Plaintiffs, Anthony and Jessica Olsovi (hereinafter, Olsovi), have motioned this court for leave to reargue this court's decision, dated the 17th day of April, 2007, which, inter alia, dismissed their Labor Law §246(1) claim, on the ground that the defendant Shore Hill Housing Company, Inc. (hereinafter, Shore Hill), had ". . .not moved for summary judgment on the inapplicability or non-specificity of the Industrial Code regulations pled by [them]. The regulations [12 NYCRR §23-1.21[3] requiringuse of ladders in good condition; §23-1.21[3] requiring use of properly secured ladder; and §23-1.7 [d] requiringnon-slippery surfaces] are applicable and were violated; the violations resulted in plaintiff's injuries; defendant's generalized assertions to the contrary were based on the argument that the work was not construction-related, which was rejected in this court's decision."

Shore Hill, in response, has petitioned this court for dual relief; 1. reversal of that portion of the afore-mentioned order which denied its motion for summary dismissal of the Olsovis' Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1) claims; and 2. denial of plaintiffs' request for leave to reargue dismissal of their Labor Law §241(6) claim on the grounds that ". . .plaintiff was not engaged in constructing or demolishing the building at SHORE HILL; plaintiff was not working in an area in which construction, excavation or demolition work was being performed; and the Industrial code Section[s] that plaintiff alleged were violated in his Bill of Particulars were not applicable to this case in that they are general provisions that cannot serve as a predicate for liability under Labor Law §241(6) or are factually inapplicable to the instant case." In addition, ". . .nowhere in plaintiff's untimely Notice of Cross-Motion[,] filed beyond the 60 day rule in Kings County and without good cause is there any mention of plaintiff's 241(6) claim and purported violations of the Industrial Code." In other words, Olsovi never before alleged the Industrial Code violations that he now asserts in his motion for reargument.

This court, in its 17th day of April, 2007 decision, now being reargued, ruled as follows, "On June 5, 2003, Anthony Olsovi, a plumber's helper employed by P.R. Plumbing & Heating, Inc. (hereinafter, PR Plumbing), fell when the extension ladder on which he had been standing slid out from underneath him as he attempted to close the main waste line trap that he was [*2]snaking/jet pumping at the Shore Hill senior citizen apartment building, located at 9000 Shore Road, in Brooklyn, NY. . . .the plaintiff argues that his injury was dually caused by the defective foot pad guards on the ladder that he was utilizing and the absence of any safety equipment to prevent or cushion his fall. To the contrary, the defendant asserts that Mr. Olsovi's own carelessness resulting from his failure to have followed his training and the posted instructions on the ladder; to wit, to have someone hold it, was the proximate cause of his injury, particularly since the floor on which he was working was wet. . . .While the photographs offered by Shore Hill tend to refute the assertion by Mr. Olsovi that the subject ladder's foot pads were in any way defective, they do not definitively resolve the color and/or condition of the pads on the accident date. Questions of fact also abound as to whether or not Shore Hill's director of maintenance exercised any supervisory control over the operation sufficient to attach liability under the common law or under Labor Law §200, or whether the ladder purportedly furnished by Shore Hill was adequate for the contemplated cleaning (of a structure of a non-one or two family dwelling); i.e., whether a hazard contemplated in §240(1) existed. . . .Clearly, however, Mr. Olsovi has failed to establish any violation of an Industrial Code provision which sets forth specific safety standards required to result in liability under §246, or to give good cause for the late submission of his request for partial summary judgment under Labor Law §240(1). . . .Wherefore, on the basis of all of the foregoing, Mr. Olsovi's request for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, pursuant to Labor Law §240 (1) is denied. Shore Hill's motion, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgement on the issue of liability under Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1) are likewise denied. Its request, however, for dismissal of the plaintiff's claim pursuant to Labor Law §246 is granted. This constitutes the decision and order of this Court."

This court, in arriving at its aforenoted decision, concluded that, 1. "[t]he objective of a motion for summary judgment is "issue-finding, not issue-determination[;]" 2. "[i]n assessing such a motion, the "court should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party" (see Assaf v. Ropog Cab Corp., 153 AD2d 520, 544 NYS2d 834 [1989]); 3. the defendant offered photographs of the purported subject ladder, the affidavit of a product safety engineer from the Louisville Ladder Corp., the deposition testimony of the plaintiff, and affidavits of its director of maintenance in support of its motion, while plaintiff's counsel referenced the deposition testimonies. The specific Industrial code regulations; to wit, [12 NYCRR §23-1.21[3] requiringuse of ladders in good condition; §23-1.21[3] requiring use of properly secured ladder; and §23-1.7 [d] requiringnon-slippery surfaces] had not been previously asserted by the plaintiffs either in their summary judgment motion or in defense of the defendant's. No reasonable justification has been furnished by the plaintiffs for this omission.

A motion to reargue requires that its proponent establish that the Court has "overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts, or misapplied any controlling principle of law. Its purpose is not to serve as a vehicle to permit the unsuccessful party to argue once again the very questions previously decided." (See CPLR §2221; Foley v. Roche, 68 AD2d 558, 418 NYS2d 588). In addition, such a motion must be made within thirty days of the order that it seeks to affect (See CPLR R2221(d) 1. and 2.; Foley v. Roche, supra ). A motion to renew must set forth "new facts not offered on the prior motion that could change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination; [and it must] contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior [*3]motion."(See CPLR R2221(e) 2. and 3.).

The motion and cross-motion for reargument presently before the Court, while meeting the procedural component therefor, fail to fulfill the substantive requirement; i.e., they have not presented any overlooked, misapprehended, or new facts, the misapplication of any controlling law or change in the law that would alter this Court's prior determination. More to the point, this Court has previously ruled on the very issues again sought to be litigated. The instant motion and cross-motion are therefore denied in their entirety.

This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

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HON. Yvonne Lewis