| Matter of Shafer v Dorsey |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 52562(U) [21 Misc 3d 1109(A)] |
| Decided on August 9, 2007 |
| Supreme Court, Albany County |
| Devine, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
In the Matter of the
Application of Howard A. Shafer, Objector and Candidate Aggrieved, and Susan E. Shafer,
Objector, Petitioners,
against Leo E. Dorsey, Jr., Candidate and the Albany County Board of Elections, Respondents. |
Petitioner has made an application, in a proceeding pursuant to Election Law
§ 16-102 for an Order declaring invalid the designating petition naming Leo E. Dorsey as
the candidate for [*2]public office of Member, Albany County
Legislature in the 36th Legislative District in Albany County in the September 18, 2007
Democratic and Independence Parties Primary Election. Petitioner also requests this Court
restrain the respondent Albany County Board of Elections (Board) from placing Mr. Dorsey's
name on the ballot in the Primary Election to be held on September 18, 2007 for both parties.
The petition was brought by Order to Show Cause returnable August 10, 2007. This Court, in an effort to expedite this matter requested the parties appear in Court on August 6, 2007. The parties did appear and were unable to conclude, due to witness unavailability, therefore the Court recessed the hearing on this matter to August 8, 2007.
The full hearing was conducted before this Court on August 8, 2007. The Court heard from four witnesses; Sgt. Scoons, respondent Dorsey, and petitioners Howard and Susan Shafer. The Court took into evidence twenty of petitioners' exhibits (numbered 1-20 consecutively), thirteen of respondent Board's exhibits (labeled A-M consecutively), and two of respondent Dorsey's exhibits (labeled A and B). As a group the witnesses appeared to be generally credible. Although three out of the four witness are a party to this action, and clearly interested in the outcome of this proceeding, their testimony was frank and candid and the Court credits most of their testimony. The Court has examined the physical exhibits entered into evidence by either stipulation or approval of this Court and finds it all worthy of consideration, but not of the same weight.
Before addressing the Findings of Fact, the Court must first address respondent Dorsey's assertion of August 6, 2007 that the petition and specifications of objections contained only conclusory statements and did not contain a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Respondent renewed this objection at the continuation of the hearing held on August 8, 2007.Reference in the pleadings to the objections and specifications of objections filed with respondent Board, coupled with the general statements in the petition has been held to sufficiently apprise the respondent of the allegations being made against the designating petition.[FN1] The specification of objections filed with the Board, states:
"[t]he said Leo E. Dorsey, Jr., does not now have a bona fide residence at 296 Creble Road, Selkirk, New York or any other place within Albany County's 36th Legislative District and is therefore ineligible by virtue of the provisions of election Law Sections 6-132 and 1-104 to be a candidate for the public office Albany County Legislator, 36th Legislative District. Further, the said Leo E. Dorsey, Jr., has not had a bona fide residence within Albany County's 36th Legislative District for a period of one year prior to the date which he would assume the office of Albany County Legislator, 36th District (January 1, 2008) if he were to be elected as is required by the Albany County Charter, Section 202."[FN2]
It is clear to this Court that the respondent was sufficiently apprised of the challenge to his residence at 296 Creble Road. Petitioners' failure to name the alleged residence of respondent Dorsey (39 Peel Street) does not dilute the challenge. Respondent Doresey's ability to prepare a [*3]defense was not hindered, in that it was clear that the location and duration of his residence were at issue. Therefore this Court holds and determines that the pleadings were sufficient and the hearing held on residence and duration thereof was proper.
Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, I make the following Findings of Fact:
It is petitioner's burden to present clear and convincing evidence of respondent's residence, or fixed and permanent home.[FN10] The Election Law defines residence as "that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located, always intends to return."[FN11] According to People v. O'Hara, the definition of "residence" originates from traditional notions of domicile, and the determination of an individual's residence is dependent upon an individual's expressed intent and conduct.[FN12] "New York courts have recognized that in this modern and mobile society, an individual can maintain more than one bona fide residence,"[FN13] and crucial factors in determining if an individual is qualified to register to vote from a particular residence is whether he or she has manifest an intent to "adopt that residence as a permanent and principal home, coupled by his or her physical presence there, without an aura of sham.' "[FN14]
However, for the purposes of the Election Law, one cannot create an address solely for [*8]the purpose of circumventing residency requirements.[FN15] As the Court of Appeals explained in People v. O'Hara, an individual having two residences may choose one to which he has legitimate, significant, and continuing attachment as his residence for purposes of the Election Law.[FN16]
The Albany County Charter Section 202 provides:" ... All County Legislators shall be
electors of the County and have been residents continuously in the County and the district
represented for at least one year prior to taking office. Each County Legislator shall reside in the
district from which that County Legislator seeks election at the time of nomination for office, and
continue to be a resident of the County and of the district within the County which she represents
for the entire term of her office, subject, however ..."[FN17]
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Petitioner bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent Dorsey's Creble Road address does not constitute a residence, or if it does that it was not his residence prior to January 1, 2007, as defined by Election Law Section 1-104(22). This Court holds and determines that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing sufficient to cast into doubt Dorsey's Creble Road residence based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing. Not only did petitioner fail to meet its evidentiary burden but, petitioners' proof ( ie., Sgt. Scoons' testimony regarding the December 2006 conversation with the respondent, the respondent's voter registration card of October 2006, and the STAR exemption applications) tend to bolster respondent's position as to duration and residency.
Petitioner provided this Court with evidence regarding respondent Dorsey's involvement in the fire district. Petitioner's witness Sgt. Scoons testified that he became aware at the fire department's holiday party, in December 2006, that respondent Dorsey was moving outside the fire district, and therefore unable to continue as an elected commissioner. Although, respondent Dorsey's resignation was not finalized until May 2007, the fire district took his December 2006 statement of his relocation so seriously as to work with their attorney, to keep respondent Dorsey involved in the fire district, by creating a position he could hold, regardless of his residence. Petitioner's own witness revealed that in December 2006 respondent Dorsey intended 296 Creble Road to be his residence.
Petitioner's next presentment of proof involved respondent Dorsey's STAR tax exemption forms. Petitioner relies on the fact that respondent Dorsey did not change his residency for STAR purposes until July 2007. However, respondent Dorsey testified that he was called by the Town of Bethlehem in July to come in and fill out his STAR forms. The STAR forms may only be completed during the month of July. Respondent Dorsey, at this first opportunity since July 2006 to complete STAR forms, did in fact change his address to 296 Creble Road. [*9]
Petitioners also rely on the fact that respondent Dorsey's vehicles where not registered at 296 Creble Road. This Court notes, that no evidence was presented that these vehicles needed the registration renewed within the last year. The evidence shows that similar to the STAR exemptions, respondent Dorsey was not proactive in changing his address. The evidence merely shows that when the opportunity arose to change his residence (by the State sending a renewal application), respondent Dorsey may or may not have proceeded to list 296 Creble Road as his residence. It neither proves or disproves his residence.
Petitioner also relied on the voter registration cards of respondent Dorsey as an indicator of residence. Although respondent Dorsey's voter registration has changed a number of times in the last few years, he is currently, and has been since October 2006, registered to vote at 296 Creble Road.
Petitioners' attempt to demonstrate that respondent Dorsey maintained another residence at Peel Street is misplaced and petitioners' evidence concerning documents which list Peel Street as respondent Dorsey's address are insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof imposed upon petitioners.
This Court has been provided with respondent's drivers license issued in 2005 which lists his address as 296 Creble Road and with deeds revealing respondent Dorsey is an owner of the Creble Road property. Respondent Dorsey's drivers license, voter registration, STAR application for 2007 and his statements at the holiday party all reveal he is a resident of 296 Creble Street and it is his intention to make 296 Creble Road his permanent home.
Respondent Dorsey maintains a physical and financial connection with Creble Road and has expressed under oath his intention to make Creble Road his family's permanent home. Creble Road is not only his, but his entire family's home, which at least he, always hopes they will all return. Respondent Dorsey's past and present ownership of Creble Road, when combined with his physical presence there (including sleeping there occasionally and regularly maintaining the interior and exterior) alone are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Election Law 1-104(22). However, the testimony concerning respondent Dorsey's conversations with Sgt. Scoons in December 2006 clearly demonstrates he established residency at Creble Road, outside the boundaries of the Delmar Fire District but within the 36th Legislative District. Based upon the uncontroverted proof of respondent Dorsey and Sgt. Scoons concerning his resignation due to change in residence, there is no doubt that respondent Dorsey considered Creble Road to be his address in December 2006.
Respondent argues that the local law purportedly imposing a durational residency requirement of one year on members of the Albany County Legislature is invalid for the reasons set forth in Campbell v. Tunny.[FN18] Based upon the facts, this Court need not address this legal argument as it is clear that respondent Dorsey was a resident of 296 Creble Road at least as early as December 2006 (and maybe even prior to October 2006), and he clearly meets the durational requirement of the Albany County Charter Section 202.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law, this Court holds and determines that petitioner has not met its burden and as such the petition to invalidate respondent [*10]Dorsey's designating petitions should be and the same is hereby dismissed. The determination of the respondent Board is upheld and as such they are not restrained to place the name of Leo E. Dorsey Jr., on the ballot for the primary election to be held on September 18, 2007 for both the Democratic and Independence party lines.
Those arguments not specifically addressed herein are found to be without merit.
This Memorandum shall constitute both the Decision and Order of the Court. This Original
DECISION/ORDER is being sent to respondent's attorney. The signing of this
DECISION/ORDER shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR § 2220. Counsel for the
respondent is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that section with respect to filing,
entry and notice of entry.
SO ORDERED
ENTER
Dated:Albany, New York
August ____, 2007_____________________________________
EUGENE P. DEVINE, J.S.C.
cc: Thomas J. Spargo