Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Jack M. Battaglia, J.), entered April 17, 2006. The order denied defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to produce an authorization for a New York City Fire Department ambulance call report.

Order reversed without costs, defendant's motion to compel granted and plaintiff is directed to provide defendant with a proper HIPAA-compliant authorization for a New York City Fire Department ambulance call report within 30 days after the date of the order entered hereon.

This personal injury action, arising out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred in July of 2000, was commenced in the Supreme Court, Kings County.
Plaintiff filed a note of issue and certificate of readiness in September of 2004, and the matter was subsequently transferred, in January of 2006, to the Civil Court, Kings County, pursuant to CPLR 325 (d). Upon transfer, the matter was placed on the trial calendar (22 NYCRR 208.15). In April of 2006, defendant moved for an order directing plaintiff to provide it with an authorization pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42 USC § 1320d et seq; hereinafter HIPAA) to accompany a subpoena duces tecum for a New York City Fire Department (FDNY) ambulance call report. Plaintiff refused to execute a HIPAA-compliant authorization, arguing that the call report should have been obtained during pretrial disclosure, prior to the filing of the note of issue. The court below denied defendant's motion with leave to renew upon a showing that the FDNY ambulance call report was not readily available to defendant prior to the filing of the note of issue. Defendant did not renew the motion but instead appealed, contending that plaintiff should have been required to provide the authorization since the report was a relevant medical document for use at trial.

The fact that a case has been placed on the trial calendar does not preclude a party from seeking to obtain evidence for trial by the use of a subpoena duces tecum. Subsequent to the [*2]lower court's decision herein, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Singh v Friedson (36 AD3d 605, 606 [2007]), distinguished between "pretrial discovery and the marshaling of evidence for trial by the use of a subpoena duces tecum." In the Singh case, the Appellate Division affirmed an order granting a defaulting defendant's motion to compel a plaintiff to execute HIPAA-compliant medical authorizations to accompany a subpoena duces tecum for the production of plaintiff's medical records at a damages inquest.

In the instant case, defendant sought not to reopen discovery, but rather to subpoena a nonparty for a medical record which was relevant and material to plaintiff's claimed injury. The only mechanism available to ensure compliance with the subpoena was a motion to compel plaintiff's execution of a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization (id.; see also CPLR 3106 [b] [requiring that a subpoena be served on a nonparty witness]; CPLR 3121 [a] [requiring a plaintiff to provide a duly executed and acknowledged written authorization for the release of pertinent medical records]). Accordingly, defendant's motion should have been granted.

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Belen, JJ., concur.