Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Edmund M. Dane, J.), entered November 16, 2007. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,800.

Judgment affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover a $2,800 security deposit paid to defendant, her former landlord. The defense was that plaintiff had "destroyed" the leased premises. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that she had paid defendant $1,000 of the deposit and the Nassau County Department of Social Services had paid $1,800. After trial, the District Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,800.

The decision of the fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see e.g. Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see e.g. Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of the trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference as the court has the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, thereby affording the trial court a better perspective from which to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses (see e.g. Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).

The record supports the finding of the District Court, based in part on the credibility of the witnesses, that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff had caused any significant damage to the premises. The record further supports the court's determination that plaintiff was entitled to recover not only the $1,000 portion of the security deposit which she had paid but also the [*2]$1,800 portion of the security deposit that the Nassau County Department of Social Services (DSS) had paid, given the proof showing that it was DSS' intent that the security deposit travel with plaintiff to her subsequent apartment. In these circumstances, DSS would not have a right of action against defendant for the recovery of its share of the security deposit (cf. Social Services Law § 143-c [3]).

Consequently, in awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff, the District Court rendered substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126), and its judgment is affirmed.

Tanenbaum, J.P., Molia and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 31, 2009