Defendant Shushanna Blake has moved to dismiss all charges in the above action pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 on the grounds that the People have exceeded the applicable time limitations for trial readiness pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law � 30.30. Defendant is charged with petit larceny (PL 155.25) and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (PL 165.40). Petit larceny is a Class A misdemeanor and the People therefore have 90 days in which to declare ready for trial.

Defendant was arraigned on November 28, 2007 and her counsel filed the instant 30.30 motion on July 7, 2008, after the passage of 222 days. In the case of a motion made pursuant to CPL � 30.30, a defendant meets her burden of going forward by showing that a delay greater than the allowable statutory limit has occurred since the commencement of the action. Once shown, the burden then shifts to the People to show that certain periods of time should not be charged against them (see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 [1980]).

After the People have announced their readiness for trial, the burden rests upon the People to clarify, on the record, the basis for an adjournment, so that on a subsequent speedy trial [*2]motion, the Court can determine to whom the adjournment should be charged (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 [1992]; People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843 [1992]). After the People have initially declared their readiness for trial, they may request a limited adjournment thereafter and be charged only for the actual period of time requested. (People v Urraea, 214 AD2d 378[1995]).

At arraignment the defendant waived motions and the matter was adjourned for trial on February 7, 2008. The parties agree that the People first declared their readiness for trial on December 11, 2007, by filing a certificate of readiness with the court and communicating that readiness by mail to the defendant. (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 [1985]), and that the 13 days between November 28th and December 11th are chargeable to the People. (13 days)

On February 7th the People were not ready for trial and the matter was adjourned to April 16, 2008 for trial. The People filed another certificate of readiness on February 15, 2008. The defendant contends that this certificate of readiness was ineffective because the People did not request a limited adjournment or adjournment to a specific date, citing People v Reid, 214 AD2d 396 (First Department, 1995). This court disagrees with defendant's argument.

In People v. Reid, the Appellate Division, First Department held that when the People caused post-readiness delay, the filing of a statement of readiness before the next adjourned date would be "too late to alter the adjournment already granted, or responsibility for the delay necessitated thereby." Id. at 397. In People v Stirrup, however (91 NY2d 434 [1998]), the Court of Appeals rejected the Reid rule, holding that a notice of readiness is the kind of record commitment to proceed which satisfies the People's duty to be ready for trial, and serves to toll the speedy trial clock' from running for the remainder of the adjournment period." (Id. at 439-40.) Both the Appellate Term and the Appellate Division, First Department have held, however, that the Stirrup rule does not apply when the People have requested an adjournment of a particular length. See People v Rodriguez, 12 Misc 3d 132A (Appellate Term, First Dept, 2006) and People v Anderson (252 AD2d 399, 401 [First Dept, 1998]. In both Reid and Stirrup, as in this matter, the People had not requested an adjournment of any particular length before filing the statement of readiness. The Stirrup rule, therefore, applies here, and the People are charged with the 8 days of delay between February 7th and February 15, 2008. (8 days)

The parties agreed that in each of the two subsequent adjournment periods, where the People requested one-week adjournments, they are responsible for the specific periods of delay that they requested: April 16th - June 10, 2008, seven (7) days; and June 10th - July 7, 2008, seven (7) days. (14 days)

Therefore, the People are charged with thirty-five (35) days of includable delay (13 + 8 + 7 +7 = 35). The People have not exceeded their statutorily available time and defendant's motion to dismiss the matter is denied.

This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated:New York, New York____________________

Sept 15, 2008Dena E. Douglas

Judge of the Civil Court