Defendant has submitted competent medical evidence including the affirmation of his examining neurologist, psychiatrist and radiologist and portions of the plaintiff's deposition testimony which establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see, Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]; Jackson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 273 AD2d 200 [2000]; Greene v. Miranda, 272 AD2d 441 [2000]). Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact by submitting competent medical proof (see, Gaddy v. Eyler, supra; Licari v. Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 235 [1982]; Lopez v. Senatore, 65 NY2d 1017 [1985]).

In opposition, the plaintiff's submissions failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Although Dr. Schepp, plaintiff's radiologist, reported finding bulging discs on the October 23, 2004 lumbar MRI, he does not opine that they are causally related to the accident (see Finkelshteyn v. Harris, 280 AD2d 579 [2001] and failed to address the defendant's radiologist's findings that the conditions are due to degenerative changes (see D'Alba v. Yong-Ae Choi, 33 AD3d 650 [2006]; Faulkner v. Steinman, 28 AD3d 604 [2006]; Shinn v. Catanzaro, 1 AD3d 195 [2003]). Moreover, the existence of a herniated or bulging disc does not constitute a serious injury in the absence of objective evidence of the extent, degree and duration of the alleged physical limitations resulting from the disc injury ( see Whitfield-Forbes v. Pazmino, 36 AD3d 901 [2007]; Mejia v. DeRose, 35 AD3d 407 [2006]; Yakubov v. CG Trans. Corp., 30 AD3d 509 [2006]; Cerisier v. Thibiu, 29 AD3d 507 [2006]; Bravo v. Rehman, 28 AD3d 694 [2006]; Kearse v. New York City Tr. Auth., 16 AD3d 45 [2005]). In this case, Dr. Hausknecht failed to set forth objectively determined and quantified limitations in the range of motion of plaintiff's cervical or lumbar spine and merely stated that plaintiff has "moderate" restrictions in his cervical and lumbar spine. However, a "minor, mild or slight" limitation does not constitute a serious injury ( Licari v.. Elliott, supra; Shepley v. Helmerson, 306 AD2d 267 [2003]). Moreover, since he has also failed to address the [*2]defendant's radiologist's findings that the bulges are due to degenerative changes, his opinion as to causation is speculative and without evidentiary value ( see Itzkowitz v. King Kullen Grocery Co., Inc.,22 AD3d 636, 637 [2005]; Gomez v. Epstein, 29 AD3d 950 [2006] Giraldo v. Mandanici, 24 AD3d 419, 420; Allyn v Hanley, 2 AD3d 470 [2003]; Ifrach v. Neiman, 306 AD2d 380 [2003]).

With respect to plaintiff's alleged head injury, Dr. Schepp does not opine that the conditions he reports finding on the head MRI are causally related to the accident, nor does he explain the clinical significance of these findings (see Bushman v. Di Carlo, 268 AD2d 920, 922-923 [2000], lv. denied 94 NY2d 764 [2000]). Nor is Dr. Hausknecht's affirmed reports sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to plaintiff's alleged cognitive deficits. Although Dr. Hausknecht's November 30, 2004, May 10, 2005 and June 13, 2006 reports mention that plaintiff continues to demonstrate significant cognitive and psychological sequella, he failed to reconcile these findings with his findings contained in his earlier November 9, 2004 report that "[l]ong and short term memory is intact. Calculations, spelling and spelling reversals, reading, writing and drawing are within normal limits for the patient's age and background." (see Magarin v. Kropf, 24 AD3d 733 [2005]).

Dr. Jason Brown's affirmation is also insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. The doctor's opinion that the plaintiff's alleged cognitive deficits are causally related to the accident rendering him disabled to the extent that he is unable to work, is unsuported by any objective medical basis and belied by the plaintiff's deposition testimony that he did not miss any time from work and was promoted since the accident. In the absence of any objective medical basis (see Bushman v. Di Carlo, supra; Merisca v. Alford, 243 AD2d 613 [1997]; Antoniou v. Duff, 204 AD2d 670 [1997]) Dr. Brown's opinions as to causation and claims of plaintiff's inability to work are speculative, conclusory, without in probative value (see Itzkowitz v. King Kullen Grocery Co., Inc., supra; Ifrach v. Neiman, supra) and tailored to meet the statutory requirements (see, Lopez v. Senatore, supra; Marshall v. Albano, 182 AD2d 614).

The unsworn medical records from St. Vincents Medical Center Emergency Room, Dr. Kim and Dr. Miloradovich, were not considered since they were not submitted in admissible form (see Grasso v. Angerami, 79 NY2d 813 [1991]; Luckey v. Bauch, 17 AD3d 411 [2005]; Sammut v. Davis, 16 AD3d 658 [2005]).

In view of the plaintiff's testimony that he did not miss any time from work, he has also failed to raise a triable issue as to whether he was unable to perform substantially all of his daily activities for not less than 90 of the first 180 days subsequent to the accident (see, McConnell v. Ouedraogo, 24 AD3d 423 [2005]; Lorenzo v. O'Keefe, 1 AD3d 411 [2003]; DiNunzio v. County of Suffolk, 256 AD2d 498, 499 [1998]).

Dated: April 30, 2007

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J.S.C.