In or about 2004, petitioner Nicole Contos, as plaintiff, sued Morris Zweig, as defendant, based on a $20,000 debt he allegedly owed her. On December 24, 2005 Morris Zweig died. Subsequently, his estate was substituted in as the defendant in the aforesaid action. On June 22, 2007, a default judgment in the amount of $29,013.00 was entered against the estate (Moving Exh. A).

Meanwhile, in or about 2005, either Morris Zweig or his daughter Ann Zweig (a respondent herein), claiming to be Morris's assignee, as plaintiff, sued respondent Home Run Avocados, Inc., as defendant, apparently on a trade debt of some sort, in Queens County Supreme Court. That case was settled pursuant to an October 31, 2007, stipulation (by which time Ann definitely was the plaintiff), "so ordered" by Judge Martin Schulman, that provided that Home Run would pay Ann $38,000 by November 30, 2007; that if said amount was in default after a five-day notice to cure, plaintiff could enter judgment for $60,000; and that Vernon Godin guaranteed payment thereon (Kreppel Reply Exh. D).

On or about November 20, 2007 Contos served an "Execution with Notice to Garnishee" on Home Run (Opposition Exh. C), which essentially notified Home Run that Contos was asking a Marshal to satisfy the estate's debt to her out of "$38,000 owed to [the estate of Morris] Zweig by Home Run Avocados, Inc." Vernon Godin, as President of Home Run, acknowledged receipt of the Execution with Notice.

That same day, Marshal Linda Swift served a "Levy and Certification" upon Home Run that indicated that the Marshal was levying upon the debt Home Run owed to the "estate of Morris Zweig" (Opposition Exh. C). The amount of the levy was $31,665.95, representing Contos's judgment of $29,013.00, plus a marshal fee of $1,562.90, plus further interest of $1,090.05. [*2]Godin again acknowledged receipt.

On November 30, 2007, Contos received a check for $31,665.95 (the exact amount of the marshal's levy), dated November 29, 2007, payable to her order, drawn on Home Run's account at Citibank, and signed by Vernon Godin (Opposition Exh. A). The bottom left hand corner of the check indicates that it was "For estate of Morris Zweig." Not satisfied with a normal business check, Contos requested a "bank check." On December 4, 2007, she received a replacement check, this time a Citibank bank check, for the same amount of money (id.). The check indicates that the "remitter" is "HOMERUN [sic] AVOCADOS." All of the foregoing is indicated in a receipt that she signed (id.).

Subsequently, Contos gave this second check back to Vernon Godin, as Home Run's president, "so that he would have the money to pay [Ann] Zweig, if he had to." In her reply affidavit (¶¶ 4-6) Contos states that Godin "is a friend of the family": that "[a]fter he presented the Citibank bank check . . . to me, he asked me if he could have the check back, in case he had to pay this money to Zweig"; that Godin was "nervous" about the possibility of having to pay Zweig $38,000 or $60,000 personally, based on his aforesaid guaranty of Home Run's debt; and that Contos "didn't want to expose [Godin] to further liability, so [she] gave him back the check as he requested."

In the instant proceeding Contos claims, among other things, that Morris Zweig's purported assignment to Ann of the debt Home Run owed to him was forged, and that in any event said assignment and, also, a transfer Morris Zweig made to his son, respondent Joel Zweig, should be set aside pursuant to the Debtor and Creditor Law as fraudulent conveyances. Contos seeks various forms of relief, including an order directing Joel and Home Run to pay her the amount of her judgment.

Discussion

Despite the plethora of disputed facts and problematic issues that the parties raise, the instant proceeding has a simple resolution: the underlying judgment was fully satisfied when Contos received a Citibank bank check, in the full amount then owed, from a party against whom she had recently served a "Notice to Garnishee" and a marshal's levy, based solely on the debt in this case. Simply put, she was paid. The fact that she then returned the money to a family friend as an accommodation does not nullify the fact that the subject debt was fully paid, pursuant to her own lawful and appropriate collection efforts.

In her reply affidavit (¶ 3) Contos claims that she "was not paid." This rather disingenuous position is patently incorrect; she was paid, and she gave the money away. She may have a claim against her family friend Godin, but she has not asserted it here; and she may have a claim against Home Run, but she would have to assert that in a plenary action, not in a CPLR Article 52 proceeding.

As a related but alternative ground for today's decision, this Court finds that Contos is estopped [*3]from asserting the instant claims. Civil Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. For the most part, and as relevant here, it renders judgments and assists prevailing parties in enforcing them. When a party obtains a judgment, undertakes collection efforts, and receives a bank check for the exact amount of money owed, from a party responsible (albeit secondarily) therefor, the court has done its work (and the marshal has done hers). If such a party decides to give the money away by handing it back, she cannot be heard to complain that she has not been paid. She has.

This Court often reflects on the interplay between law and morality. Civil Court can only enforce the former. On some moral level, perhaps petitioner is "owed" money. Perhaps she has a valid claim against Godin or Home Run. But in the case before this Court, the law has run its course. Courts should not be called upon to provide a second payment when the first payment was presented, and accepted. Petitioner's having returned the check does not change this basic truth; and statutes enabling judgment collection do not provide for "do-overs."

Thus, the instant petition is denied and the instant proceeding is dismissed, without prejudice to petitioner's bringing a plenary action against Home Run Avocados, Inc. and/or Vernon Godin, based on the return of the aforesaid bank check. In light of the foregoing, this Court does not reach the factual issue of whether the purported assignment from Morris to Ann is a forgery (except to note that to this Court 's untrained eye, Morris obviously did not sign it with his own hand).

Dated:February 13, 2009

Arthur F. Engoron, J.C.C.