Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Lee A. Mayersohn, J.), entered June 30, 2006. The judgment, upon a jury verdict, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $55,000.

Judgment affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for serious injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. After a trial on the issue of liability, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, finding that defendant was negligent and that his negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. Upon completion of the damages phase of the trial, the jury found that plaintiff had sustained "a permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member" (Insurance Law § 5102 [d]), and awarded
damages to plaintiff in the sum of $22,000 for past pain and suffering, and $33,000 for future pain and suffering over the course of 25 years. This appeal by defendant ensued.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the jury's determinations with respect to liability and damages were not against the weight of the evidence. A verdict should not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence "unless the jury could not have reached the verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence'" (Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 134 [1985]). In reviewing the record to ascertain whether the verdict was based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence, great deference must be given to the finder of fact, as it is the jury which was in the foremost position to assess witness credibility (see Schray v Amerada Hess Corp., 297 AD2d 339 [2002]). In the instant case, the jury could have concluded, based upon a fair interpretation of the [*2]evidence, that defendant had just begun his left turn when his car collided with plaintiff's car which was in the intersection. Such a scenario could have caused the damage to the vehicles in the manner in which the parties testified. Thus, it was not unreasonable or irrational for the jury to have found that defendant was responsible for the accident.

Moreover, the testimony of plaintiff's medical expert clearly established a basis from which the jury could conclude that plaintiff had sustained a serious injury (see Insurance Law § 5102 [d]). Although defendant's medical experts offered a different opinion, the resolution of conflicting expert medical opinions is within the province of the jury (see Mendoza v Kaplowitz, 215 AD2d 735 [1995]). Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the jury's determinations regarding liability and damages.

With respect to defendant's remaining contentions, including defendant's claim that it was error for the court below to have allowed into evidence certain medical records, we find that said contentions are either unpreserved, without merit, or do not warrant a different result.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment is affirmed

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 10, 2008