On February 11, 2005, plaintiff applied to the New York City Business Integrity Commission (hereafter "BIC")^[FN1] for an exemption from its licensing requirements, and for the issuance of a registration enabling it to operate An unlicensed trade waste business "solely engaged in the removal of waste material resulting from building demolition, construction, alteration or excavation". Local Law No. 42 (New York City Administrative Code §§16-501 et seq [effective June 3, 1996]) empowers the BIC to review and determine exemption applications, and to issue such trade waste registrations. Ultimately, the BIC denied plaintiff's application on the ground that Edcia had failed to demonstrate its eligibility for either (see Defendants' Exhibit "D"). As a result, plaintiff commenced this hybrid action on or about April 14, 2006, inter alia, to declare that it was exempt from the requirements of Local Law No. 42 and permanently enjoin defendants from taking any enforcement action against it for hauling away trade waste without a license ^[FN2]. In moving for summary judgment, defendants claim that the trade waste licensing and regulatory scheme enacted in 1996 and codified in New York City Administrative Code §§16-501 et seq. (Local Law No. 42) was properly construed to deny plaintiff's application, and that the action should be dismissed.

In opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion, Alicia DiMichele, the President of Edcia Corporation, claims that under the provisions of Local Law 42, a person or entity engaged in the removal of demolition debris from non-commercial premises is ipso facto exempt from its licensing provisions so long as that person or entity has never previously engaged in or served as a principal of an entity that required licensing by the BIC. Ms. DiMichele further claims that Edica's "business is comprised of eighty percent public governmental projects and twenty percent projects that are totally unrelated to commercial establishments". Accordingly, plaintiff claims that since it does not engage in the removal of "commercial" waste, it requires no operating exemption under Local Law No. 42.

The Court disagrees.

The granting or denial of an application for an exemption under Administrative Code [*2]

§16-505(a) is not a ministerial act, nor is there clear legal right thereto (see Matter of Attonito v. Maldonado, 3 AD3d 415, 418, lv denied 2 NY3d 705). In addition, plaintiff's claim of exemption because it is not engaged in the removal of trade waste from commercial establishments is not only at odds with defendants' interpretation of the regulations, but clearly contradicts plaintiff's exemption application dated February 2005, wherein it specifically lists "commercial construction sites" as the type of site from which the applicant removes waste (see Defendants' Exhibit "B"). Finally, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff's business is limited in scope to the removal of construction and demolition debris from residential and governmental sites, the Court must defer to that interpretation of the applicable sections of the Administrative Code adopted by the agency charged with its enforcement, i.e., the BIC, which has focused its licensing requirements on the commercial or non-commercial nature of the entities or establishments that generate the trade waste, rather than on the location from which the waste is removed. In the opinion of this Court, this interpretation has a rational basis in the law, and is neither arbitrary nor capricious (see Matter of Salvati v Eimicke, 72 NY2d 784, 791; Rapid Demolition Container Services v. Maldonado 21 AD3d 812, lv denied 6 NY3d 709). In fact, the Appellate Division for the Second Department has recently held that construction and demolition debris removed from residential and other so-called "non-commercial" sites was properly subjected to the licensing requirements of the BIC so long as the debris itself was generated during, e.g., construction and/or demolition performed by a commercial establishment (see DeCostole Carting, Inc. v. Maldonado, 35 AD3d 648; Administrative Code §16-501[f]). As a result, it is a matter of no importance for purposes of Local Law 42 whether the site at which the waste was generated may be characterized as commercial or non-commercial.

In view of the foregoing interpretation of Local Law No. 42, plaintiff's affirmation in opposition fails to raise any triable issue of fact. Taken together, both defendants' interpretation of the law and plaintiff's original application for an exemption virtually compel the conclusion that the latter is engaged in the business of collecting the trade waste of "commercial establishments" within the meaning of the cited provisions of the Administrative Code and, therefore, is required to obtain either a license or an exemption from the BIC (see Administrative Code § 16-505).

We have considered plaintiff's other arguments, including those tendered in its attorney's affirmation, and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted; and it is further,

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that plaintiff Edica Corporation is subject to the provisions of Local Law No. 42 (1996), including, with limitation, the requirements set forth in New York City Administrative Code §16 -505(a); and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment in accordance herewith.

ENTER,

/s/ Philip G. Minardo________

J.S.C.

DATED: October 18, 2007