The defendants move, inter alia, to dismiss all six causes of action in this case pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(5) and CPLR 3211 (a)(7), claiming among other things that the claims for defamation are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations (see, CPLR 215 [3]).

In this case, Darius Michalski, Margaret Chudziak, and Merek Podlecki (hereinafter Plaintiffs) claim to have been libeled by defendants Wojciech Mleczko, Bozena Kaminska, Centrum, Polish and Slavic Center, Inc. ("PSC"), and Polish and Slavic Federal Credit Union. Plaintiffs also assert causes of action for injurious falsehood, tortuous interference with contractual relations and punitive damages. The alleged libelous statements were published in the January 2005, April 2005, May 2005, June 2005, and April 2006 issues of Centrum, a Polish language Monthly newspaper issued by defendant PSC. The summons was filed on May 17, 2006.

Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' libel causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(5) is granted in regards to all statements published in the January, April, and May 2005 issues of Centrum and denied in regards to those statements published in June 2005 and April 2006. Additionally, plaintiffs' claims for injurious falsehood, tortuous interference with contractual relations, and punitive damages are also dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(5) and CPLR 3211 (a)(7).

The first three causes of action are for libel. The statute of limitations for libel is one year (CPLR 215[3]). The statute begins to run on the first date that the publication is distributed, and expires one year from this date (Gregoire v GP Putnam's Sons, 298 NY 119; Love v Morrow, 193 AD2d 586, 589 [2nd Dept. 1993]). There is an exception to the one-year statute of limitations when the publication has been republished, in which case the statute begins to run from the most recent publication (Rinaldi v Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 NY2d 422). The June 2005 and April 2006 issues of Centrum were published within the one-year period before the May 2006 summons and as such any claims of libel based on statements published in these issues of Centrum are not time-barred by the statute of limitation (CPLR 215[3]).

Plaintiffs claim the alleged libelous statements in the January, April, and May 2005 issues of Centrum are not time-barred by the statute of limitations due to the republication rule. The May issue was originally distributed in Greenpoint, Brooklyn on May 10, 2005. Based on the May 10, 2005 publication date the statute of limitations would have run by May 10, 2006, 7 days prior to the filing of the summons. The January and April 2005 issues of Centrum were first [*2]published in their respective months in 2005, more than one-year prior to the May 17, 2006 summons. Plaintiffs argue that these three issues were republished on or about May 20-25, 2005 when copies of those issues of Centrum were distributed in New Jersey.

Generally, the republication rule requires modification and reproduction of the offending material intended to reach a new audience.(see, Firth v New York, 98 NY2d 365, requiring modification of text to qualify as a republication; Dodd v Harper & Brothers, 3 AD2d 548 [1st Dept. 1957], stating that reprinted copies are a republication; Lehman v Discovery Communications, 332 FSupp2d 534; stating that the reasoning behind republication is reaching a new audience; Zoll v Jordache Enterprises Inc., 2003 WL 1964054 [SDNY 2003]; stating that you need more than just a new audience to qualify for the republication exception; Rinaldi, 52 NY2d 422; rebinding a book is a republication; Gregoire, 298 NY 119; stating sales from stock are not a republication). In this case, preprinted copies of Centrum were merely redistributed at a later date in a different community. Plaintiffs argue that distribution in a new community is reaching a new audience and as such should qualify for the republication exception. Simply reaching a new audience is not enough to qualify for the republication exception. Zoll v Jordache Enterprises Inc. supra. Further, publication in a sister state has no effect on the tolling of the statute of limitations in New York (Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v Simon, 299 F2d 212 [2nd Cir. 1962]). If the statute of limitations in New Jersey will allow for a filing of a complaint at this juncture plaintiff can feel free to file in that state.

The fourth cause of action sounds in injurious falsehood. To plead injurious falsehood the plaintiff must also plead special damages with sufficient particularity (Wasserman v Maimonides Medical Center, 268 AD2d 425 [2nd Dept. 2000]). In pleading special damages plaintiff must identify actual damages and these must be causally related to the alleged tortuous act. In this case, plaintiff Michalski claims that he lost certain commissions that would have been earned by his employees as well as his mortgage broker's license. Since plaintiff has not set forth in his pleadings how this loss of sales commissions is related to the published statements, or how his mortgage broker's license being revoked is related to statements in a Polish language monthly newspaper, he has failed to sufficiently plead special damages. Additionally, any claims for injurious falsehood stemming from statements published prior to May 17, 2005 should be dismissed as time barred. It is well-settled law that you cannot use a prima facie tort as a device to avoid the statute of limitations governing defamation (Morrison v National Broadcasting Co., 19 NY2d 453 [1967]; National Nutritional Food Association v Whelan, 492 FSupp 374 [SDNY 1980]).

The fifth cause of action sounds in tortuous interference with contractual relations. To plead tortuous interference the plaintiff must show, among other things, the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and a third party (MJ & K v Matthew Bender and Co., 220 AD2d 488 [2nd Dept. 1995]). Contending that a third party cancelled contracts with plaintiff because of alleged defamatory remarks, with no factual basis to support that allegation is insufficient to state a cause of action for tortuous interference with contractual relations Id. In this case, plaintiff Michalski contends that contracts were lost due to the statements of defendants but fails to give any factual basis for this claim. Additionally, in reviewing pleadings courts look to the reality and essence of an action and not its name for determining the statute of limitations (Noel v Interboro Mutual Indemnity Insurance Co., 31 AD2d 54 [1st Dept. 1968]). Here, plaintiff's fifth [*3]cause of action essentially sounds in defamation which carries the same one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, this cause of action must be dismissed.

The sixth cause of action, for punitive damages must also be dismissed in its entirety. A demand for punitive damages does not amount to a separate cause of action for pleading purposes (Fiesel v Nanuet Properties Corp., 125 AD2d 292 [2nd Dept. 1986]). While plaintiffs may be entitled to punitive damages in regards to their other claims, punitive damages is not a claim that can stand on it own.

Accordingly, defendants' motion is granted to the extent that the complaint is hereby dismissed with regards to all defamation claims surrounding the statements published in the January, April, and May 2005 issues of Centrum as time-barred by the statute of limitations. Additionally, plaintiffs' 4th, 5th and 6th causes of action are dismissed in their entirety.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

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Michael A. Ambrosio