Upon the foregoing papers, plaintiff Wajid Kazmi ("plaintiff") moves pursuant to CPLR 3212, for an order (1) granting summary judgment on the issue of liability in his favor ,(2) dismissing all affirmative defenses as to any issues of liability and (3) directing a trial on the issue of damages.

This instant action arises out of a lawsuit commenced by plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained on July 14, 2005, when a vehicle operated by plaintiff was struck in the rear by a vehicle owned and operated by defendant Kwame Asante ("defendant") on Ninth Avenue, at its intersection with West 29th Street, in New York County.

In his affidavit submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff avers that in the morning of July 14, 2005, while operating his vehicle (a yellow livery car) southbound on Ninth Avenue "in the second lane," he observed that the traffic light on Ninth Avenue at its intersection of West 29th Street changed from green to yellow. He states that he slowed his [*2]vehicle and then came to a complete stop for the red light and about twenty to thirty seconds later his vehicle was hit in the rear by defendant's vehicle (a Lincoln Town Car). As a result of the accident, plaintiff alleges that he sustained serious personal injuries.

Plaintiff also requests that the court dismiss all affirmative defenses as to liability on the grounds that there are no issues as to liability in this matter. He contends that the accident occurred as a result of defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care in operating his vehicle andthere are no facts that would indicate any contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff.

In opposition to plaintiff's motion, defendant submits his own affidavit wherein he disputes plaintiff's version of the accident. Defendant states that prior to the accident, he was traveling south on Ninth Avenue, and intended to proceed straight through the intersection of West 29th Street. He was traveling directly behind plaintiff's vehicle, at a rate of speed of approximately 15 miles per hour, with an approximate distance of 15 feet between the front of his vehicle and the rear of plaintiff's vehicle. He notes that the southbound traffic on Ninth Avenue was flowing normally and was moving well. Defendant adds that as both his vehicle and plaintiff's vehicle were approaching the intersection of West 29th Street, plaintiff's vehicle "stopped unexpectedly, abruptly, suddenly and without warning or indication and without signaling an intention to stop in order to pick up a passenger who had hailed the yellow livery car from the right side of the roadway of Ninth Avenue." Defendant maintains that he was unable to stop his vehicle without his front bumper contacting the rear bumper of plaintiff's vehicle. He concludes that the accident was caused by plaintiff's unexpected, sudden and abrupt stop in the center travel lane of Ninth Avenue, to pick up a passenger, while traffic was flowing.

In reply, plaintiff asserts that defendant's affidavit fails to provide any specifics as to the occurrence of the accident and is designed to avoid summary judgment.

Negligence cases, by their very nature, do not usually lend themselves to summary judgment (Ugarriza v Schmieda, 46 NY2 471, 474 [1979]). Even when "the facts are conceded there is often a question as to whether the defendant or the plaintiff acted reasonably under the circumstances. This can rarely be decided as a matter of law" (Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]). It is well settled under New York law that a rear end collision into a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle (see Chepel v Myers, 306 AD2d 235 [2003]), and thereby imposes a duty to rebut this inference of negligence on [*3]that operator, who is in the best position to explain whether or not the collision occurred due to a reasonable, non-negligent cause (see Reed v New York City TR. Auth., 249 AD2d 330 [2002]; Dewar v Padilla, 305 AD2d 629 [2003]; Cerda v Parsley, 273 AD2d 339 [2000]). Mechanical failure, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, an unavoidable skidding on a wet pavement, or any other reasonable explanation would constitute a non-negligent cause (see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392 [1996]; Carhuayano v J & R Hacking, 28 AD3d 413 [2006]; Power v Hupart, 260 AD2d 458 [1999]; Rodriquez-Johnson v Hunt, 279 AD2d 781 [2001]). If the operator cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the plaintiff may properly be awarded judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability ( Starace v Inner Circle Qonexions, 198 AD2d 493 [1993]; Young v City of New york, 113 AD2d 833, 834 [1985]; Lopez v Minot, 258 AD2d 564 [1999]). A rear end collision is therefore sufficient to create a prima facie case of liability, and imposes a duty on the operator of the offending vehicle to prove a non-negligent explanation of how the accident occurred (Vecchio v Hildebrand, 304 AD2d 749 [2003]).

Here, plaintiff has demonstrated, prima facie, his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law since it is undisputed that the defendant's vehicle struck the plaintiff's vehicle in the rear (Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]. Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law 1129 (a), a driver has a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her vehicle and the vehicle in front of them and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the vehicle in front of them (see Power, 260 AD2d 458).

The burden then shifted to defendant to come forward with a non-negligent explanation for the accident. In this regard, defendant by way of his own affidavit, raises a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff made a sudden, abrupt stop without signaling an intention to stop in a lane of travel, thereby contributing to the accident (see Gaeta v Carter, 6 AD3d 576 [2004; Chapel v Meyers, 306 AD2d 235 [2003]). The law imposes a duty on the frontmost driver "not to stop suddenly or slow down without signaling" so as to avoid a collision when there is an opportunity to give such signal (VTL 1165 [3]; Purcell v Axelsen, 286 AD2d 379 [2001]); Collana v Suarez, 278 Ad2d 355 [2000]). Further, the court finds that the conflicting allegations in the parties' affidavit regarding how the accident really occurred, raises material issues for the trier of fact.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion is denied in all respects.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.

E N T E R

J. S. C.