[*1]
People v Lockwood (Frank)
2008 NY Slip Op 50699(U) [19 Misc 3d 134(A)]
Decided on March 21, 2008
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on March 21, 2008
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : RUDOLPH, P.J., MOLIA and SCHEINKMAN, JJ
2007-688 W CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Frank Lockwood, Appellant.


Appeal from a judgment of the City Court of Peekskill, Westchester County (William L. Maher, J.), rendered April 9, 2007. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, convicted defendant of menacing in the second degree.


Judgment of conviction affirmed.

Upon a review of the record on appeal, we are of the opinion that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]). It is well settled that the credibility of witnesses is a question of fact, and the resolution of issues of
credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, is to be decided by the trier of fact, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]). The determination of the trier of fact should be afforded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86, 88 [1974]).

Contrary to defendant's contention, the People sufficiently proved defendant's intent to commit the offense. In the instant case, even if defendant intended only to play a "joke" on his fellow employees, it is apparent that he accomplished the joke by intentionally placing said co-workers in reasonable fear of physical injury. With respect to defendant's contention that the lower court employed an erroneous standard regarding the requirement of intent, when the court's entire statement is examined in context, it is apparent that the court did not misconstrue the law.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of conviction is affirmed. [*2]

Rudolph, P.J., Molia and Scheinkman, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 21, 2008