Matter of Aaron McC.
2009 NY Slip Op 07258 [66 AD3d 684]
October 6, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2009


In the Matter of Aaron McC., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant. —[*1] Rayaaz N. Khan, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers and Janet L. Zaleon of counsel), for respondent.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeals are from (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Queens County (Hunt, J.), dated March 26, 2008, which, after a hearing, found that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted burglary in the first degree as a hate crime, attempted burglary in the second degree as a hate crime, menacing in the second degree as a hate crime, aggravated harassment in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the third degree as a hate crime, and (2) an order of disposition of the same court dated August 13, 2008, as amended October 27, 2008, which, upon the fact-finding order, adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent and placed him in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 18 months.

Ordered that the appeal from the fact-finding order is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the order of disposition; and it is further,

Ordered that the order of disposition, as amended, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Viewing the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted burglary in the first degree as a hate crime, attempted burglary in the second degree as a hate crime, menacing in the second degree as a hate crime, aggravated harassment in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the third degree as a hate crime (cf. Penal Law § 485.05 [1]; People v Marino, 35 AD3d 292, 293 [2006]). Moreover, upon our independent review of the record, we are satisfied that the findings of fact were not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; Matter of Victor I., 57 AD3d 779 [2008]). Skelos, J.P., Covello, Leventhal and Roman, JJ., concur.