Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (James P. Flanagan, J.), entered December 16, 2005. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $16,747.58.

Judgment reversed without costs and matter remanded to the court below for a new trial.

The instant action was brought by plaintiff employment agency to recover fees allegedly due for the placement of two workers it referred to defendant employer. On the first cause of action, plaintiff sought a referral fee of $9,000, and on the second cause of action, plaintiff sought a referral fee of $7,747.58. Defendant contended that it
owed nothing to plaintiff, since the worker named in the first cause of action had been referred to it under plaintiff's free replacement guarantee, and the worker named in the second cause of action had terminated employment prior to the expiration of the 90-day guarantee period. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court found that plaintiff had proved its entitlement to judgment by a fair preponderance of the evidence, and that defendant had failed to establish a meritorious defense. The court further found that the testimony of the sole defense witness was "vague, evasive and contradictory." Because the tape of the trial proceedings could not be transcribed, each party submitted to the court its statement of the proceedings, and those submissions were made part of the reconstructed record settled by the trial court. [*2]

We note initially that there is no merit to defendant's contention on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. UDCA 202 provides that the District Court has jurisdiction over actions for the recovery of money where the amount sought to be recovered does not exceed $15,000. "Where several causes of action are asserted in the complaint, and each of them would be within the jurisdiction of the court if sued upon separately, the court shall have jurisdiction of the action. In such case judgment may be rendered by the court in excess of $15,000 if such excess result solely because of such joinder" (UDCA 211). In the instant case, it is clear that both causes of action were separate and distinct and were within the court's monetary jurisdictional limit.

With respect to defendant's contention that the court below erred in not considering the testimony regarding the parties' prior course of dealing as well as their interpretation of plaintiff's 90-day replacement guarantee, the reconstructed record is inadequate for proper appellate review (see People v Mack, 2001 NY Slip Op 40535[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2001]). While the determination of a trial court after a nonjury trial should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear that the court's conclusions could not have been reached upon a fair interpretation of the evidence, especially where the findings of fact rest in large measure on considerations relating to the credibility of witnesses (see Bercow v Damus, 5 AD3d 711 [2004]), in the instant case, no written agreement between the parties was entered into evidence, and the issues raised revolve around the testimony regarding the parties' prior course of dealing and their understanding of the terms of the agreement. The court also appeared to base its determination, in large measure, on its negative assessment of the defense witness' credibility. Since the reconstructed record is not sufficiently descriptive of the trial testimony, it does not permit meaningful appellate review of the issues raised on
the appeal (see Estate of Adele Maher v Maher, 2003 NY Slip Op 50918[U] [App Term,
9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]). Accordingly, under the circumstances, a new trial is ordered.

Rudolph, P.J., McCabe and Molia, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2008