| Kalkan v University of Rochester |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 51057(U) [15 Misc 3d 1139(A)] |
| Decided on March 29, 2007 |
| Sup Ct, Monroe County |
| Rosenbaum, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Meliha Kalkan and Zeynal Kalkan, Plaintiffs
against University of Rochester, Defendant |
Plaintiff and Defendant tried a medical malpractice case before this court. After the jury had deliberated for a period of time, the Jury came back with a question to the Court concerning how much of an award was appropriate in cases similar to the one at bar. After the Court instructed the jury, they continued their deliberations. As the jury continued to deliberate, but before it rendered a verdict, plaintiff and defendant entered into a high low agreement. The agreement, which was placed on the record, was as follows:
MR. WARD: Your Honor, in the period of time since
we last spoke with you, Mr. Murphy and I have come
to an agreement in terms of a high/low agreement for
this case. And the Agreement is a two hundred / six
hundred agreement; in other words, if the verdict is
less than two hundred, then the University of Rochester
will pay two hundred, and if the verdict is more than
six hundred, the University of Rochester will pay six
hundred, and if it falls between, we will pay whatever [*2]
the verdict is.
THE COURT: Is that your understanding, Mr. Murphy?
MR. MURPHY: Yes.
Shortly thereafter, the jury came back with a verdict of $475,000 for the plaintiff. Defendant thereafter moved to set aside the verdict. Plaintiff now moves to preclude Defendant from bringing his motion, asserting that a high/low stipulation placed on the record settles the matter and precludes Defendant from bringing a motion to set aside the verdict.
THE LAW:
New York "has long favored and encouraged the fashioning of stipulations as a means of expediting and simplifying the resolution of disputes". Mitchell v. New York Hospital, 61 NY2d 208, 215 (1984). Further, CPLR 2104 clearly states, "An agreement between...attorneys relating to any matter in an action, other than one made between counsel in open court, is not binding upon a party unless it is in a writing subscribed by him or his attorney or reduced to the form of an order and entered." (Emphasis added). An agreement between parties or their attorneys in open court, on the record, is binding.
Here, clearly Defendant sought a high/low agreement only after its attorney had heard the jury's question relative to the amount they could award in an action such as the one they had just heard over the period of nearly two weeks. Defendant argues in its affirmation, however, that a stipulation's terms must be definite and concrete. Defendant further argues that a court will not read terms into the stipulation that do not exist, although Defendant offers no citation to this proposition. This Court agrees that stipulations of settlement "must be construed in accordance with contract interpretation principles." Ochal v. Television Technology Corp., 26 AD3d 575, 576 (3rd Dept. 2006). The Court asserts that the stipulation followed proper contract interpretation principles as it was placed on the record in open court, specified the terms of the agreement and there was a meeting of the minds of both parties.
It is further patently obvious that Defendant offered a high/low agreement only after it heard the jury inquiring about the size of an award that the jury might [*3]deliver. That is no more an inference than in Defendant's stipulation on the record where it offered a high/low of a "two hundred/six hundred agreement." The Court, Plaintiffs and Defendant clearly understood that Defendant was speaking of a two hundred thousand dollar/six hundred thousand dollar agreement, not a two hundred dollar/six hundred dollar agreement (emphasis added). No further specificity needed to be made, nor did Defendant raise this as a possible issue. The stipulation therefore satisfied contract principles. Ochal, Supra.
It is held that a court is "bound to enforce a stipulation even if, with hindsight, it causes an unfavorable result upon either of the parties." Nishman v. DeMarco, 76 AD2d 360 (2nd Dept. 1981). Therefore, even in cases where a jury may render an unfavorable verdict, the court must look to the stipulation. To render a decision otherwise, would compromise the effect or interest parties might otherwise have in entering into high/low agreements. An "open court" stipulation affirms that strict enforcement be required, as it "serves the interest of efficient dispute resolution (and also) is essential to the management of court clanders and integrity of the litigation process." Hallock v. NY, 64 NY2d 224, 230 (1984). Further, only where there is cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of a stipulation made during litigation. Matter of Frutinger, 29 NY2d 143, 149-150 (1971). That simply is not the case here.
The stipulated settlement of damages also means that the Court does not reach the question of setting aside the jury verdict. McDonnell v. Tello, 8 Misc 3d 1003A (Westchester Co. 2005).
Plaintiff's motion is granted and Defendant's motion is denied.