[*1]
Matter of Delgado v Lader
2009 NY Slip Op 50749(U) [23 Misc 3d 1114(A)]
Decided on February 19, 2009
Supreme Court, Nassau County
Austin, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on February 19, 2009
Supreme Court, Nassau County


In the Matter of the Application of Carlos Delgado, Petitioners,

against

For an Order pursuant to CPLR §3102(c) allowing, plaintiff to depose Spencer Lader and MARK E. GELFAND, Respondents.




21324-08



COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

Natiss & Gordon, P.C.

277 Willis Avenue

Roslyn Heights, New York 11577

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS

NO APPEARANCE

Leonard B. Austin, J.



Petitioner, Carlos Delgado ("Delgado") seeks an order pursuant to CPLR 3102(c) against [*2]Respondent Spencer Lader ("Lader") and Mark E. Gelfand ("Gelfand").[FN1]

BACKGROUND

Petitioner contends that he entered into a "memorabilia agreement" with an entity known as Authentic Memorabilia, LLC ("Authentic I"). The memorabilia agreement recites Lader as being engaged in the sports marketing and memorabilia business and that he is an employee of Authentic I. The memorabilia agreement was executed by all parties on October 18, 2006. Lader executed the agreement individually while Gelfand executed it as "Executive Vice-President" even though Authentic I was recited as a New York Limited Liability Company.

The agreement provided for various payments to Delgado for services rendered relating to the marketing of his celebrity status as a professional baseball player. Certain minimum annual compensation was recited under the terms of the memorabilia agreement.

It appears that on December 6, 2007 Authentic I was dissolved on the basis that "There are no members of the limited liability company." An individual named Nitin Doshi, who was listed as a member of the limited liability company filed the articles of dissolution with the Secretary of State. Significantly, the articles of dissolution were filed by Mark E. Gelfand, Esq.

A few weeks later, on January 14, 2008, it would appear that a new limited liability company, also called Authentic Memorabilia, LLC ("Authentic II") was filed with the Secretary of State with Mark E. Gelfand listed as the party to whom process should be forwarded by the Secretary of State.

Thus, Delgado, who claims a breach of the memorabilia agreement, is left in the unenviable position of not knowing the proper parties to be named in this action for breach of contract. Thus, the instant petition is brought to enable Delgado to conduct discovery to identify the proper party defendant(s) prior to commencing an action for breach of the memorabilia agreement.

DISCUSSION

CPLR 3102(c) permits disclosure in aid of bringing an action. This has been interpreted to permit such disclosure only where the petitioners are able to identify and state the existence of a viable cause of action. See, Matter of Toal v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 300 AD2d 592 (2nd Dept. 2002). Cf. Evans v. State, 259 AD2d 729, 730 (2nd Dept. 1999).

Disclosure under CPLR 3102(c) is appropriately invoked to enable a plaintiff to identify potential defendants. Matter of Toal v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., supra; and Holzman v, Manhattan Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 271 AD2d 346, 347 (1st Dept. 2000). "[D]isclosure in advance of service of a summons and complaint is available anywhere there is a demonstration that the party bringing such a petition has a meritorious cause of action and that the information being sought is material and necessary to the actionable wrong." Liberty [*3]Imports Inc. v. Bauerguet, 146 AD2d 535, 536 (1st Dept. 1989); and Matter of Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 18 Misc 3d 185, 188 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2007). In this case, Delgado has well demonstrated a viable, meritorious claim for a breach of contract, at the very least.

Here, Delgado seeks to untangle the relationship among each of the two Authentic Memorabilia, LLC entities, Lader and Gelfand. It is clear to this Court that unless and until he can do so, the ability to properly frame a complaint against all necessary parties would be severely limited. In this regard, determining the appropriate party or parties who are properly before the Court carry for the commencement of an action is the proper application of CPLR 3102(c). See, Matter of Alexander v. Spanierman Gallery, LLC, 33 AD3d 411, 412 (1st Dept. 2006); and Matter of Wien & Malkin LLP v. Wichman, 255 AD2d 244 (1st Dept. 1998).

Accordingly, it is,

ORDERED, that the petition herein is granted; and it is,

ORDERED, that Respondents Spencer Lader and Mark E. Gelfand shall appear for deposition to be held in Room 05 in the basement of the Supreme Courthouse, 100 Supreme Court Drive, Mineola, New York on March 23, 2009 at 9:30 a.m. and shall continue day-to-day until completed, provided that counsel for Petitioner serve each

Respondent with a copy of this order with Notice of Entry pursuant to CPLR 308(1)(2) not later than March 6, 2009; and it is further,

ORDERED, that, at the depositions to be held in accordance herewith, Lader and Gelfand shall produce all of the records related to the formation of each of the Authentic Memorabilia LLC, entities including but not limited to their formation, dissolution and and current status and a listing of all members in each of the entities including their names and last known address.

This constitutes the decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: Mineola, NY_____________________________

February 19, 2009Hon. LEONARD B. AUSTIN, J.S.C.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:This case is a special proceeding. See, Robinson v. Government of Malaysia, 174 Misc 2d 560 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 1997). Thus, Delgado should be named as Petitioner and Lader and Gelfand named as Respondents. While the matter before the Court was properly commenced by Order to Show Cause, the parties were not properly designated and the affidavit in support was not properly identified as a petition. Nevertheless, such mistakes are merely irregularities which do not hinder the rights of Respondents herein. CPLR 2001 permits a court to disregard such irregularity in the absence of prejudice. See also, Colony Mortgage Bankers v. Levell, 194 Misc 2d 447 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2003), citing Covino v. Allside Aluminum Supply Co., 42 AD2d 77 (4th Dept. 1973). Accordingly, the parties herein shall be referenced as though this matter was properly commenced as a special proceeding.