| Negron v Topelson |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 03717 [50 AD3d 531] |
| April 24, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| Joann Negron, Plaintiff, v Daniel Grinberg Topelson et al., Defendants. Chrysler Financial Company, LLP, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v Richard Radna, M.D., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. |
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Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP, Lake Success (Gerard S. Rath of counsel), for
respondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (John A. Barone, J.), entered March 30, 2007, dismissing the third-party complaint as barred by General Obligations Law § 15-108 (c), unanimously affirmed, with costs.
The plain language of General Obligations Law § 15-108 (c) bars the contribution claim of the settling defendant/third-party plaintiff against the nonsettling third-party defendant (see Chase Manhattan Bank v Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, 309 AD2d 173, 174 [2003]). As the Court of Appeals has stated, "[S]urrender of the right to contribution is a small price to ask of a defendant who is intent on avoiding litigation" (Rock v Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 39 NY2d 34, 41 [1976]). [*2]
We have considered the third-party plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Mazzarelli, Williams and Sweeny, JJ.