Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Eastchester, Westchester County (Domenick J. Porco, J.), entered October 20, 2005. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.

Judgment reversed without costs and matter remanded to the Justice Court for a new trial.

In this small claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover membership fees she paid in advance to defendant fitness club, claiming that paragraph 2 of the membership agreement gave her a right to cancel. Plaintiff asserted at trial she had a right to cancel if, "upon a doctor's order," she was unable to physically receive services because of a significant physical disability for a period in excess of six months. Plaintiff further testified that when she went to the club to determine her membership status, she discovered that the club had been shut down for a period of time. When plaintiff was unable to produce the doctor's letter, which she allegedly sent to defendant, the Justice Court dismissed the action. The instant appeal by plaintiff ensued.

In addition to the right to cancel the membership agreement based upon a doctor's order, paragraph 2 of the membership agreement, which was entered into evidence, contained a provision authorizing cancellation "[i]f the services of the Club cease to be offered as stated in the contract." The Justice Court, however, did not address said basis prior to dismissing the action.

The standard of review on appeal of a small claims judgment is whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UJCA 1807). A small claims judgment may not be reversed absent a showing that there is no support in the record for the court's conclusions, or that the court's determination is otherwise so clearly erroneous as to deny substantial justice (see Forte v Bielecki, 118 AD2d 620 [1986]; [*2]see also Blair v Five Points Shopping Plaza, 51 AD2d 167 [1976]).

In our view, because the Justice Court did not address the alternative ground for liability asserted by plaintiff, i.e., that plaintiff's services "cease[d] to be offered as stated in the contract," the judgment in favor of defendant failed to provide substantial justice between the parties. A new trial is therefore necessary in order for plaintiff to present her alternative basis for liability.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and a new trial ordered for further development of the facts.

Tanenbaum, J.P., Molia and LaCava, JJ., concur.