| People v Jones (Alyssa) |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 50347(U) [22 Misc 3d 138(A)] |
| Decided on February 27, 2009 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Chester, Orange County (Janet
M. Haislip, J.), rendered November 20, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury
trial, of speeding.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of speeding (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [d]). The issues on appeal relate to whether the proper vehicle was stopped and the identity of the driver. While it is unclear whether the issue relating to the vehicle was preserved for appellate review by the affidavit of errors (see People v Klein, 7 NY2d 264 [1959]; People v Rozario, 20 Misc 3d 76 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]), we find, in any event, in light of Trooper Forestire's description of the vehicle, the length of time he had it under observation, the area where it had been stopped and his positive identification thereof, that the People's proof with regard to said issue was sufficient.
With respect to the issue raised as to the identity of the driver of the subject vehicle, the Justice Court's return states that the officer testified that "Only defendant, the operator, was present in the vehicle and she was identified through her operator's license." Consequently, since no one else was in the vehicle and defendant's identity was established through her license, which presumably had her photograph, name and address, defendant's contention with regard thereto lacks merit.
We note that the affidavit of errors states that the "Court improperly admitted hearsay [*2]evidence." The lower court responded that it did not "rely on improperly admitted hearsay evidence." As defendant's affidavit of errors on the issue of hearsay did not specify with any particularity the nature of the hearsay, the issue was not preserved. In any event, we note that the court is presumed to know the law and the court stated in its return that it did not rely on hearsay evidence in arriving at its ultimate determination of guilt. Consequently, said contention similarly lacks merit. In view of the foregoing and upon a review of the record, we are of the opinion that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Tanenbaum, J.P., Molia and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 27, 2009