At his arraignment on February 1, 2008, defendant pleaded guilty to obstructing governmental administration in the second degree — the sole count of the accusatory instrument by which he was charged — and was sentenced to a conditional discharge on condition that he perform two days of community service and pay a mandatory surcharge.^[FN1] He moves to withdraw his plea of guilty and to vacate the judgment, contending that his guilty plea was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent.

The court lacks authority to consider defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. "At any time before the imposition of sentence, the court in its discretion may permit a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty . . . to withdraw such plea" (CPL 220.60 [3] [emphasis added]; see also People v Louree, 8 NY3d 541, 546 [2007]; People v Alexander, 97 NY2d 482, 483 [2002]). Sentence having been previously imposed in this case, a plea withdrawal application no longer properly lies. Instead, if defendant is entitled to redress, it must be by means of a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment.

Defendant maintains that the court should not have accepted his guilty plea because [*2]before the plea was offered, his arraignment counsel ^[FN2] made statements that were, defendant avers, inconsistent with his guilt. Based on those statements, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allocution in support of his plea, contending that the transcript of the proceeding at which his guilty plea was taken establishes that the plea was involuntary. Such a record-based claim is, however, unreviewable in a motion to vacate the judgment.

"[T]he court must deny a motion to vacate a judgment when . . . [t]he judgment is, at the time of the motion, appealable or pending on appeal, and sufficient facts appear on the record with respect to the ground or issue raised upon the motion to permit adequate review thereof upon such an appeal; or . . . [a]lthough sufficient facts appear on the record of the proceedings underlying the judgment to have permitted, upon appeal from such judgment, adequate review of the ground or issue raised upon the motion, no such appellate review or determination occurred owing to the defendant's unjustifiable failure to take or perfect an appeal during the prescribed period or to his unjustifiable failure to raise such ground or issue upon an appeal actually perfected by him" (CPL 440.10 [2] [b], [c]).

Since defendant's claim is based in its entirety on the record of his plea proceeding, the motion is, therefore, procedurally barred (see People v Cooks, 67 NY2d 100, 104 [1986] ["When, as will usually be the case, sufficient facts appear on the record to permit the question to be reviewed, sufficiency of the plea allocution can be reviewed only by direct appeal. Only in the unusual situation that sufficient facts with respect to the issue do not appear on the record is a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate available as a means of review" (internal citation omitted)]; People v Angelakos, 70 NY2d 670, 672-673 [1987]).^[FN3]

But even were this court authorized to review defendant's motion on the merits, the motion would be denied. A motion to vacate the judgment must be based on a statutorily enumerated ground (see CPL 440.10 [1]). Here, defendant premises his motion on the ground that the conviction was obtained in violation of a constitutional right (see CPL 440.10 [1] [h]) — specifically, his due process right to require that his guilty plea be accepted only if it has been offered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently (see People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 403 [1995]). Defendant asserts that his plea was invalid because the court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry into his factual guilt.

To be sure, when, during a plea allocution, a defendant "clearly casts significant doubt upon" his guilt, the court is required to conduct further inquiry in order to be sure that the plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent (People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666 [1988]). Here, however, defendant himself at no time said anything inconsistent with guilt. On the contrary, he responded affirmatively to the court's question whether he was pleading guilty "[b]ecause [he was] in fact guilty." Nor does defendant contend that he said otherwise. Rather, his motion is based on statements about the case that his counsel made — before defendant's guilty plea was offered, and [*3]outside of defendant's own allocution. But only when a defendant denies an element of the crime or otherwise casts doubt on his guilt is further inquiry by the court required. Unsupported statements made by defense counsel, later contradicted by defendant's own admission that he was "in fact guilty," are of no moment in assessing the sufficiency of the defendant's plea allocution (cf. Lopez, 71 NY2d at 666 ["where a defendant's factual recitation negates an essential element of the crime pleaded to, the court may not accept the plea without making further inquiry to ensure that defendant understands the nature of the charge and that the plea is intelligently entered" (emphasis added)]).

In any event, counsel's remarks were not in themselves inconsistent with factual guilt. The information filed against defendant alleged that police officers and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) workers "were attempting to render aid to a person lying in the street in apparent need of medical attention, and the defendant prevented the officers and EMS workers to render aid by repeatedly standing in between officials and the person in need of aid, shouting at [the arresting officer], and refusing to comply with police instructions to stand to the side." Defense counsel explained:

"[Defendant] works for John [Heuss] House . . . [I]t's a drop-in center for the homeless. They get calls from the Department of Health Services when there is someone on the street that they think needs to be placed. He got a call and went out. He was talking to this gentleman who was drunk. At the same time, his car was parked by a parking attendant. The attendant asked him to move his car, then this homeless gentleman fell on the floor and hit his head. [Defendant] called EMS. [Defendant] was trying to explain to the police officer what was going on. He was telling him that he had hit his head, not that he was just a drunk guy, and that he was unconscious, not to move him. The police officer was not listening to [defendant]. He was poking him, grabbing him by the jacket, trying to drag him. [Defendant] was trying to explain to the police and to EMS as well. As soon as EMS put him on the stretcher, he asked for their badge and all the information. He was about to leave, then that's when he was arrested. I don't think he was doing anything wrong."

In any event, a defendant need not admit factual guilt in order to plead guilty, as long as the record reflects that the defendant, made aware of the People's evidence, voluntarily chose to enter the plea (see People v Serrano, 15 NY2d 304, 310 [1965]; North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25 [1970]; see also CPL 220.10 [2]; 340.20 [1] [defendant entitled as a matter of right to plead guilty to an information]; People v Gonzalez, 156 AD2d 135, 135 [1st Dept 1989] ["When the circumstances of the plea demonstrate that it was voluntarily and intelligently entered, even the total absence of inquiry into the facts of a crime will not invalidate the plea"]). Here, defendant offered to plead guilty only after the People asserted:

"[T]he officers state that the defendant . . . was in between them, and there was a man lying on the street. The police officers asked the defendant to move to the side multiple times, at which point[] the defendant started accusing the arresting officer of beating the man that was on the ground. The defendant physically placed himself in between the police officers and EMS, and would not move out of the way. The police officers asked him, about a dozen times, to move out of the way. He refused to comply."

Defendant's claim in his motion papers that the court "was not concerned . . . with [defendant's] guilt or innocence and directed [defense counsel's] attention to the matter of bail" is belied by the record. At the very commencement of the arraignment, the People recommended a sentence of ten days in jail in exchange for a guilty plea to the class A misdemeanor with which defendant was charged.^[FN5] In response to the People's plea recommendation, defense counsel, not the court, immediately shifted the discussion to the subject of bail:

[THE PEOPLE]:On a plea to the charge, the People are recommending ten days jail.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]I ask that you ROR my client.

Defense counsel then proceeded to support her request for release on recognizance with [*5]an argument devoted primarily to explaining defendant's conduct during the incident.^[FN6] In response to defendant's application, and in support of their request that bail be set in the amount of $1,000, the People offered an account of the facts intended to demonstrate that defendant's culpability was greater than his counsel had asserted. After defense counsel briefly readdressed the facts of the case, the court — having not yet decided the question of bail — offered defense counsel an opportunity to specifically address the court's residual concern respecting defendant's application for release on his own recognizance: "I understand your position. My concern is he never ever comes back to [c]ourt. He has an unbelievable history of bench warrants on every case he ever had, including his most recent" (see CPL 510.30 [2] [a] [vi] [determination of application for recognizance or bail must consider, among other factors, the defendant's "previous record if any in responding to court appearances when required"]).

But without attempting to satisfy the court that recognizance was appropriate despite defendant's bench-warrant history, and before the court had made any final decision as to whether bail would be set, defense counsel — who, of course, had an opportunity to consult with her client throughout the proceedings — instead immediately suggested that defendant was interested in pleading guilty: "Would your Honor consider a non-jail disposition?" When the court indicated that it would indeed reject the People's sentencing recommendation and instead offer "two days of community service with a thirty day jail alternative," counsel responded, "He would accept that. My client authorizes me to enter a plea of guilty, on his behalf, to Penal Law 195.05, in full satisfaction of the docket."

Thus, the record does not support defendant's claim that "his options were, in light of the comments made by the ADA and the Court, to accept the Court's offer, and be released that day, or to reject the offer and return to jail" (see People v Doggett, 2003 NY Slip Op 50873[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2003] [insufficient record basis to conclude that defendant's counseled and considered choice to accept the favorable plea terms was prompted by the court's statements with respect to bail]).

Defendant further claims that he did not understand the crime with which he was charged, which he characterizes as "technical." When questioned during the allocution, however, defendant agreed that he "want[ed] to plead guilty to Obstruction of Governmental Administration" — a plea which his counsel specifically offered under "Penal Law 195.05." Although a defendant is entitled, upon arraignment, to be informed of the charges against him (see CPL 170.10 [2]), defense counsel here expressly "waive[d] the reading of the rights and charges." It is common practice in the New York City Criminal Court for defense counsel to waive the reading of such rights and charges — but not the rights thereunder (see People v Connor, 63 NY2d 11 [1984]) — and instead, armed with a copy of the accusatory instrument (see CPL 170.10 [2]), to explain both the crimes charged, and the facts alleged in their support, during the prearraignment interview conducted between attorney and client.

Defendant has not supplied any affidavit from his prior defense counsel supporting his implied claim that counsel failed to advise him of the nature of the crime with which he was [*6]charged (and to which he therefore pleaded guilty). Inasmuch as the court may deny a motion to vacate the judgment without a hearing when the motion "is based upon the existence or occurrence of facts and the moving papers do not contain sworn allegations substantiating or tending to substantiate all the essential facts" (CPL 440.30 [4] [b]), defendant's unsupported allegations are insufficient to demonstrate his entitlement to a hearing.

After all, a presumption of regularity attaches to judicial proceedings (see People v Velasquez, 1 NY3d 44, 48 [2003]; People v Harrison, 85 NY2d 794, 796 [1995]). In the absence of substantiating evidence to the contrary, the court cannot presume that experienced and competent counsel failed in her obligation to inform defendant of the nature of the crime with which he was charged, while at the same time agreeing to waive his right to have the court so advise him (see Panuccio v Kelly, 927 F2d 106, 111 [2d Cir 1991] [trial court could appropriately assume that defendant understood the charges against him since he was represented by counsel who had presumably explained the charges to him]). "To hold otherwise and require a hearing to investigate every speculative and unsupported allegation . . . would unquestionably impose an undue burden upon both the District Attorney and the judiciary" (People v Brown, 56 NY2d 242, 247 [1982]).

Nor was defendant's plea rendered involuntary by the court's failure to specifically apprise him of the constitutional rights he was waiving by virtue of his guilty plea. To be sure, "[a] trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences" (Ford, 86 NY2d at 402-403 [citations omitted]). Among the important constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea are the right to a jury trial, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right of confrontation (see Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238, 243 [1969]). But "the court is not required to engage in any particular litany when allocuting the defendant" (People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242, 245 [2005]). For " there is no requirement that the Judge conduct a pro forma inquisition in each case on the off-chance that a defendant who is adequately represented by counsel * * * may nevertheless not know what he is doing'" (People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 16-17 [1983], quoting People v Francis, 38 NY2d 150, 154 [1975]; see also People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338, 354 [1967] ["it is more important that (the defendant) consult with competent counsel than that a harried, calendar-conscious Judge be the one to perform the function in displacement of the lawyer"]). Due process requires only that the record be clear "that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant" (Ford, 86 NY2d at 403 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]).

Nothing in the record calls into question defendant's affirmative response to the court's specific inquiry as to whether he was pleading guilty "voluntarily and of [his] own free will." Among the factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant understands the nature of his proffered guilty plea are the "age, experience and background of the accused" (People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 11 [1989] [citations omitted]). In this case,^[FN7] defendant's criminal-history record report reflects 10 previous arrests resulting in one violation conviction, seven misdemeanor convictions, and one felony conviction — every one arising from a guilty plea. As "a recidivist, already experienced in the ways of a criminal proceeding" (Nixon, 21 NY2d at [*7]350), defendant must be charged with knowledge that attendant upon a plea of guilty is a waiver of trial and its constitutional and procedural protections (see also Alexander, 97 NY2d at 486 ["defendant's familiarity with the criminal justice system speaks volumes"]; People v Frederick, 45 NY2d 520, 525 [1978] ["Defendant was not a novice in criminal affairs . . . There is . . . no basis for assuming that defendant was not cognizant of the legal implications and personal repercussions of his (guilty plea)"]).

Plainly, when allocuting a defendant with no prior criminal history, the court must take additional care to ensure that the defendant understands the full panoply of rights being waived, even when the defendant is represented by competent counsel (cf. People v Aleman, 43 AD3d 756, 757 [1st Dept 2007]). But to mandate that every misdemeanor defendant wishing to plead guilty, no matter his or her sophistication as a career criminal, be advised in full of the so-called Boykin rights, would grind the Criminal Court to a halt.^[FN8] Nor does decisional law require such an advisal (see Harris, 61 NY2d at 16 [guilty plea is not invalid solely because trial court "failed to specifically enumerate all the rights to which the defendant was entitled and to elicit from him or her a list of detailed waivers before accepting the guilty plea"]; Nixon, 21 NY2d at 353 [no requirement for a "uniform mandatory catechism of pleading defendants"]). "Though a rigorous and detailed colloquy may be appropriate in certain instances, under most ordinary circumstances such questioning by the Trial Judge would be an unnecessary formalism. The seriousness of the crime, the competency, experience and actual participation by counsel, the rationality of the plea bargain', and the pace of the proceedings in the particular criminal court are among the many factors which the Trial Judge must consider in exercising discretion" (Harris, 61 NY2d at 16 [citation omitted]). In this case, every one of those factors militates in favor of a determination that defendant's plea was valid.

Thus, defendant's belated assertion of innocence cannot entitle him to vacatur of his counseled guilty plea (see People v Billingsley, 54 NY2d 960, 961 [1981]). A guilty plea, after all, "marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation" (People v Taylor, 65 NY2d 1, 5 [1985]). Both procedurally and on the merits, defendant's motion to vacate must therefore be summarily denied.

This opinion shall constitute the decision and order of the court.