Charged by information with intentional and reckless assault in the third degree, attempted assault in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree, defendant moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on two grounds — in furtherance of justice and for facial insufficiency. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is denied in both respects.

In the early morning hours of July 30, 2006, defendant and the complaining witness were present at a Manhattan nightclub known as The Park. Although the parties disagree as to the origin of the incident that arose between them, defendant does not dispute — at least for purposes of the present motion — that he struck complainant in the face. According to the People, the blow was delivered with the use of an object, thought to have been a bottle, resulting in a cut that required nine stitches to close. According to defendant, complainant provoked him.

A motion to dismiss in the interest of justice may be granted only when "dismissal is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the existence of some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon [the] accusatory instrument . . . would constitute or result in injustice" (CPL 170.40 [1]; see People v Diggs, 125 AD2d 189, 191 [1st Dept 1986]). No such compelling circumstance has been clearly demonstrated here.

A court's discretionary power to dismiss in the interest of justice may be exercised "only in that rare and unusual case where it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations" (People v Harmon, 181 AD2d 34, 36 [1st Dept 1992] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). In determining such a motion to dismiss, the court must, to the extent applicable, examine and consider, individually and collectively, each of 10 enumerated statutory factors (see CPL 170.40 [1] [a]-[j]; see also People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204, 208 [2d Dept 1973]). Inasmuch as no catechistic discussion of the factors is required (see People v Rickert, 58 NY2d 122, 128 [1983]), I will not list them here. But having examined and considered, individually and collectively, each of the relevant factors, the court concludes that this is not that rare case.

Defendant claims that provocation or self-defense served as justification for his alleged crime. Inasmuch as a motion to dismiss in the interest of justice is not intended to substitute for the factfinding process, however, "that defense is more appropriately considered at trial" (People [*2]v Litman, 99 AD2d 573, 574 [3d Dept 1984]). Nor is such a motion intended to overcome the People's decision not to consent to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, which defendant seeks (see People v Stern, 83 Misc 2d 935, 938-939 [Crim Ct, NY County 1975]).

Characterizing any offensive conduct as an aberration, defendant grounds his interest-of-justice motion primarily in his otherwise-unblemished arrest record and his history of academic and professional achievement. Neither consideration, however, warrants dismissal. "[T]hat a defendant may have had no prior criminal record and an exemplary background, standing alone, is insufficient to justify a dismissal in the interest of justice" (Diggs, 125 AD2d at 191 [reversing dismissal in furtherance of justice]; accord People v Insignares, 109 AD2d 221, 234 [1st Dept 1985] [same]; People v Varela, 106 AD2d 339, 340 [1st Dept 1984] [same; defendant's exemplary background "does not immunize him from the normal processes of the criminal law"]). Were it otherwise, a first-time offender with a successful career could rarely be prosecuted for his or her offense. But the law does not permit one free crime, whether committed by the employed or by the indigent.

Defendant stands charged with a serious crime of violence, resulting in significant harm to the alleged victim. To short-circuit the factfinding process by depriving a jury of an opportunity to resolve the ultimate question of defendant's guilt, based simply on his status as an otherwise-productive member of society, would undermine the public's confidence that no one is above the law and that violent assaults, if proven, will result in appropriate punishment necessary to ensure the safety of public spaces.

The information alleges that defendant "str[uck complainant] about the face with an object, causing [complainant] to sustain a laceration to [his] eyebrow requiring nine stitches to close . . . and causing [him] substantial pain." Defendant contends that these allegations are legally insufficient to support any of the charges against him, arguing that the accusatory instrument lacks sufficient facts to establish the culpable mental state required with respect to each charge.

Under the first count of the information, defendant stands charged with intentional assault in the third degree, committed when a person, "[w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, . . . causes such injury" (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]). Under the second count, he is charged with reckless assault in the third degree, established when someone "recklessly causes physical injury to another person" (Penal Law § 120.00 [2]). Under the fourth count, defendant is charged with attempted assault in the third degree, requiring proof that, "with intent to commit [the] crime" of intentional assault in the third degree, a person "engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime" (Penal Law § 110.00; see also Penal Law § 120.00 [1]). Finally, under the fifth count, he is charged with harassment in the second degree, committed when, "with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another," someone "strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same" (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]).^[FN1] Thus, three of the charged counts require proof of intent, and the [*3]remaining one requires proof of recklessness.

In order to be sufficient on its face, an information, or a count thereof, must provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the crime charged and contain nonhearsay allegations that, if true, establish every element of the crime and its commission by the defendant (see CPL 100.40 [1] [b], [c]).^[FN2] Conduct constituting an offense consists of an act or omission and its accompanying mental state (see Penal Law § 15.00 [4]; see also Penal Law § 10.00 [1]). Defendant does not dispute that the information here sufficiently alleges that he caused physical injury to the complainant or that he subjected the complainant to physical contact by striking him — thus establishing a culpable act. Rather, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations proffered with respect to his mental state. Specifically, he contends that the intentional- and attempted-assault counts are jurisdictionally defective because the information fails to expressly recite that he acted with the requisite intent to cause physical injury. Similarly, he argues, the failure to recite that he acted with intent to harass, annoy or alarm the complainant renders the information facially insufficient with respect to the charge of harassment in the second degree. Finally, he asserts that the allegations fail to establish that he acted recklessly, as required for the reckless-assault count.

In support of his contention that the information filed against him is insufficient to establish the element of intent — essential to three of the charges — defendant relies heavily on People v Hall (48 NY2d 927 [1979]). In Hall, the defendant was charged with harassment in an information that "recited only that defendant, who it also alleges indicated that his desire was that the complainant leave the defendant's premises, did strike, shove and otherwise subject the complainant to physical contact and threatened . . . physical harm'" (48 NY2d at 927-928 [internal brackets omitted]). The Court of Appeals dismissed on the ground that the instrument failed to "specify an essential element of the crime, which is that the acts be done with intent to harass, annoy or alarm" (48 NY2d at 928 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Contrary to defendant's contention, Hall does not stand for the proposition that an accusatory instrument must ritualistically recite the statutory language of intent, on peril of jurisdictional dismissal. Such a formalistic reading simply cannot be squared either with the relevant statutes or with decisional law governing the standard for assessing the facial sufficiency of informations.

Under the Criminal Procedure Law, an information must, among other things, contain an accusatory part and a factual part (see CPL 100.15 [1]). The accusatory part "must designate the offense or offenses charged" (CPL 100.15 [2]). Notably, so long as the accusatory part "designate[s]" the offenses — that is, sets forth their names and the statutory sections that the defendant is alleged to have violated — there is no further requirement that it recite the elements of those offenses as statutorily defined. The factual part of an information, by contrast, "must contain a statement of the complainant alleging facts of an evidentiary character supporting or [*4]tending to support the charges" (CPL 100.15 [3]). And, as noted, in order to be facially sufficient, those evidentiary facts must provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the crime charged and contain nonhearsay allegations that, if true, establish every element of the crime and its commission by the defendant (see CPL 100.40 [1] [b], [c]). Of course, in the context of an intentional crime, the factual part of the information must include allegations that, if true, establish the essential element of intent.

Thus, Hall's observation that "[i]n order for an information to be sufficient on its face, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof must be alleged" (48 NY2d at 927) means simply that the information is required to contain factual allegations that suffice to establish every element of the offense — including the requisite mental state. That the Court's memorandum opinion in Hall, in faulting the information before it for failing to "allege[]" or to "specify" the intent element, did not intend to engraft any additional requirement onto the statute beyond that of "establish[ment]" of every element by the facts alleged is evident from its citation to the very provisions setting forth that requirement — CPL 100.15 (3) and 100.40 (1) (c) (see 48 NY2d at 927).

Thus, in People v Letang (14 Misc 3d 139[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50318[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2007]), the court — in concluding that an information charging disorderly conduct was jurisdictionally defective for failure to "allege" the essential element of either intent or recklessness — explained that the facial insufficiency in the accusatory instrument there arose because the requisite intent to cause public inconvenience by obstructing pedestrian traffic was "not fairly inferable" from the specified police allegations set forth in the information (14 Misc 3d 139[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50318[U], *1 [internal quotation marks and internal brackets omitted]).^[FN3]

"So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]). That being so, there can be no requirement that an accusatory instrument recite particular incantatory words of intent in order to sufficiently plead an intentional crime. Rather, an information will be facially sufficient when the facts alleged, if true, provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant acted with the requisite mens rea (see People v Inserra, 4 NY3d 30 [2004] [allegation that defendant's name appeared on signature line of an order of protection held sufficient to allege element — essential to charge of criminal [*5]contempt — that defendant had knowledge of the order's contents]).^[FN4]

Turning to the case at hand, the evidentiary facts alleged, if true, suffice to establish, for pleading purposes, that defendant acted with either an intent to cause physical injury or an intent to harass, annoy or alarm. Intent, of course, involves the internal workings of the mind and is therefore incapable of direct proof in the absence of an express declaration by the perpetrator or admission by the defendant. Typically, intent must "be inferred from the act itself . . . [or] from the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances" (People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see also People v Smith, 79 NY2d 309, 315 [1992]).^[FN5]

In determining questions of intent, a jury may permissibly infer that "a person intends that which is the natural and necessary and probable consequences of the act done by him" (People v Getch, 50 NY2d 456, 465 [1980]). And if a given set of facts can establish proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt, surely those same facts must suffice for pleading purposes (see People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999]; see also People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 115 [1986]). Plainly, an intent to cause physical injury, or to harass, annoy or alarm, is fairly inferable from the act of striking another person in the face with an object, with sufficient force to require nine stitches (cf. Matter of Tiffany D., 29 AD3d 693, 694 [2d Dept 2006] [evidence legally sufficient to establish intent to cause physical injury and, therefore, attempted assault in the third degree where appellant's accomplice punched complainant in the face "eight or nine times" and appellant kicked complainant in the face]; Matter of Jonathan M., 4 AD3d 154, 155 [1st Dept 2004] ["Appellant's intent to cause physical injury to the victim and to place him in fear of physical injury can be readily inferred from the fact that appellant displayed and swung a knife at the victim, causing him to wrestle with appellant in self-defense"]; see also People v Chiddick (__ NY3d __, 2007 NY Slip Op 03757, *3 [May 1, 2007] ["an offender more interested in displaying hostility than in inflicting pain will often not inflict much of it"]).

Nor does any jurisdictional defect result from the common circumstance that more than one culpable mental state is fairly inferable from the facts alleged. Rather, the same facts can reasonably support, as here, an intent either to injure or to harass, thus rendering the information facially sufficient as to each of the separate counts charging those different mentes reae (see People v Combs, 38 NY2d 868, 870 [1976] ["while harassment ha(s) been held not to be a lesser included offense to assault, there is such an intimate relation between the two offenses that the same factual allegations could, under circumstances like those presented here, form the basis of [*6]an information as to either one" (internal quotation marks and internal citations omitted)]).

Moreover, such facts can, and in this case do, support the separate charge of reckless assault. Just as the act of striking another in the face with an object can provide reasonable cause to believe that it was the actor's conscious objective to cause physical injury (see Penal Law § 15.05 [1]), so can it reasonably support a conclusion that the actor consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such injury would occur (see Penal Law § 15.05 [3]). In general, differences in mental state with respect to a particular result "involve fine gradations along but a single spectrum of culpability'" (People v Green, 56 NY2d 427, 432 [1982], quoting People v Stanfield, 36 NY2d 467, 473 [1975]). "It is up to the jury to decide in a particular case whether the defendant acted intentionally, or recklessly, or negligently (or not at all)" (People v Suarez, 6 NY3d 202, 212 n 6 [2005]).^[FN6]

Nor is the information rendered insufficient by defendant's speculative claims that he might have struck complainant not with an intent to injure or to harass, but by accident. Although conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not establish reasonable cause (see People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981]), the People need not, for pleading purposes, disprove every conceivable defense (cf. People v Santana, 7 NY3d 234, 237 [2006]; see also People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183 [1972]).

Defendant's motion to preclude evidence of a non-police-arranged point-out of defendant by three identifying witnesses is denied. A spontaneous identification arising from an encounter not orchestrated by the police is not subject to statutory notice or suppression (see People v Dixon, 85 NY2d 218, 223 [1995]; People v Rumph, 248 AD2d 142 [1st Dept 1998]; Miriam Hibel, New York Identification Law § 1.02 [6] [a], at 30 [2006 ed]). The People are, of course, bound by their representation that the identifications here arose from a non-police-arranged point-out. Should the evidence at trial demonstrate otherwise, defendant will be entitled to preclusion of any identification testimony (see CPL 710.30 [1] [b]; People v O'Doherty, 70 NY2d 479 [1987]).

Defendant's motion to compel compliance with his demand for discovery and request for a bill of particulars is granted to the extent provided in the People's voluntary disclosure form. Medical records are to be provided to the defense immediately upon their receipt by the People and in no event later than two weeks before trial.

This opinion shall constitute the decision and order of the court.