Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Fourth District (Gigi A. Spelman, J.), entered September 22, 2006. The order denied defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment.

Order affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action to recover the sum of $2,047.28. The affidavit of service established that defendant was served on June 22, 2005, by the affixation of the summons and verified complaint to defendant's door at her premises located at 188 Overlook Drive, Farmingville, and by mailing same to her last known residence located at 51 Dulittle Street, #1, North Babylon on June 27, 2005. A default judgment was entered against defendant on August 26, 2005. By order to show cause dated August 25, 2006, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment. Defendant alleged in her affidavit that she was away on vacation in July 2005 and she did not receive the summons and complaint.

In opposition to the motion, plaintiff alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because the judgment had been paid. The court below denied the motion on the ground raised by plaintiff.

Contrary to the opinion of the court below, payment of the judgment did not divest the District Court of jurisdiction over the action (see Smithtown Gen. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 111 AD2d 382 [1985]; Pergament Employee Federal Credit Union v Estrada, 2002 NY Slip Op 50577[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2002]). Although the court below did not lack jurisdiction to determine the motion to vacate the default judgment, the order denying the motion should nevertheless be affirmed. [*2]

Defendant failed to rebut the presumption of proper service created by the process server's affidavit (see Roberts v Anka, 45 AD3d 752 [2007]; Anderson v GHI Auto Serv., Inc., 45 AD3d 512 [2007]). Likewise, defendant failed to establish that she did not receive plaintiff's summons and complaint in time to defend the action (see CPLR 317; Burnett v Renne, 32 AD3d 449, 450 [2006]).

In view of the lack of a reasonable excuse for her default, it is unnecessary to consider whether defendant sufficiently demonstrated the existence of a meritorious defense (see Levi v Levi, 46 AD3d 519 [2007]). Accordingly, the order denying defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment is affirmed.

McCabe, J.P., and Scheinkman, J., concur.

Tanenbaum, J., dissents in a separate memorandum.

Tanenbaum, J., dissents and votes to reverse the order and grant defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment in the following memorandum:

In my view, the order denying defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment should be reversed and the motion granted. Defendant established a reasonable excuse for her default and a meritorious defense to the action with respect to the credit card charges at issue, and she should be permitted to present her defense at trial (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138 [1986]).
Decision Date: April 25, 2008