Non-party law firm Sankel, Skurman & McCartin, LLP (the Sankel firm) moves, by order to show cause, for an order that: (1) fixes, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475, the charging lien of said firm for legal fees and disbursements, accrued by reason of their representation of defendant M.K. in the underlying matrimonial action {see N.K. v M.K. 17 Misc. 3rd 1101 (A)} , in the sum of $290,762.92, or in the alternative, schedules the matter for a hearing to determine the value of such charging lien; (2) directs, pursuant to 22 NYCRR §1400.5(a), that such lien be recorded against the real properties awarded to defendant, including the marital residence at Brooklyn, New York and "Apartment No. 24" in Jerusalem; (3) issues, pursuant to CPLR 6301, a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining the transfer of the aforesaid properties to defendant pending the hearing and determination of the instant order to show cause; and (4) directs the sum of $125,000.00, reflecting the previous award of this court of attorney's fees to plaintiff in said amount, to be paid and delivered to the Sankel firm, in partial satisfaction of the firm's claim for attorneys' fees herein, or in the alternative allocates said award of attorneys' fees on a proportional basis between the Sankel firm and defendant's prior attorney, Anthony Daniele, Esq. Non-party attorney Anthony R. Daniele, Esq., cross-moves for an order that: (1) fixes, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475, the charging lien of the Law Offices of Anthony R. Daniele for legal fees and disbursements in the sum of $87,765.54 for its prior representation of defendant in the underlying matrimonial action, or in the alternative, scheduling a hearing to determine the value of such charging lien; (2) orders and directs that $87,765.54 of the court's previous award of attorneys fees in favor of the defendant in the sum of $125,000 be paid and delivered to the Law Offices of Anthony R. Daniele in partial satisfaction of said firm's claim for legal fees and disbursements, or in the alternative, allocates said award between said firm and the Sankel firm, in such manner as the court determines to be fair and reasonable.

Defendant opposes the present motion and cross motion on the ground that a hearing is warranted with respect to the actual fees owed to both the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele. Plaintiff takes no position with respect to the substance of either the motion or cross motion, other than to oppose defendant's position that a hearing is warranted with respect to the amount of the requested charging liens and to request that to the extent a lien is imposed on real property that said lien is limited to encumbering the marital residence.

Background

In support of the Sankel firm's instant motion for a charging lien and related relief, William F. McCartin, a member of said firm, submits an affirmation which states, in relevant part, that:

During the course of our attorney-client relationship, and right up until the end of last week when [defendant] decided to retain other counsel, [defendant] has continuously expressed her unqualified appreciation for the [Sankel firm's] legal work and all that we have done for her in her time of great personal need. She has also expressed repeatedly that [the Sankel firm] should be paid in full for our work on the case. In fact, at various times in the past year, she [*2]acknowledged her ever-increasing financial obligation to the Firm, and between July 2006 and March 2007 she signed off on six separate letters acknowledging the amount of our legal fees and disbursements, and agreeing that we would be paid at the end of the case.

The Sankel firm has attached said letters, dated July, 2006, August 4, 2006, October 20, 2006, November 21, 2006, January 15, 2007 and March 16, 2007, to its instant motion. The subject letters were utilized by the Sankel firm as cover letters for the bills it issued to the defendant periodically for legal services accrued in the course of its representation of her, contain the amount due at the time each bill was issued and were countersigned by defendant as confirmation of the obligation to pay said bills at the conclusion of the underlying matrimonial action.

The Sankel firm also appends the affidavit of Mark Plaine, an attorney with the Sankel firm, which was previously submitted to this court in support of the Sankel firm's application for an award of counsel fees, detailing both the legal services performed for defendant during the heavily litigated pre-trial portion of the action and over the course of the 21 day trial, as well as the experience, qualifications and reputation of counsel. Similarly detailed time sheets related to the aforesaid legal services are appended to that affidavit. In addition, Mr. McCartin avers, in his affidavit, that the Sankel firm continued to provide legal services to defendant during the post-trial phase of the action and he submits a thorough account of the legal work performed and the corresponding bills issued.

On or about September 12, 2007, the Sankel firm served a notice of charging lien in the amount of $290,762.92 on the attorney for plaintiff and the current and former attorneys for defendant. Mr. McCartin avers that, to date, it is still owed $290,762.92 from the defendant. Moreover, Mr. McCartin states that defendant has refused to sign an Affidavit for Confession of Judgment for said amount.

Mr. Daniele avers, in an affidavit submitted in support of his cross-motion, in relevant part, that:

My office was originally retained by defendant to represent her in this action on or about January 20, 2005, substituting us for her first attorney, Aaron Weitz, Esq. Defendant entered into a written retainer agreement consistent with the Rules of the Court and paid a retainer of $25,000. She was thereafter billed monthly for our services and disbursements. Defendant terminated our services and retained [the Sankel firm] in March 2006.

During the period that we represented defendant, she was billed $239,254.37 for legal services, representing 658.21 hours, plus an additional $8,978.72 for billable expenses and advances, and an additional $10,616.19 in interest charges as per the retainer agreement. According to our records, a total of $151,488.83 was paid by or on behalf of defendant in connection with our representation in this matter, of which amount this Court twice awarded affirmant a total of $55,000 for interim counsel fees, which was duly paid by plaintiff on or about August 12, 2005 and March 15, 2006. As of February 2007, when I submitted on behalf of defendant an affirmation in support of her application for attorneys fees, defendant was indebted to this office for an additional $87,765.54. Since that time, additional interest has accrued, and the total due on defendant's account is $94,255.13. [*3]

Immediately following our termination, I caused to be filed a notice of Charging Lien, dated March 14, 2006, in the amount of $113,935.99, which was duly served upon both plaintiff and defendant's attorneys.

Shortly thereafter, having received from plaintiff the $35,000 interim counsel fee award from this Court, we served an Amended Notice of Charging Lien in the amount of $80,055.43. On or about August 16, 2007, this court issued a comprehensive decision on all the issues that had been litigated between the parties at trial. Defendant, inter alia, was awarded the sum of $125,000 for attorneys fees. This Court found on page 123 of the decision that my office had an outstanding balance due from defendant in the amount of $87,765.54. Accordingly, we served on or about September 5, 2007 and thereafter filed a Second Amended Notice of Charging Lien in the same $87,765.54 amount that had been found by this Court to be owed to my firm, notwithstanding that at the time with accrued interest defendant actually owed $92,643.19 as per our August 10, 2007 billing statement. I intended that our lien notice correspond with this Court's decision, and I was willing to forgo having the lien include the accrued interest charges.

At or around the conclusion of the trial, Mark Plaine, Esq., the attorney then representing defendant, requested that I prepare and submit an affirmation as part of defendant's application for fees in this action. Accordingly, I then proceeded to prepare my affirmation, to which I annexed all of our billing records. I did not charge defendant for the time devoted to the preparation of the affirmation.

Mr. Daniele has annexed a copy of this affirmation, dated February 23, 2007, to his current affirmation. The February 23, 2007, affirmation contains a detailed description of the legal services rendered to defendant by Mr. Daniele's firm as well as the qualifications, experience and reputation of counsel, both elements of which are central to a determination of the proper fee award.

Plaintiff takes no position on the merits of the instant motion and cross motion. However, in an affirmation submitted by his counsel, Barry Elisofon, Esq., Mr. Elisofson states the following:

Plaintiff intends to pay the $125,000 counsel fee [award to defendant] in a check payable to both Mr. Daniele and Mr. McCartin's office. It should be further noted that Plaintiff will be able to have the $125,000 funds available to him when he sells the Brooklyn apartment. Until that time, Plaintiff intends to file a UCC-1 in favor of Mr. Daniele and Mr. McCartin's office for the $125,000 so as to assure Mr. Daniele and Mr. McCartin's office that Plaintiff will make the payment and the payment is reduced to a secured interest in the property.

Which brings me to the only partial opposition that Plaintiff has to the Order to Show Cause herein. The Queens property and the Brooklyn apartment are presently in Defendant's name and are to be transferred to Plaintiff. If Mr. McCartin's office is granted a money judgment against Defendant, that money judgment will become an encumbrance on the properties destined [*4]to be exclusively Plaintiff's. As to the marital residence, same is presently in joint names and will be transferred to Defendant. While any encumbrance against Defendant will be a lien on that property, that property is going to Defendant anyway so such a lien is not prejudicial. Further, the marital residence is valued at 2.2 million dollars, probably 2.5 million dollars by now, and will be more than sufficient security to insure that the McCartin lien is paid by Defendant.

Defendant opposes the instant motion and cross motion via the submission to this court of an affirmation from her current attorney, Jason Advocate, Esq. In said affirmation, Mr. Advocate states that "[a]fter reviewing the billing records Mr. Daniele attached to his cross-motion, it appears that Mr. Daniele's bills may exceed the value of the services he performed for Defendant." The only such allegedly excessive billing identified by defendant's counsel is that "Mr. Daniele charged Defendant approximately $20,000 in connection with his firm's preparation of her Net Worth Statement. While Mr. Daniele's charges themselves could be deemed excessive, they are even more so when one considers the fact that Defendant also independently paid approximately $15,000 to $20,000 to an accounting firm in connection with the preparation of that Net Worth Statement." Accordingly, defendant allegedly "was charged between $35,000 and $40,000 for the preparation of her Net Worth Statement." Defendant's counsel further states that "[t]here appear to be many other discrepancies in Mr. Danieel's bills, but which we feel would be better served if explored in a hearing rather than on this motion." In addition, defendant's counsel "request[s] a hearing on [the Sankel firm's ] fees, which also appear excessive, particularly in light of defendant's ultimate recovery in this case.

In reply, Mr. Daniele states the following:

Defendant belatedly voices objection to the fees that were charged to her by [the Sankel firm] and my firm during the course of our representation and has requested a hearing of the appropriateness of the charges. And yet, defendant represented and relied upon these fees in her submissions in connection with her request for counsel fees under DRL § 237 [footnote omitted]. Based upon the submissions of counsel, the Court awarded defendant $125,000 for attorneys' fees. Having received a judgment in her favor - the counsel fee award - founded upon the submissions from [the Sankel firm] and me, defendant is barred by the clearly applicable doctrine of judicial estoppel from taking an inconsistent position at this stage of the litigation by contesting the fees charged to her. Accordingly, her request for a hearing on the appropriateness of the fee should be summarily denied and the charging liens requested by [the Sankel firm ] and me be granted.

Even were the doctrine of judicial estoppel inapplicable to the circumstances of this case, is it evident that my firm is entitled to a charging lien in the amount sought. Defendant has failed to demonstrate in her papers why the fees and disbursements that she incurred during the period I represented her are unreasonable. Moreover, as is readily apparent from Exhibit 2 to the Affirmation of Barry Eliofson, just two months ago defendant submitted an updated net worth statement in connection with a counsel fee application listing as part of her liabilities $93,615.47 due to my office and $290,762.92 due [to the Sankel firm]. Clearly, she continues to maintain a position in this action that she has incurred and is liable for these fees.

This Court is sufficiently acquainted with the facts of this case and the work of both [the Sankel firm] and me that any recitation here would be superfluous. Defendant's now fourth attorney, Jason Advocate, has submitted an affidavit on behalf of his client asserting in conclusory fashion that "it appears that Mr. Daniele's bills may exceed the value of the services he performed for Defendant." Advocate Affirm at ¶ 5. The only instance he offers, however, is his assertion that my office charged approximately $20,000 for the preparation of defendant[']s net worth statement. Id. at ¶ 6. Since he has raised this issue, and without conceding the accuracy of his estimate, I will respond in brief fashion.

Lynn C, Amari, who is of counsel to my office, and Jeanne Fitzgerald, paralegal, had primary responsibility for working with defendant in the preparation of her net worth statement. Their applicable hourly rates were $350 and $115, respectively. Ms. Amari, in addition to being an attorney admitted to the Bars of both New York and New Jersey, is a certified public accountant. Both Ms. Amari and Ms. Fitzgerald have had years of experience preparing net worth statements in matrimonial actions. Unfortunately, neither ever encountered the difficulty of completing the task as they did in the instant case. Since I continue to have an ethical and disciplinary rule requirement to avoid making statements that unnecessarily prejudice a former client, suffice it to say for present purposes that these individuals found it difficult to elicit defendant's cooperation and obtain documenting financial records, which we requested in order to fulfill our obligation to certify the net worth statement. This was particularly true with respect to completing that portion of defendant's statement that listed her expenses. Time and time again, defendant insisted that Ms. Amari first hear once again her complaints about her husband - "This is very important" - before she focused on answering questions about her financial circumstances.

Thereafter, following countless, unavailing attempts to gain from our former client the cooperation and documentation required to properly prepare her statement of new [sic] worth, we referred her to the accounting firm of Eisner & Co., which we had previously used in the past to assist us in the preparation of statements for high net worth clients. Ordinarily, this results in some savings to the client, since the hourly charges for a junior accountant ordinarily assigned to the project are significantly less than what attorneys bill. But as this Court noted, defendant incurred $21,159 with the Eisner firm for the preparation of her statement of net worth. Decision After Trial at 118 (Exhibit A) [footnote omitted]. As I recall from the numerous complaints received from the Eisner firm, defendant persisted with the same obstinacy and lack of cooperation as my counsel and paralegal had encountered when they attempted to work with her.

The Court recognized last year in its decision on our application for additional interim counsel fees the substantial time demands that defendant placed upon her attorneys:

It is evident that untold hours have been spent by the wife's counsel with his client in an effort to reach resolution of the various issues before the Court. In fact, at times it has appeared to the Court that trying the case might have been quicker rather than having spent the time the [*5]wife required of her lawyers in settlement conferences and explanations to the events and circumstances. There is no doubt that the wife is both nervous and cautious and that she suffers from an extreme sense of concern over the well being of her daughter and the litigation in general. Decision and Order (Sunshine, J.), dated March 6, 2006 at , (Exhibit B).

At trial, the Court firsthand observed the unrelenting demands the defendant placed upon her attorneys, their staff and the Court itself:

The court recognized that the wife's special needs and the demands that she places upon all who come in contact with her for unfettered access is a costly process. She demanded of and received from the court days upon days of testimony to tell her story and yet she complained . . .

Defendant has failed to raise any genuine issue that the fees charged to her by [the Sankel firm] and my office were unreasonable, particularly in view of the previous findings of this Court that she demanded and exacted a tremendous toll upon her lawyers for unfettered access. It is insufficient for her current attorney to assert that the fees were excessive without demonstration whatsoever of the facts upon which his conclusions rest. One cannot avoid the clear impression that Mr. Advocate's contentions are based on nothing more than his client's desire to avoid her financial obligations to the two law firms that saw her through this very difficult and contentious divorce.

It was not until the first appearance by counsel on this motion that Mr. Advocate [*6]informed the Court and me that his client was objecting to our charges. This notification clearly came too late to defeat our claim against [defendant] based upon account stated.

In addition, Mr. Eliofson submits an affirmation opposing a hearing on the charging lien issue requested by defendant's attorney based primarily on judicial estoppel grounds identical to those raised by both the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele on their respective motions. In addition, he objects to defendant's request for said hearing given her alleged "less than forthright representations" on her most recent net worth statement as well as her claim that she is currently "without funds" and notes that, in light of defendant's alleged financial situation, such a hearing would only serve to further unnecessarily deplete her resources.

Pursuant to a stipulation dated December 14, 2007, the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele have reached an agreement with respect to the allocation of the $125,000 fee award as follows:

1. With respect to the Court award of $125,000 in attorneys fees Anthony R. Daniele and [the Sankel firm] agree that, subject to the following paragraph, said award shall be paid and delivered as follows, within 90 days after entry of judgment in accordance with the Decision herein:

(a) One half (the sum of $62,500) shall be paid and delivered by plaintiff to [the Sankel firm]; and

(b) One half (the sum of $62,500) shall be paid and delivered by plaintiff to Anthony R Daniele, Esq.

2. In the event that the Court determines that the claims of either [the Sankel firm] or [Mr. Daniele] are less that $62,500, the difference between said amount and the amount determined by the Court shall be paid to the other law firm provided that the Court has approved the fees of the latter in at least such amount as equal to what it will receive under this Stipulation. Any excess or unapplied portion of the attorneys' fee award shall be paid to defendant.

3. The charging liens of [the Sankel firm] and [Mr. Daniele] shall be reduced by any and all payments received pursuant to this Stipulation.

4. The claims for legal fees and disbursements by [the Sankel firm] and [Mr. Daniele] shall be reduced by any and all payments received pursuant to this Stipulation.

Accordingly, the only issue before the court is that portion of the instant motion and cross motion seeking an order from this fixing the subject requested charging liens of the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele and authorizing a lien on the real property of defendant sought by the Sankel firm in satisfaction of its current claim for legal fees.

The court finds that both the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele are entitled to the charging liens they seek pursuant to their respective motion and cross motion. It is well settled that "[u]nder Judiciary Law § 475, a charging lien automatically comes into existence, without notice or filing, upon commencement of the action, and is measured by the reasonable value of the [*7]attorney's services in the action, unless fixed by agreement" (Resnick v Resnick, 24 AD3d 238, 239 [1 Dept., 2005]; see also Judiciary Law § 475; Theroux v Theroux, 145 AD2d 625,626 [2 Dept., 1989]; D'Amico v. Nuzzo, 138 AD2d 667, 668 [2 Dept., 1988]). Moreover, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 1400.5:

(a) An attorney may obtain a confession of judgment or promissory note, take a lien on real proprty, or otherwise obtain a security interest to secure his or her fee only where:

(1) the retainer agreement provides that a security interest may be sought;

(2) notice of an application for a security interest has been given to the other spouse; and

(3) the court grants approval for the security interest after an application for counsel fees.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of this section, an attorney shall not foreclose on a mortgage placed on the marital residence while the spouse who consents to the mortgage remains the titleholder and the residence remains the spouse's primary residence.

The court is mindful that, generally, "[w]hen challenged, counsel fees must be proved in an adversarial atmosphere where, upon presentation of testimony, the opposing parties may assert the right to cross-examine" (Weinberg v Weinberg, 95 AD2d 828, 829 [2 Dept., 1983]). A hearing on attorney's fees is particularly warranted where the record before the court is patently deficient to allow for a proper fee determination (see Singer v Singer, 106 AD2d 623, 624 [2 Dept., 1984]). A hearing is not only required in cases where an opposing party seeks to challenge the award of attorney's fees sought by his or her adversary, but also may be necessary to determine the appropriate amount of legal fees due to counsel from his or her own client (see Silver v Silver, 45 AD3d 759, 759 [2 Dept., 2007]).

In the instant matter, however, the court is persuaded by the arguments of both the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele that the subject legal fees represent an enforceable account stated and, therefore, a hearing is not warranted with respect to the amount of fees sought. "An account stated exists where a party to a contract receives bills or invoices and does not protest within a reasonable time" (Bartning v Bartning, 16 AD3d 249, 250 [1 Dept., 2005][finding that court erred in dismissing appellant attorney's claim to fix his fees and impose a lien where the attorney sent out regular invoices, including a final invoice, to which he received no objection from his client and the client also failed to establish that he objected in a timely fashion to the invoices]). An account stated may also be established where there has been an explicit promise to pay the outstanding bill (see Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein, LLP v Ackerman, 280 AD2d 355, 356 [1 Dept., 2001]). The "account stated" cause of action has been held to apply to legal fees accrued in matrimonial matters [see Bartning, 16 AD3d at 249 [1 Dept., 2005]; see also Marshall v Marshall, 264 AD2d 824, 825-826 [[2 Dept., 1999]), lv dismissed in part and denied in part 94 NY2d 899 [2000]; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 4 Misc 3d 447, 450).

Here, it is undisputed that both the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele firm sent numerous bills to defendant for legal services which were never disputed by defendant. Moreover, a number of the Sankel firm bills were countersigned by defendant in acknowledgment that she owed the fees sought. Neither the Sankel firm nor Mr. Daniele were discharged for cause. The court notes that [*8]the submissions by the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele, in support of both their instant motion and cross motion and the prior fee application which resulted in the award by this court of $125,000 in counsel fees to defendant, are voluminous and highly detailed with respect to the legal services performed for defendant and the fees which accrued as a result of same.

In opposition to the motion and cross motion of her prior attorneys, defendant submits the conclusory affirmation of her current attorney and does not submit her own affidavit. Such omission is telling, given her failure to object previously to any of the bills or invoices and in light of her reliance on such bills and invoices in obtaining an award of counsel fees in the amount of $125,000 from plaintiff, her former spouse. The court also notes that, given both her lengthy testimony at trial and her subsequent fee application to the court, the defendant had ample opportunity to raise the issue of alleged excessive fees and yet had failed to do so until the submission of the aforesaid affirmation form her current counsel. Her continued silence on the matter and her attorney's vague, conclusory and wholly unsupported musings that some of the bills "appear" to be excessive only seek to bolster, rather than dispel, the existence of an account stated with respect to the subject legal fees. The court further notes that the only issue addressed with any level of detail by defendant's current counsel - namely the alleged excessive fees incurred with respect to the preparation of defendant's initial net worth statement - has been adequately explained by Mr. Daniele in his reply affirmation. As a result, the court finds that the charging liens sought are properly fixed in the amount requested by both the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele without need for any further hearing on the matter.

The court notes that both the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele also rely upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel to support their contention that they are entitled to receive charging liens fixed in the amount sought in their respective papers without the necessity of a further hearing. The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that "a party is precluded from inequitably adopting a position directly contrary to or inconsistent with an earlier assumed position in the same proceeding" (Nestor v Britt, 270 AD2d 192, 193 [1 Dept., 2000][internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court notes, as previously mentioned, that plaintiff received a sizable fee award based upon the very bills and invoices which she now alleges contain some measure of "excessive" fees. Whatever difficulties may be inherent to challenging the fees of a party's own counsel during said counsel's representation, the court notes that the defendant here regularly received bills and invoices, in some cases countersigned her assent to same, relied upon said bills and invoices in her fee application and never raised any objection to the legal fees claimed by her counsel either throughout the trial or during the pendency of the fee application, despite the institution of such measures by counsel as, for instance, on the part of Mr. Daniele, informing her that questions or concerns about her fees could be discussed with counsel without any further billing attaching to such discussion. Given the court's observation of defendant during the trial and its supervision of the extensive motion practice in this case, the court is satisfied that defendant has not been, at any time during these proceedings, either reluctant or otherwise constrained from airing her concerns on any and all matters related to the subject matrimonial litigation. Accordingly, the court cannot overlook her continued acquiescence, without complaint, to such billing and her ongoing reliance on same for purposes of her fee application and current net worth statements in determining whether a hearing is warranted on the issue. As a result, the court also finds that the arguments advanced by the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele based upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel offer further persuasive support with respect to their [*9]motion and cross motion.

Concerning the application by the Sankel firm for a lien to be recorded against the real properties awarded to defendant in the former marital residence in Brooklyn, New York and "Apartment No. 24," in Jerusalem, the court grants such request pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 1400.5. The Sankel firm has complied with the requirements of said provision. The only objection raised to the application is a request by counsel for plaintiff that said application be limited to placing a lien on the marital residence and not upon "the Queens

property" and "Brooklyn apartment" which are currently in defendant's name and are to be

transferred to plaintiff. The court notes that the Sankel firm has not requested to place a lien on such properties and the court agrees that said lien shall be limited to the marital residence and the "Apartment No. 24 property" (to which no objection was raised by plaintiff) in order to avoid placing an encumbrance upon real property that is to be distributed to plaintiff pursuant to the prior decision and order of this court.

In summary, the court finds that the Sankel firm and Mr. Daniele are both entitled to charging liens fixed in the amounts sought by them and supported by their submissions to the court, taking into account any applicable interest accrued, payments made since the motion and cross motion were brought, if any, and the allocation of the $125,000 prior fee award as between the two firms. The Sankel firm is entitled to a security interest in the form of a lien on real property; to wit, the subject marital residence and "Apartment No. 24" in Jerusalem, both of which were awarded to defendant in the underlying matrimonial action. The temporary restraining order imposed pursuant to the order to show cause shall remain in effect until the subject liens are taken against the aforesaid properties. Said liens are to be so taken within 30 days of the date of the order being signed with notice

of entry.^[FN1]

Settle order on notice with a copy of this decision.

E N T E R:

J. S. C.