[*1]
Ganelina v Perchikov
2009 NY Slip Op 50475(U) [22 Misc 3d 1137(A)]
Decided on March 11, 2009
Supreme Court, New York County
Feinman, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on March 11, 2009
Supreme Court, New York County


Inessa Ganelina, as Personal Representative of and Administratrix of the Estate of Tatiana Light aka Tatiana Korkhova, Deceased, and Valentina Minakova, by Inessa Ganelina, Attorney in Fact, Plaintiffs,

against

Eugene Perchikov aka Eyal Shahar; Larisa Yurkov-Shkolnik; Allstate Life Insurance Company of New York; and Pruco Life Insurance Company of New Jersey, Defendants.




110968/2006



For the Plaintiff:

Debrot & Siris, P.C.

By: Jacques L. Debrot, Esq.

60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor

New York, NY 10165

(212) 599-0120

For non-appearing defendant Yurkov-Shkolnik:

Moskowitz, Book & Walsh, LLP

By: Chaim B. Book, Esq.

345 Seventh Avenue, 21st Floor

New York, NY 10001

For non-appearing defendant Allstate Insurance Co.:

Saiber Schlesinger Satz & Goldstein, LLC

By: David J. D'Aloia, Esq.

One Gateway Center, 13th Floor

Newark, New Jersey 07102-5311

For non-appearing defendant Pruco Insurance Co.:

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP

Three Gannett Drive

White Plains, NY 10604-3407

Defendant Eugene Perchikov aka Eyal Shahar has never appeared.

Paul G. Feinman, J.



Motion sequence numbers 003 and 004 are consolidated for disposition. In motion sequence number 003, plaintiffs Inessa Ganelina, as Personal Representative of and Administratrix of the Estate of Tatiana Light aka Tatiana Korkhova (the "deceased") and Valentina Minakova, sister of the deceased (collectively the "plaintiffs"), move to renew a prior motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 (d) for a default judgment against defendant Eugene Perchikov aka Eyal Shahar (the "Perchikov Motion"). In motion sequence number 004 plaintiffs move to renew a prior motion seeking a default judgment against defendant Larisa Yurkov-Shkolnik or in the alternative, seek summary judgment against Shkolnik based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel (the "Shkolnik Motion"). None of the defendants have opposed the motions. For the reasons enumerated below, plaintiffs' motions for renewal are granted, and upon renewal, their motions for a default judgment against defendants Perchikov and Shkolnik are each respectively granted.

Background


The current motions arise in the context of a procedurally and factually complicated background that will be summarized here to provide clarity to the relevant issues now before the court. Plaintiffs' underlying allegations are that defendant Perchikov murdered the deceased, a widowed Russian immigrant, on August 7, 2004 in her New York City apartment by administering a lethal dose of norepinephrine. This murder was alleged to be a direct result of an agreement between defendants Perchikov and Shkolnik whereby they would persuade the victim to obtain large life insurance policies naming Perchikov and Shkolnik as the primary beneficiaries, kill her, and collect and share the proceeds distributed under the insurance policies.Two life insurance policies were allegedly purchased pursuant to this plan: one issued through Pruco Life Insurance Company of New Jersey; and one issued through Allstate Life Insurance Company of New York. Perchikov was listed as the primary beneficiary of the life insurance policy issued by Pruco in which he was identified as the deceased's "brother." Shkolnik was listed as the primary beneficiary of the life insurance policy issued by Allstate. This policy identified Shkolnik as the deceased's "sister." Perchikov allegedly accompanied the deceased when she met with representatives of Pruco and Allstate to obtain these policies. During these consultations Perchikov allegedly furnished information to these representatives because of the deceased's poor command of the English language, and Perchikov allegedly paid the premiums for both of these policies. In addition, it is alleged that Perchikov had previously engaged in a similar plan of fraud and murder as concerns one Larysa Vasserman (who is not a party in this case) under circumstances similar to those alleged here. Furthermore, Perchikov allegedly previously wrote and self-published a short story in which he described the method of murder that allegedly occurred here.

On June 19, 2006, Shkolnik commenced an action in state Supreme Court (Shkolnik v Allstate Life Ins. Co. of New York, Index No. 602140/2006), seeking to recover the proceeds of the Allstate policy issued on the deceased's life. Allstate successfully removed that action to the federal District Court for the Southern District of New York (Shkolnik v Allstate Life Ins. Co. of New York, et. al., Civil Action No. 06-CV-5451). Allstate then answered and counterclaimed against Shkolnik for a judgment relieving it from any obligation to pay the proceeds of the deceased's life insurance policy to Shkolnik on the grounds that the policy was void ab initio [*2]because it was obtained in furtherance of a criminal enterprise (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3E). Allstate also served Minakova with a third-party claim in the Federal Action, seeking a declaration that it was relieved from paying the proceeds to Minakova on the same grounds (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3E). Minakova in turn answered, counterclaimed against Allstate, and cross-claimed against Pruco, Perchikov and Shkolnik, seeking to recover the proceeds of the Allstate and Pruco policies to the exclusion of Perchikov and Shkolnik on the grounds that they were disqualified as beneficiaries, because of their participation in the planning and execution of the murder of the deceased (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3F).

After Shkolnik's action was commenced, plaintiffs brought this action on August 6, 2006, by filing a summons and complaint naming Perchikov, Shkolnik, Allstate Life Insurance of New York ("Allstate"), and Pruco Life Insurance Company of New Jersey ("Pruco") as defendants (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3C). Plaintiffs' complaint seeks a judgment declaring that the rightful beneficiary of the policies issued by Pruco and Allstate is plaintiff Minakova, and that Perchikov and Shkolnik should pay over to Minakova any monies received from the policies; directing Allstate and Pruco to pay out the proceeds of the life insurance policies to Minakova; and awarding damages for the pain and mental anguish inflicted upon the deceased and for her wrongful death. While Perchikov has never appeared or answered, Allstate and Pruco subsequently answered (Shkolnik Motion, Exs. 3K and 3M). As will be discussed in greater detail below, whether Shkolnik has answered has been a matter of contention between the parties.

Subsequently, in the federal action, Allstate and Minakova moved for default judgments. On December 28, 2006, the District Court issued an order dismissing Shkolnik's complaint with prejudice on the ground that it appeared Shkolnik had abandoned proceeding on her claims (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3J). Furthermore, the court further ordered that a default judgment be entered against Shkolnik on Allstate's counterclaim and declaring that Allstate Life is not obligated to remit to Shkolnik the proceeds of the Allstate life insurance policy. Similarly, on January 16, 2007, the District Court ordered that a default judgment be entered against Shkolnik for failing to respond to Minakova's cross-claim, declaring that Shkolnik was disqualified from receiving the proceeds of the Allstate life insurance policy (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3I). Shkolnik then moved to vacate the judgments against her (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 5G).

On January 30, 2007, plaintiffs moved in this court for an order pursuant to CPLR 3215 granting a default judgment against defendant Shkolnik on the ground that Shkolnik failed to answer or appear (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3). At a May 9, 2007 hearing, the previously assigned Justice stayed proceedings pending the determination of Shkolnik's motion to vacate in the federal court. (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 6). On October 16, 2007, plaintiffs also moved for a default judgment against defendant Perchikov (Perchikov Motion, Exs. 2 and 3). By decision dated November 14, 2007, and again by decision dated August 5, 2008, the previously assigned Justice denied plaintiffs' motions for a default judgment against Shkolnik (Perchikov Motion, Ex. 4; Shkolnik, Ex. 7). Both of these motions were denied with leave to renew once the federal court issued its decision on Shkolnik's motion to vacate the default judgments.

The decision in the federal action was issued on September 2, 2008. It denied Shkolnik's motions to vacate the default judgments in favor of Allstate and Minakova (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 8). Plaintiffs now seek to renew their prior motions for default judgments in this action [*3]against defendants Shkolnik and Perchikov.

Motion to Renew


Motions to renew a prior motion or to vacate or modify an order are governed by CPLR 2221. "[I]f the order was made upon a default such motion may be made, on notice, to any judge of the court ." (CPLR 2221 [a] [1]). A motion for leave to renew must be based upon either " new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination." (CPLR 2221 [e] [2]). In addition, the motion for leave to renew "shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion." (CPLR 2221 [e] [3]).

Here, the justice previously assigned to this matter denied plaintiffs' prior motions for default judgments against Shkolnik and Perchikov with leave to renew after the determination of the motion to vacate the default judgments in the federal action. Following the federal court's denial, plaintiffs moved to renew. As the federal court's decision represents a change in the facts in this matter, plaintiffs' motions to renew the prior motions for default judgment against Perchikov and Shkolnik, which are not opposed, are granted.

Default Judgments


CPLR 3215 governs applications for default judgments. Under CPLR 3215 (a), a plaintiff may move for entry of judgment by default when a defendant has failed to appear. A plaintiff must normally commence proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the time of default. (CPLR 3215 [c]). However, CPLR 3215 (d) allows a plaintiff, within one year of the default by one or more defendants in a litigation where others defendants have appeared, to apply for an order postponing the entry of judgment until disposition of the action against the appearing defendants. A plaintiff moving for a judgment by default must also satisfy the proof requirements established in CPLR 3215 (f): proof of service of the summons and complaint; proof of the claim; and proof of default.

Plaintiffs' Perchikov Motion (Motion Sequence No. 003)


Here, plaintiffs seek an order pursuant to CPLR 3215 (d) for a default judgment against defendant Perchikov. A copy of the summons and complaint was served on Perchikov in Israel on November 20, 2006 and an affidavit and proof of service were filed with this court on November 28, 2006. (Perchikov Motion, Ex. 3G). Service upon a person in Israel must be made pursuant to the Hague Convention. (See, Volkswagenwerk Atkiengesellschaft v Schlunk, 486 US 694 [1988]; Marcus v "Five J" Jewelers Precious Metals Industry Ltd., et al., 2002 NY Slip Op. 50269[U] [Sup. Ct. New York County, 2002]). Article 2 of the Hague Convention requires that each "contracting State shall designate a Central Authority which will undertake to receive requests for service coming from other contracting States." (20 UST 361, TIAS 6638 [1969]). In Israel, service must be made through the Directorate of the Courts. (Marcus, 2002 NY Slip Op. 50269[U]). Here, as part of the affidavit service, a certificate of service from the Israeli Directorate of Courts confirms service upon Perchikov of the summons and complaint on November 20, 2006. (Perchikov Motion, Ex. 3G).

Plaintiffs' papers provide sufficient proof of the facts underlying the claim through their submission of an Affidavit of Inessa Ganelina, dated January 30, 2007, setting forth the allegations underlying the complaint and found as Exhibit 2 to the Shkolnik Motion. (See, CPLR [*4]3215 [f] [proof of facts may be shown by submission of "an affidavit made by the party."]).[FN1] Plaintiffs' papers also provide adequate proof of defendant Perchikov's default for failing to appear or answer. Plaintiffs' original motion for a default judgment was brought on October 16, 2006, within one year of Perchikov's default as required by CPLR 3215 (d). Therefore, plaintiffs' papers in support of the Perchikov motion comply with the requirements of CPLR 3215 and, as such, the motion for a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 (d) should be granted.

Plaintiffs' Shkolnik Motion (Motion Sequence No. 004)


Plaintiffs also bring a motion for a default judgment against defendant Shkolnik pursuant to CPLR 3215. As described above with regards to the Perchikov Motion, plaintiffs provide sufficient proof of the facts underlying the claim through their submission of an Affidavit of Inessa Ganelina. (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 2). Furthermore, plaintiffs also properly served Shkolnik with copies of the summons and complaint on November 20, 2006 through the Israeli Directorate of Courts pursuant to the requirements of the Hague Convention (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3H).

The issue of whether Shkolnik originally defaulted has been a matter of contention between the parties. According to Exhibit 3P of plaintiff's Shkolnik Motion, a letter from plaintiffs' counsel to Shkolnik's counsel, dated December 20, 2006, shows that the parties agreed that Shkolnik would have until December 27, 2006 to answer the complaint. According to an affirmation of plaintiffs' attorney submitted with the original January 30, 2007 default motion against Shkolnik, Shkolnik's counsel telephoned plaintiffs' attorney on January 4, 2007 seeking another extension (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3). Upon plaintiffs' attorney's refusal to further extend the time, Shkolnik served her answer later that day (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 3Q). Thereafter, by letter dated January 5, 2007, plaintiff's counsel rejected and returned Shkolnik's papers on the ground that they were "not timely served" and Shkolnik "was in default at the time the enclosed papers were delivered ." On January 30, 2007, plaintiffs brought their original motion for a default judgment against Shkolnik (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 1). While Shkolnik opposed the prior default motion (Shkolnik Motion, Ex. 5), she has not renewed her opposition here, although according to the November 20, 2008, affidavit of service attached to the moving papers, she appears to have been properly served with the motion.

As such, plaintiffs provide sufficient proof of default in their papers by showing that Shkolnik failed to timely answer or appear within the required time period and has failed to appear subsequently to oppose this motion. Therefore, plaintiffs' papers adequately fulfill the requirements of CPLR 3215 and a default judgment should be granted. As such, there is no need to address plaintiffs' alternative motion for a summary judgment against Shkolnik.

It is

ORDERED that in motion sequence number 003, the motion to renew is granted and upon renewal, the motion by plaintiffs for a judgment on default against Larisa Yurkov-Shkolnik is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that in motion sequence number 004, the motion to renew is granted and upon renewal, the motion by plaintiffs for a judgment on default against Eugene Perchikov aka Eyal Shahar, is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that an inquest at to damages as against Yurkov-Shkolnik and Perchikov shall be conducted upon the service and filing of a Note of Issue and a judgment shall be entered [*5]in plaintiffs' favor and against Yurkov-Shkolnik and Perchikov in the amount determined at the assessment of damages, together with costs and disbursements; and it is further

ORDERED that service of a copy of this decision and order together shall be served upon the defaulting defendants Larisa Yurkov-Shkolnik and Eugene Perchikov aka Eyal Shahar as follows:

(1) by mailing a copy to Larisa Yurkov-Shkolnik, by ordinary mail addressed to her attorneys, Moskowitz, Book & Walsh LLP, Attention: Chaim B. Book, Esq., 345 Seventh Avenue, 21st Floor, New York, NY 10001 within fifteen days of entry of this order; and

(2) that the foregoing shall be deemed good and sufficient service; and

(3) by mailing of a copy to Eugene Perchikov aka Eyal Shahar, by overnight international mail or Federal Express addressed to him at 13G B'nei Benjamin Street, Herzliya, Israel within fifteen days of entry of this order; and

(4) that the foregoing shall be deemed good and sufficient service; and it is further

ORDERED that service of a copy of this order together with the papers upon which it was granted shall be made upon the defendants who have appeared and answered, by ordinary mail to their attorneys within fifteen days of entry of this order

ORDERED that if the parties believe that discovery is required between the plaintiffs and the answering insurance companies, any of the remaining parties may contact the Part 12 Clerk, Mr. Michael Kasper, at 646-386-3273 to schedule a compliance conference on or before March 30, 2009. Failure to contact the Part 12 Clerk will be deemed a stipulation that all discovery is complete.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.

Dated: March 11, 2009____________________________________

New York, New YorkJ.S.C.

(2009 D & O_110968_2006_003_004_DAZ rev4)

Footnotes


Footnote 1: The court considers plaintiffs' papers from the related Shkolnik motion.