The defendant stands charged with, inter alia, Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree. Defendant moved to suppress statements and a Huntley hearing was held. The sole witness at the hearing was police officer Tanya Barry, who the Court finds to be credible.

The issue presented here is whether the question, "Why did you give us a different name?" comes under the pedigree exception to Miranda warnings or is the functional equivalent of interrogation.

On February 17, 2006 police officer Tanya Barry of the 67th precinct responded to a radio call of a "dispute with a weapon" at apartment D7 at 1070 East New York Avenue, Brooklyn, NY. Upon arriving at that location, the officer knocked on the door and there was no answer. When the officer knocked again, the complainant, Ms. Amoy Blair, opened the door.

The police officer suspected something was afoot, as the complainant when responding to the questions of P.O. Barry gestured in the affirmative while verbally indicating in the negative (and vice versa) and made other signs suggesting that someone else was in the apartment. P.O. Barry with four other officers entered the apartment and heard noises behind a shut door. Three [*2]of the officers had their guns drawn but pointed towards the floor. The officers attempted to open the door but it would not open. P.O. Barry asked the person behind the door to come out. The defendant came out and was handcuffed for safety precautions as a weapon was mentioned in the radio transmission.

After the defendant was handcuffed, all of the officers' guns were holstered. The defendant was asked "What is your name?" and responded, "Milton [something indiscernible]". A gun was recovered from the top of the closet in a hallway located in the area behind the door from whence the defendant had come.^[FN1] The defendant was then patted down and a passport was removed from his back pocket. After seeing that the name on the passport with the defendant's picture was Jakes Willis, the officer asked the defendant, "Why did you give us a different name?". The defendant replied, "Now you know my real name." No Miranda warnings were administered to the defendant.

A reasonable person, innocent of any crime, in the defendant's position would have believed that his liberty was interfered with and that he was not free to leave (People v. Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969]). This court finds that the defendant was in custody at the time of the police officer's questions.

The first question"What is your name?" is clearly a permissible inquiry if the defendant were not arrested (see, People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 [1976]; People v. Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 [1992]); and even if he were in fact arrested, it would constitute a permissible pedigree inquiry. In either event, Miranda warnings were not necessary to pose this question.

The second question presents a more problematic issue: Although the officer was allowed to remove the passport from the defendant's back pocket and open it to confirm pedigree information even absent probable cause, as it was not related to the investigation of the crime to which the officers responded (see, People v. Watkins, 40 AD3d 290 [2007]; see also, United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 [1980]), was the officer permitted to ask the defendant why his passport name did not match the name that he had previously given without first administering Miranda warnings?

Courts have consistently found "pedigree" questions, routinely asked by police officers for identification purposes, (see, e.g., People v. Ryff, 27 NY2d 707 [1970]; People v. Mays, 190 Misc 2d 310 [Sup 2001]), and questions meant to "clarify" a situation or statement (see e.g., Huffman, 41 NY2d 29 [1976]; People v. Washington,299 AD2d 286 [2002]) to be exceptions to the Miranda rule.

For example, in Ryff the defendant, while being interrogated about stolen merchandise, was asked whether he had identification. In response, defendant handed over a license and credit card that bore the name "Fryer," and answered "yes" to the question of whether his name was "Fryer." Defendant's affirmative answer was held to be a "pedigree statement" made to the police for identification purposes and was admissible even though defendant had not been read Miranda warnings. In Mays, the defendant had two licenses on his person, each with a different name. Defendant first told the police that his name was "Cook," then after the police officer [*3]asked defendant questions about his date of birth and address, defendant admitted that he had obtained the "Cook" license when he took his cousin's information to the DMV. Defendant's statements were held admissible because they were the result of pedigree questioning about the defendant's identification and not the result of interrogation.

In Huffman, a police officer who saw defendant leave the steps of a delicatessen and hide behind nearby bushes asked defendant, with gun drawn, "What are you doing back here?" Defendant answered, "We are trying to break into that store." Defendant's statement was held to be admissible because the police officer's question was "designed to clarify the nature of the situation confronted, rather that to coerce a statement." Similarly, in Washington, defendant's statement in response to a "single clarifying question" about the ownership of a credit card found on defendant but not bearing defendant's name was held admissible even though defendant had not been given Miranda warnings prior to questioning.

In this case, the officer's question, "Why did you give us a different name?" was "not a disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation" (People v. Rodney 85 NY2d 289, 294 [1995]), nor was it an attempt to elicit information bearing directly on an essential element of the crime charged (id. at 293; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 US 582, 602 n 14 [1990]). The officer here was trying to clarify a discrepancy in pedigree information provided by the defendant. Courts have consistently held such requests to clarify information to be patently proper (see People v. Velazquez, 33 AD3d 352 [2006]). Even assuming the second question "[fell] within the scope of an interrogation under Rhode Island v. Innis (446 US 291, 302 [1980]), [it] does not for that reason fall outside of the pedigree exception" (see Velazquez, 33 AD3d at 353). The police officer's inquiry in asking the defendant a "single clarifying question," unrelated to the charge for which defendant had been stopped and later arrested, is not tantamount to interrogation and does not trigger a requirement that Miranda warnings be provided (see Huffman, 41 NY2d at 34; Washington, 299 AD2d 296).

Accordingly, the defendant's motion to suppress statements is denied in all respects.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

ENTER

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J.S.C.