Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Second District (Edmund M. Dane, J.), entered August 15, 2007. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,700 as against defendant 441 State Management Associates, Inc.

Judgment, insofar as appealed from, affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover $1,700, representing the first month's rent and a security deposit which he had paid on an apartment. Plaintiff asserted that the apartment and the building were not in move-in or habitable condition when the lease term commenced. After a nonjury trial, the court awarded plaintiff judgment as against defendant 441 State Management Associates, Inc. and dismissed the action as against defendant George Sameyah. This appeal by defendant 441 State Management Associates, Inc. ensued.

Upon a review of the record, we find that the trial court's judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). The decision of the fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see e.g. Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to [*2]judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see e.g. Williams, 269 AD2d at 126). Furthermore, the determination of the trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference as the court has the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, thereby affording the trial court a better perspective from which to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses (see e.g. Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). Contrary to appellant's contention, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the premises were not habitable at the commencement of the lease. Accordingly, there is no reason to disturb the judgment, insofar as appealed from.

Rudolph, P.J., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 13, 2009