Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Gene Lopez, J.), rendered June 1, 2004. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted aggravated harassment in the second degree and harassment in the second degree.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.

Defendant, while charged with aggravated harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.30 [1]) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]), brought pretrial applications dated November 12, 2002 and November 20, 2002 to dismiss the accusatory instrument for denial of his statutory right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.30). The court below, after the People had waived their lack of receipt of the applications (see People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103 [1986]), denied the applications, finding only 23 days chargeable to the People since the date of arraignment. Based upon the submitted trial transcripts of pre-trial appearances and what is uncontroverted upon this appeal, we likewise are of the opinion that the applications should have been denied, although additional periods of delay should have been charged to the People.

It is uncontroverted that the People's initial declaration of readiness occurred on the date of arraignment, April 24, 2002. From that date until May 9th, there was an excusable delay for proceedings to determine defendant's competency to stand trial (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; CPL art 730). From May 9th to June 17th, the delay was excusable as a period requested by defense counsel (Legal Aid Society) to file pre-trial motions (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). From June 17th to June 26th, the delay was excusable because new 18-B counsel had to be assigned (CPL 30.30 [4] [f]). From June 26th to June 27th, the one-day delay was chargeable to the People due to the failure of the court to have assigned new counsel on the previous day (see id.; cf. People v Melendez, 182 AD2d 644 [1992] [period excludable where counsel absent through no fault of the court]). From [*2]June 27th to July 11th, the delay was excusable due to the court's need to render a decision on a motion by defendant (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). From July 11th to July 18th, the delay was excusable due to the nonappearance of the previously assigned 18-B counsel (CPL 30.30 [4] [f]; People v Melendez, 182 AD2d 644 [1992], supra).

There is no transcript for July 18, 2002, and so it is unclear whether the period between July 18th and September 5th should be chargeable to the People, but it is noteworthy that the People do not directly address defendant's statement on this appeal that the delay is attributable to them because they were not ready when defense counsel Siccardi appeared (cf. People v Accetta, 17 Misc 3d 126[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51807[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). Charging the People with this delay would not, in any event, make the total chargeable period exceed the statutory requirement (as indicated below). The time from September 5th to September 9th is chargeable to the People because of the failure of the police officer to appear without a showing of due diligence by the People to obtain his appearance (see id.). From September 9th to October 1st (the previously scheduled court date for a Huntley hearing), the delay was excusable because of the need for the hearing (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]) and the People's filing of a statement of readiness on September 9th (see generally People v Baumann, 38 AD3d 452, 454 [2007]; People v Tolentino, 258 AD2d 288 [1999]).

There is no transcript for October 1, 2002, but we consider the delay from that date until October 23rd excusable in light of defendant's statement on the appeal that the delay was attributable to defense counsel Siccardi's "Delib. Deficiency for Inappearances" (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; People v Melendez, 182 AD2d 644 [1992], supra). The time from October 23rd until November 12th was chargeable to the People due to the failure of the officer to appear and the failure of the prosecution to exercise due diligence in obtaining said appearance (see People v Accetta, 17 Misc 3d 126[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51807[U] [2007], supra). On November 12th, although defendant's attorney had sent an affirmation of actual engagement and requested an adjournment until December 2, 2002, defendant presented his own application to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial. Thus, the periods from November 12, 2002 to November 20, 2002 (the date of defendant's second application) and from November 20, 2002 to December 2, 2002 (the adjourned date for a hearing) were excusable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a] [b]). Therefore, we conclude that the four delays for which the People could be charged (June 26th to June 27th, July 18th to September 5th, September 5th to September 9th and October 23rd to November 12th) amounted to 74 days, which did not violate the statutory requirement for bringing defendant, who was, as of the time of the applications, being prosecuted for a class A misdemeanor and a violation, to trial within 90 days (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]).

Following a reduction of the class A misdemeanor count to a class B misdemeanor count, i.e., aggravated harassment in the second degree to attempted aggravated harassment in the second degree, defendant was correctly afforded a bench trial rather than a jury trial (see Penal Law § 70.15 [2]; §§ 110.00, 240.30; § 110.05 [8]; CPL 340.40 [2]).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we determine that it was legally sufficient to establish all of the elements of attempted aggravated harassment in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, [*3]240.30 [1]) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]) beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if it be asserted that the case was predominantly one of the complainant's word against defendant's as to the material events that happened, it has been observed that "while a single, though unimpeached, witness need not be believed, so too is the testimony of a single witness sufficient to support a conviction" (People v Arroyo, 54 NY2d 567, 578 [1982]). Nor do we hold, upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]), that the verdict of guilt was against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]). Although defendant offered testimony contradicting complainant's testimony and the People's version of the incident, we remain unpersuaded by such testimony and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Moreover, upon our review of the facts, great deference is to be given to the original fact finder's "opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor" (People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644 [2006]).

The other issues raised herein are either unpreserved for appeal or similarly lacking in merit (see e.g. People v Jones, 2 NY3d 235, 242 [2002]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v Worrell, 110 AD2d 733 [1985]).

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 21, 2008