[*1]
Parisi v Brooklyn Pub. Lib.
2007 NY Slip Op 51642(U) [16 Misc 3d 1130(A)]
Decided on August 27, 2007
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County
Sweeney, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on August 27, 2007
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County


William Parisi, Joseph C. Parisi, Thomas Parisi, Joanne Colacino & Doreen Passariella, Petitioners/Landlords,

against

The Brooklyn Public Library and The Brooklyn Public Library Foundation Inc., 2602 Bath Avenue a/k/a 2602-14 Bath Avenue, The Entire Building Brooklyn, New York 11214, Respondents/Tenants, and "XYZ Corp." and "John Doe" and "Jane Doe," Respondents/Undertenants.




81875/2007



Petitioner's Attorney

Finkelstein Newman Ferrara LLP

225 Broadway

New York, NY 10007

Tel.: (212) 619-5400

Respondent's Attorney:

Rosenberg & Estes, P.C.

733 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10017

Tel.: (212) 867-6000

Peter P. Sweeney, J.

Petitioners commenced this commercial holdover proceeding seeking to recover possession of the premises located at 2602 Bath Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11214 a/k/a [*2]2602-14 Bath Avenue, Brooklyn New York. The premises are currently operated, occupied and used as a public library. Petitioners maintain that respondents were month-to-month tenants whose tenancy was terminated when they were served with a 30-day notice pursuant to Real Property Law § 232-a. Respondents now move to dismiss the proceeding claiming that the 30-day notice was jurisdictionally void.

Factual Background:


Before the proceeding was commenced, respondents were served with two 30-day notices. The first notice is entitled "THIRTY DAY NOTICE OF TERMINATION and is dated May 29, 2007. It informed respondents, among other things, that unless they surrendered possession of the premises by June 30, 2006, eviction proceedings would be commenced against them. The notice was signed on the second page by Joanne Colacino, one of the petitioners, who indicated that she was signing the notice on behalf of all petitioners.

The second 30-day notice is entitled "THIRTY DAY NOTICE OF TERMINATION (CORRECTED)" and is also dated May 29, 2007. Except for the title, the only difference between this notice and the first is that it informed respondents that eviction proceedings would be commenced against them unless they surrendered possession of the premises by June 30, 2007. The second page of this notice is an exact photocopy of the second page of the first notice and was apparently affixed to the notice by petitioners' attorneys outside petitioners' presence. Petitioners maintain that the service of this notice on May 31, 2007 is what forms the predicate for the proceeding.

Respondents contend that since the signature page on the second notice is a photocopy of the signature page from the first notice, the second notice was obviously never signed or reviewed by any of the petitioners before it was served. Respondents maintain that for these reasons, the second notice was fraudulently issued and jurisdictionally void. Respondents further maintain that in accordance with the holding in Siegel v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of Long Island, 108 AD2d 218 [1995], aff'd 67 NY2d 792 [1986], the proceeding should be dismissed.

In opposition to the motion, petitioners submitted an affidavit by Ms. Colacino. She averred that on May 29, 2006, her attorneys faxed her a copy of the first notice at which time she reviewed it, signed it and faxed it back to her attorneys. The following day, she realized that the notice contained a typographical error in that it informed respondents that they had until June 30, 2006 to surrender possession of the premises when it should informed them that they had until June 30, 2007 to surrender possession. Upon discovering the error, Ms. Colacino called her attorney and brought the error to his attention. When her attorney told her that the first notice had already been served, she directed him to serve a second notice containing the correct surrender date. Petitioners maintain that the second notice was served to correct an obvious typographical error, that it was neither fraudulently issued nor jurisdictionally void.

Discussion:

Respondents' contention that the second notice was fraudulently issued and jurisdictionally void because it contained a photocopied signature and was never reviewed or signed by petitioners prior to its service is without merit. Real Property Law § 232-a [FN1] does not [*3]require that a 30-day notice be signed by the landlord, or for that matter, by anyone. The Appellate Division, Second Department has held that a 30-day notice was valid, even though it was unsigned, where it indicated that it emanated from the landlord (Norlee Wholesale Corp., Inc. v. 4111 Hempstead Turnpike Corp., 138 AD2d 466, 469 [1988]; see also Lorenzo v. Rivera, 132 Misc 2d 591, 594 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1986, Fuchs, J.][FN2]; Sobers v. Baker, NYLJ., Mar. 14, 1998, at 27, col 3 [Civ Ct, Kings County, Thomas, J.] (Unsigned rent demand valid where what was typed "clearly delineate[d] the petitioner's name and his capacity as the landlord of the premises. "); L & B 595 Madison Inc. v. Susan Sheehan Inc., NYLJ., Aug. 31, 1994, at 22, col 6 [Civ Ct, NY County, Gische, J.] ("The typewritten identification on the demand which reads: 'L & B 595 MADISON INC. LANDLORD' is a legal signature."); but see Fazal Realty Corp v. Paz, 151 Misc 2d 396 [Civ Ct, NY County 1991, Braun, J.]; Warehouse Eyes v. Hann, NYLJ, Dec. 12, 1990, at 22, col 4 [Civ Ct, NY County, Gans, J.] ).

Even if there was a requirement that the 30-day notice be signed, the requirement was met when petitioners' attorneys affixed Ms. Colacino's photocopied signature to the notice. A

30-day notice is not rendered invalid because it is signed in the name and on behalf of a landlord by its attorney ( see A. Dubois & Son v. Goldsmith Bros., 273 A.D. 306, 308 [2nd Dep't 1948]) and there is no requirement that a signature be hand written ( see Lorenzo,132 Misc 2d at 594). "The term signature includes any memorandum, mark or sign, written, printed, stamped, photographed, engraved or otherwise placed upon any instrument or writing with intent to execute or authenticate such instrument or writing" (General Construction Law § 46). Thus, by affixing the photocopied signature page to the second notice, petitioners' attorneys clearly indicated their intention to execute and/or authenticate the notice on petitioners' behalf.

Respondents' contention that the proceeding should be dismissed in accordance with the holding in Siegel is also without merit. In Siegel, the Court of Appeals held that notices of default and termination must be issued by either the landlord or an attorney named in the lease and not by a third party attorney with whom the tenant had never previously dealt. Here, the second 30-day notice indicated on its face that it was issued by petitioners. There is no indication on the notice that it was issued by a third party with whom respondents had never previously dealt. In these circumstances Siegel does not apply ( see Norlee Wholesale Corp., Inc., 138 AD2d at 469).

The court has considered respondents' remaining arguments and finds them to be without [*4]merit.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that respondents' motion is DENIED in its entirety; it is further

ORDERED that the parties are directed to appear in Part 52 for conference/trial on September 12, 2007 at 10:00 a.m. in Room 904C.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: August 27, 2007____________________________

PETER P. SWEENEY

Civil Court Judge

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Real Property Law § 232-a, entitled "Notice to terminate monthly tenancy or tenancy from month to month in the city of New York" provides as follows: "No monthly tenant, or tenant from month to month, shall hereafter be removed from any lands or buildings in the city of New York on the grounds of holding over his term unless at least thirty days before the expiration of the term the landlord or his agent serve upon the tenant, in the same manner in which a notice of petition in summary proceedings is now allowed to be served by law, a notice in writing to the effect that the landlord elects to terminate the tenancy and that unless the tenant removes from such premises on the day on which his term expires the landlord will commence summary proceedings under the statute to remove such tenant therefrom."

Footnote 2:In Lorenzo, an unsigned 30-day notice which was subscribed with petitioner's name in typed letters on the line marked "Landlord" was held valid (132 Misc 2d at 594).