[*1]
People v Pettinato (Phillip)
2009 NY Slip Op 50394(U) [22 Misc 3d 140(A)]
Decided on March 9, 2009
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on March 9, 2009
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : TANENBAUM, J.P., MOLIA and LaCAVA, JJ
2007-1858 N C.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Phillip W. Pettinato, Appellant.


Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (William J. O'Brien, J.), dated September 17, 2007. The order denied defendant's motion to seal and expunge records of his arrest and conviction.


Order affirmed without costs.

On August 1, 1984, defendant was arrested and charged, inter alia, with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01), a class A misdemeanor. On August 20, 1984, defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20 [7]), a violation, in full satisfaction of the charges. Twenty-three years later, defendant moved to seal and expunge the record of his arrest and conviction pursuant to CPL 160.55. In support of the motion, defense counsel argued that the records of defendant's arrest and conviction were not sealed. The District Court determined that defendant's fingerprints and arrest photographs were either destroyed or returned to him after the criminal proceeding terminated. The court's analysis then focused on whether defendant was entitled to have the court records of his arrest and conviction sealed and expunged. Although the court noted that CPL 160.50 contains a provision for the sealing of court records (CPL 160.50 [1] [c]), the court found that said section did not apply in this case since the instant criminal proceeding terminated in a conviction for a violation. Accordingly, the court denied defendant's motion.

On appeal, defendant contends that the District Court should have granted his motion seeking the sealing of all records, including the court's records of defendant's arrest and conviction.

Where a defendant is arrested or charged with a criminal offense, but is ultimately convicted of a petty offense, the sealing of certain records is accomplished pursuant to CPL 160.55 (1) (c). In the case at bar, the criminal proceeding terminated in 1984 by defendant's [*2]conviction of disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20 [7]), a violation. "Paragraph (c) of subdivision one [of CPL 160.55] is different from its counterpart in CPL § 160.50 [which applies to the termination of a criminal action in favor of the accused], thus reflecting a vital distinction between the rights granted [under CPL 160.55 (1) (c)] and those where defendant is acquitted" (Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 160.55 at 643-644). Judgments and orders of the court are not sealed because the defendant has been convicted and a record of that fact is needed. Defendant herein has failed to establish that the records referred to in CPL 160.55 (1) (c) had not been appropriately sealed. There is, however, no provision contained in CPL 160.55 which provides for the sealing of court records.

While courts may have the inherent power to seal their own records (see Matter of Hynes v Karassik, 47 NY2d 659 [1979]), this power, exercised only rarely, has been wielded when there has been a showing that there is a need to protect an individual who might unjustly be injured by the indiscriminate availability of records (see Matter of Hynes v Karassik, 47 NY2d at 664). In the case at bar, defendant has not demonstrated that in the last 23 years he was unjustly injured by the indiscriminate availability of his court records or that he would sustain such injury in the future. Accordingly, the order denying defendant's motion to seal the record of his conviction is affirmed.

Tanenbaum, J.P., Molia and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 09, 2009