[*1]
People v Hart (Leonard)
2008 NY Slip Op 52198(U) [21 Misc 3d 134(A)] [21 Misc 3d 134(A)]
Decided on October 30, 2008
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on October 30, 2008
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : GOLIA, J.P., RIOS and STEINHARDT, JJ
2007-55 K CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Leonard Hart, Appellant.


Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (William L. McGuire, Jr., J.), rendered December 4, 2006. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of assault in the third degree, menacing in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree.


Judgment of conviction affirmed.

Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]), menacing in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.15), and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.30). On appeal, defendant
contends that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by restricting his cross-examination of the complainant and her sister.

It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretion over the nature and extent of cross-examination (see People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 [1969]) and can limit the scope of cross-examination when questions are repetitive, irrelevant or only marginally relevant, concern collateral issues or threaten to mislead the jury (see Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679 [1986]; People v Francisco, 44 AD3d 870 [2007]). We find that the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion herein and note that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish" (Delaware v Fenstener, 474 US [*2]15, 20 [1985]; see also Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US at 679; People v Burns, 6 NY3d 793, 795 [2006]).

Defendant's further contention that the trial court's sua sponte instruction to the jury blunted the force of the defense impeachment strategy is unpreserved for appellate review since defense counsel made no objection to the instruction at trial (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Nunez, 13 Misc 3d 143[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 52309[U] [App Term,
9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006]; People v Spaulding, 7 Misc 3d 131[A], 2005 NY Slip Op
50555[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]). In any event, we find that said contention has no merit.

Golia, J.P., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 30, 2008