 NY2d 1, 6-7 [1978]; People v Connair, 6 Misc 3d 138[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50362 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]). Viewed in the light most favorable to the People (People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]; see also
People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 437 [1985]), there was sufficient proof that the offense was committed within the Village of Goshen's geographical jurisdiction as defendant committed the offense either in the Village of Goshen or in the Town of Goshen within one hundred yards of its boundary with the Village of Goshen (CPL 20.40 [4] [g]; 20.50; 100.55 [5]; see People v Lowen, 100 AD2d 518, 519 [1984]).

With respect to the proof of guilt, defendant does not challenge the court's determination to credit the testimony of the State Trooper as to his competence to estimate the speeds of moving vehicles and that he observed defendant traveling on Route 17 at 89 miles per hour in a 65 miles per hour speed zone. It is well settled that even the uncorroborated testimony of a qualified police officer as to a vehicle's rate of speed is legally sufficient to support a conviction of violating section 1180 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law so long as "the variance between the estimated speed and maximum permissible speed is sufficiently wide so that . . . [the fact finder] may be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exceeded the permissible limit" (People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230, 232 [1968]; e.g. People v Ramaker, 9 Misc 3d 131[A], 2005 NY [*2]Slip Op 51592[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]; People v Crawford, 5 Misc 3d 137[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51558[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]). In this case, the variance between defendant's speed and the speed limit was "sufficiently wide" to permit that inference, as it exceeded the 20 miles per hour variance deemed "clearly sufficient" to support the conviction (People v Olsen, 22 NY2d at 232). Further, even if, as defendant contends, the record does not support the court's conclusion that the Trooper employed a properly calibrated radar device to measure defendant's speed (cf. People v Dusing, 5 NY2d 126, 128 [1959]), the Trooper's visual estimates sufficiently corroborated the radar measurements to render "any perceived deficiency in the radar evidence . . . of no consequence" (People v Knight, 72 NY2d 481, 488 [1988]; see e.g. People v Magri, 3 NY2d 562, 567 [1958]; People v Ramaker, 9 Misc 3d 131[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51592[U], supra; People v Davis, 5 Misc 3d 137[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51559[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]).

Rudolph, P.J., Lippman and Owen, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 7, 2007