| Matter of Nespoli v Doherty |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 52048(U) [17 Misc 3d 1117(A)] |
| Decided on September 28, 2007 |
| Supreme Court, New York County |
| Kahn, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
In the Matter of the
Application of Harry Nespoli, as President of the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association, Local
831 I.B of T., And the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association, Local 831 I.B. of T., Petitioners,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
against John J. Doherty, as Commissioner of the Department of Sanitation of the City of New York, the Department of Sanitation of the City of New York, Martha K. Hirst, as Commissioner of the Department of Citywide Administrative Services, and the City of New York, Respondents. |
Petitioners Harry Nespoli ("Nespoli"), as president of the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association, Local 831, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, (the "union") and the union have moved this court for an order and judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") vacating and annulling the administrative action of respondents which extended the probationary period for all newly appointed sanitation workers of respondent Department of Sanitation of the City of New York ("DSNY") from twelve months to eighteen months as arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion (motion sequence no. 1). Respondents have opposed the application, and the matter is currently pending before this court.
On this motion (motion sequence no. 2), petitioners seek leave of court to obtain "limited" discovery of respondents pursuant to CPLR §408 in aid of the underlying proceeding. Respondents oppose the application as unnecessary.
For the reasons stated, petitioners' application for limited discovery is granted, as set forth
below.
I.BACKGROUND
A.Motion Sequence No. 1
On or about February 7, 2007, the Department of Citywide Administrative Services ("DCAS") by its Commissioner, respondent Martha K. Hirst ("Commissioner Hirst"), issued a notice of examination for its June 9, 2007 sanitation worker civil service examination which stated that successful candidates who were hired by DSNY would be subject to an eighteen-month probationary period, which would apply to all sanitation workers appointed from the eligible list thereafter. (Affid. of William Klimowicz, sworn May 24, 2007 ["Klimowicz Affid."], attached as Exh. 1 to Verified Answer of Respondents ["Ver. Answ."], ¶14; Ver. Answ., at 3). Sometime prior to that date, respondent John J. Doherty, Commissioner of DSNY ("the Commissioner" or Commissioner Doherty") had requested, and Commissioner Hirst had approved, the probationary period extension. (Verified Petition ["Pet."], Exh. B).
On February 15, 2007, Nespoli complained to Commissioner Doherty about the lengthening of the probationary period for all newly appointed sanitation workers from twelve months [FN1] to eighteen months in the absence of any consultation with the union. (Pet., Exh. A). On [*2]February 20, 2007, the Commissioner responded to Nespoli, confirming the change, and stating that the lengthened probationary period was warranted due to "experience and education requirements, and the new entry level salary for the job." (Pet., Exh. B).
Petitioners commenced an Article 78 proceeding to annul the administrative action of DSNY and DCAS, alleging that it lacks a rational basis justifying an across-the-board extension of the probationary period. (Pet., at 4). Respondents contend that the decision is rationally based, in that the extended period will provide more time to train and evaluate newly hired employees, resulting in safer and more effective job performance. (Ver. Answ., at 6-8, 12).
B.Motion Sequence No. 2
In defense of their position, respondents rely on representations by Commissioner Doherty that the administrative action was neither arbitrary nor capricious. (Affid. of John J. Doherty, sworn May 24, 2007, attached as Exh. 2 to Ver. Answ. of Respondents ["Doherty Affid."]). In his affidavit, the Commissioner cites certain statistical information derived from the records of DSNY to establish respondents' contention that his decision was rationally based. (Id.).[FN2] Petitioners allege that they are unable to respond in a meaningful way to the statistics the [*3]Commissioner provides, because respondents proffer no documentary support for the statistics beyond the Commissioner's own conclusory representations. (Affirm. of Ernst H. Rosenberger, Esq., affirmed June 8, 2007, attached to Petitioners' Motion for Discovery ["Rosenberger Affirm."], at 3.) Accordingly, petitioners now seek limited disclosure of certain books and records in DSNY's possession in order to ascertain the factual basis of respondents' statistical averments.[FN3] (Rosenberger Affirm., at 4). [*4]
Respondents counter that petitioners have failed to
demonstrate how the discovery of the books and records sought will aid the court in its resolution
of the petition, and argue that the Doherty Affidavit provides ample rational basis to support the
administrative action. (Affirm. of Jonathan Bardavid, Esq. in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion
for Discovery, affirmed July 20, 2007, at 3).
II.DISCUSSION
Although disclosure is not prohibited in Article 78 proceedings, it is only available upon leave of court. (CPLR §408). Due to the summary nature of special proceedings, and the tendency of discovery to prolong litigation, courts should grant discovery only upon a demonstrated need for such relief. (Town of Pleasant Valley v. New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs., 253 AD2d 8, 15 [2nd Dept. 1999]). The information sought must be "material and necessary" to the prosecution or defense of the proceeding. (Id., quoting CPLR §3101[a]). As observed by the Appellate Division, Second Department in Town of Pleasant Valley, the Court of Appeals has determined that:
" material and necessary'" should be "interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason." (Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406).
In the present case, although couched in terms of their need to reply to respondents' answer, petitioners' reason for seeking discovery of seven categories of data maintained by DSNY is, in practical terms, to aid them in furnishing information to the court that the statistically-based arguments advanced by the Commissioner in support of respondents' actions are without basis in fact. Although the Commissioner does offer some limited statistical support for his position (see Doherty Affid., at 5,7 and 8), it is proffered without attribution or context.
It seems clear that petitioners need access to the data they are seeking in order to address, and give the court access to, the factual basis for the Commissioner's conclusions. (Margolis v. New York City Transit Auth., supra). Certainly, this court's interpretation of the "material and necessary" standard need not be very liberal in order to conclude that access to the underlying data would aid the court in evaluating respondents' contentions of rational bases in fact for the extension of the probationary period. Although respondents are correct in stating that citation of statistical evidence was not a prerequisite to their successful defense of this proceeding, that is the defense they have chosen. Access to the underlying data is therefore material and necessary to petitioner's prosecution of the proceeding as well as to this court's resolution of it.
The Pleasant Valley court further observed:
Generally, the trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying disclosure . . ., although it must balance the needs of the party seeking discovery against opposing interests as expedition and confidentiality . . . .
Here, none of the records sought by petitioners are cloaked in privilege or confidentiality.
Moreover, respondents have not demonstrated that production of these materials would be
prejudicial or unduly burdensome, nor that their disclosure would cause undue delay of these
proceedings. Absent any such considerations, disclosure relevant to the issues at hand is deemed
material and necessary, and subject to discovery. (Town of Pleasant Valley v. New York
State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs., supra, 253 AD2d at 16).
III.CONCLUSION
Accordingly, petitioners' motion for discovery pursuant to CPLR §408 is granted, to the extent indicated herein. Respondents Doherty and DSNY are directed to provide the following documents to petitioners within 45 days of service of this order and notice of entry upon them: a) [*6]all documents reflecting the number of sanitation workers, in total and as broken down by length of employment, for each year, 2003 through 2006 [FN5], inclusive; b) all documents reflecting the number of sanitation workers whose probationary periods were extended on an individual basis, and the number of sanitation workers who refused to consent to such extension, for each year, 2003 through 2006, inclusive; c) all documents reflecting the number of accidents involving sanitation workers and a breakdown of accidents reflecting the length of employment of the sanitation workers involved, for each year, 2003 through 2006, inclusive; d) all documents reflecting the number of disciplinary complaints resulting in disciplinary action [FN6] and/or charges against sanitation workers and a breakdown of all such complaints reflecting the length of employment of the sanitation workers involved, for each year, 2003 through 2006, inclusive; e) all documents reflecting the number of arrests of sanitation workers and a breakdown of arrests reflecting the length of employment of the sanitation workers involved, for each year, 2003 through 2006; and f) all documents reflecting any additional training respondents intend to implement for sanitation workers.
Petitioners are granted 30 days after the conclusion of the discovery period within which to file a supplemental reply in motion sequence no. 1. Respondents are granted 20 days after the filing and service upon them of the supplemental reply for the filing of any supplemental sur-reply.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this court.
E N T E R:
Marcy L. Kahn, J.S.C.
DATED: New York, New York
September 28, 2007