This court conducted a Mapp/Dunaway hearing on July 12 and August 2, 7, 13, 14 and 20, 2007. Before commencing the hearing, the court asked the prosecutor and defense counsel to state the hearing issues. After hearing both counsel, the court framed the issues as follows:

First, did the police have a proper basis to stop the vehicle? Secondly, did the police have a basis to ask the driver for his license and registration? And thirdly, when did the police learn that the defendant did not have a license? Both the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed with that framing of the issues.

The People then called a New York City police officer as a witness: Police Officer Mark Jablonski who was assigned to the Anti-Crime Patrol of the 67th Precinct in Brooklyn, New York. The defendant called two witnesses: Cora Grant, the defendant's wife, and the defendant himself, Derone Grant.

After both parties rested, defense counsel raised the issue of the validity of the inventory search citing People v Johnson, 1 NY3d 252 (2003). Since this issue had not been raised previously, the court granted the prosecutor's motion to reopen the evidentiary phase of the hearing.

The People recalled Officer Jablonski and called, for the first time, Sergeant Richard Pignatelli who was also assigned to the 67th Precinct Anti-Crime Unit. The court credits their testimony but does not fully credit the testimony of Cara Grant or of the defendant for the reasons set forth below.

On November 19, 2006, at about 12:05 A.M., Officer Jablonski and Sergeant Pignatelli were both in plain clothes and in an unmarked police car in the vicinity of East 53rd Street and Church Avenue in Kings County. Officer Jablonski observed a tan Chevy Tahoe with a New York license plate with a defective driver's side taillight. The taillight, as distinguished from the brake light, was not illuminated as the car passed. Upon observing the darkened taillight, Officer Jablonski stopped the vehicle and approached it on the driver's side. Sergeant Pignatelli approached it on the passenger side.

When Officer Jablonski reached the driver, he found defendant who was alone in the car. Officer Jablonski asked the defendant for his license, registration and insurance. The defendant responded that he did not have any of these identifying documents nor could he produce any other identification or any papers with regard to the ownership of the vehicle. Officer Jablonski then asked the defendant to exit the vehicle and placed him under arrest. Officer Jablonski and

Sergeant Pignatelli drove the defendant back to the 67th Precinct in their unmarked police car [*2]which did not have a partition. Another officer brought the subject vehicle back to the 67th Precinct.

At the precinct, Officer Jablonski began to process the defendant's arrest which involved obtaining pedigree information such as defendant's name, address and date of birth. Officer Jablonski then ran a Department of Motor Vehicles check which revealed that the defendant did not have a license. The officer also ran the vehicle's license plate which revealed that it was registered to a dealer assignment. In conversation with the defendant, the defendant told the officer that his wife owned the vehicle.

Not knowing who owned the vehicle, Officer Jablonski intended that it be "vouchered". As part of department procedure, Officer Jablonski then conducted an inventory search of the vehicle in the precinct parking lot. He testified that he was aware of the guidelines for inventory searches with which he had to comply and that the purpose of the inventory search was to protect property, ensure against liability claims and to be sure there were no weapons or explosives ^[FN1]. He was also aware that the vehicle was to be searched thoroughly and referred to areas he could search such as floor mats, seats, console, glove compartment, trunk and hood.

During this inventory search, Officer Jablonski noticed that the cup holder on the console was slightly out of position. He lifted it up and observed a firearm, a .380 semi-automatic. which was recovered and vouchered. Sergeant Pignatelli was present in a supervisory capacity during the inventory search. He testified knowledgeably about the Patrol Guide and the purpose of inventory searches and the procedures to be followed. The Patrol Guide, Sub-section 218-13, entitled "Inventory Searches of Automobiles and Other Property", was admitted into evidence through him and set forth the purpose and procedure for inventory searches of vehicles. Section 218-13 states that the purpose of an inventory search is to "protect property, ensure against unwarranted claims of theft, and protect uniformed members of the service and others against dangerous instrumentalities." It also generally outlines the areas of a vehicle that may be searched and includes the six areas Officer Jablonski referenced. Section 218-13 also limits the discretion of the officer in that the officer may force open a trunk or glove compartment only if it can be done with minimal damage unless there are other specified factors. Sergeant Pignatelli testified that he would have stopped Officer Jablonski if Officer Jablonski had not followed the procedure in the patrol guide.

After the firearm was vouchered, the defendant's wife came to the precinct with a State of Georgia driver's license, proof of ownership, registration and insurance for the vehicle. Upon verifying the information, Officer Jablonski released the vehicle to her.

At that time, Officer Jablonski directed her to where the vehicle was located. Concerned about the traffic in the parking lot, Officer Jablonski watched to make sure that she reached the car safely. After she started the vehicle, he could not observe the taillight because the vehicle was backed into a parking space and only the front was exposed to his view. He also testified creditably that he never reentered the vehicle to participate with the defendant's wife in testing the workability of the rear lights. [*3]

Cara Grant, the defendant's wife, did not testify credibly. Her testimony that Officer Jablonski complied when she told him to get in the vehicle and push the brake pedal is implausible. Furthermore, she gave conflicting testimony regarding the vehicle documentation she brought to the precinct. On one hand, she testified that she brought her license to the precinct without proof of ownership. On the other hand, she testified that she brought the bill of sale and the loan papers to the precinct. Moreover, the court does not credit her testimony that Officer Jablonski released the vehicle to her without giving him any proof of ownership. Nor is her testimony credible that in the parking lot the taillight was working. As the defendant's wife, she has an interest in the outcome of this case.

Neither does the court credit defendant's testimony. It is incredible to believe Officer Jablonski did not ask the defendant for his name until they were both at the precinct and that Officer Jablonski never asked the defendant for his date of birth or his address. The court does not credit the defendant's testimony that only Officer Jablonski drove defendant in the unmarked police car to the precinct, especially in light of the fact that the unmarked car had no partition between the back seat where the defendant sat and the front seat. Finally, the court does not credit defendant's testimony that he never told an officer who owned the vehicle. When asked how he expected his wife to pick up the vehicle if he did not tell the officer she owned it, the defendant said "I don't know.". The defendant is an interested witness in this case.

In People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341[2001], the Court of Appeals held that an automobile stop is reasonable when an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. In this instance, where the violation consisted of a defective taillight, the police acted lawfully (People v Jackson, 241 AD2d 557 [2d Dept 1997]; People v Bonsignore, 133 AD2d 771 [2d Dept 1987]). As a consequence of such a lawful stop the police may direct a driver to step out of his car out of concern for their safety "even though they lack any particularized reason for believing the driver possesses a weapon" (People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, 774 [1989]). Under these circumstances and upon demand of the police, the operator is required to furnish the automobile registration and all information concerning his license to operate the vehicle (People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413, 416 [1975]). The defendant's failure to produce a valid driver's license was presumptive evidence that he was not duly licensed and justified his immediate arrest (People v Grear, 232 AD2d 578, 579 [2d Dept 1996]; People v Watson, 177 AD2d 676 [2d Dept 1991]).

Because defendant was the sole occupant of the car and could no longer legally operate

it, the police were authorized to impound it (People v Figueroa, 6 AD3d 720, 722 [2d Dept 2004]; People v Jackson, supra). That Officer Jablonski testified that he intended to "voucher" the vehicle is of little consequence. By taking possession of the vehicle under these circumstances and transporting it to the precinct, the police became custodians of the vehicle and effectively and lawfully impounded it by such action.

Once impounded the vehicle was subject to an inventory search (People v Johnson, 1 NY3d 252, 255 [2003]). An inventory search serves "to protect the property of the defendant, to protect the police against any claim of lost property, and to protect police personnel and others from any dangerous instruments" (Id. at 256). The inventory search must be conducted pursuant to "an established procedure clearly limiting the conduct of individual officers that assures that the searches are carried out consistently and reasonably" (Id. quoting People v Galak, 80 NY2d [*4]715, 719 [1993]). The procedure must be standardized and must limit the officer's discretion (Id.).

Here the inventory search procedure was set forth in the New York City Police Department Patrol Guide, section 218-13, and the invoicing procedure was set forth in section 218-01. This court finds that the regulations represent standardized procedures and that they are rationally designed to meet the objectives of an inventory search. The three purposes of inventory searches of automobiles set forth in section 218-13 paraphrase the language in Johnson and thus adequately satisfied Johnson in that regard. This section also sets forth the procedure the officer is to follow and limits the discretion of the individual officer. For example, the trunk and the glove compartment can only be forced open if it can be done with minimal damage unless there are other extenuating circumstances.

The court finds that the presence of Sergeant Pignatelli placed another limitation on the exercise of Officer Jablonski's discretion. He was knowledgeable about the procedures and limitations of an inventory search and would have stopped Officer Jablonski had Officer Jablonski failed to comply with section 218-13. The court finds that Officer Jablonski followed the procedure in Patrol Guide Sub-section 218-13 and 218-01. Consequently, this court concludes that the inventory search complied with the requirements of Johnson and was lawful.

In conclusion, defendant's motion to suppress the firearm is denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

E N T E R ,

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J. S. C.