Application by petitioner Saul Edelstein for a judgment, pursuant to CPLR 7510, confirming an arbitration award is granted.

This matter involves a fee dispute between petitioner, an attorney, and respondent Abraham Greisman, his former client. On September 2, 2007, petitioner's claim in the amount of $6,690.38 for services rendered was considered by a panel of three arbitrators pursuant to the applicable court rules. After a hearing, the panel, by a 2-1 margin, rendered an award in favor of petitioner. In his application, petitioner seeks confirmation of the award.

In his opposition papers, respondent asserts that the award should be vacated because petitioner allegedly failed to provide respondent with statements every 60 days which showed the time expended on respondent's behalf and the charges incurred. According to respondent, such statements are required by 22 NYCRR 1400.2 and by the retainer agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent. Because petitioner's law firm did not transmit an invoice for services rendered until 17 months after the firm first commenced representation of respondent in a matrimonial matter and only once thereafter (in June 2006 when petitioner was discharged as counsel), respondent argues that the attorney was not entitled to "every penny of the amount ($6,690.38) set forth in the final' June 2006 bill."In reply, petitioner points out that the "technical defense" upon which respondent relies was presented to and considered by the arbitrators; nevertheless, they chose to award petitioner the full amount sought. According to

petitioner, the panel correctly held that he was entitled to an award in quantum meruit because he had "substantially complied" with 22 NYCRR 1400.2. Petitioner also points out that respondent did not object to the bills until after the attorney was fired, that the bills contained an itemization of the services rendered and that the client made an additional payment of $1,500 on January 30, 2006 toward the unpaid balance on the first bill. Petitioner adds that there is no basis to vacate the award under any of the narrow grounds enumerated [*2]in CPLR 7510 (b) and that respondent's request that the award be vacated is untimely.

An application to vacate or modify an award may be made by a party within 90 days after its delivery (see CPLR 7511 [a]). However, the losing party may, as here, forego an application to vacate or modify and wait until the winning party seeks to confirm the award. Confirmation may be opposed on the same grounds that provide a basis for vacatur or modification, even if the ninety-day period has expired (see Brentnall v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 194 AD2d 537, 538 [1993]; Karlan Construction Co. v Burdick Associates Owners Corp., 166 AD2d 416 [1990]). Therefore, the court will consider the arguments raised by respondent in opposition to petitioner's application.

Unless an arbitration agreement provides otherwise, an arbitrator is not bound by principles of substantive law or rules of evidence but "may do justice as he sees fit, applying his own sense of law and equity to the facts as he finds them to be" and the award will not be vacated "unless it is violative of a strong public policy, or is totally irrational, or exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on his power" (Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats], 61 NY2d 299, 308 [1984]). Consistent with the public policy in favor of arbitration, the grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award as set forth in CPLR 7511 (b) "are few in number and are narrowly applied" (Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 7511, at 772). Only if a party's rights were prejudiced by corruption, fraud or misconduct (CPLR 7511 [b] [1] [i], bias (subpara [ii]); excess of power (subpara [iii]) or

procedural defects (subpara [iv]) should an award be vacated. With these principles in mind, the court is compelled to the conclusion that the arbitration award does not fall within the proscribed sanction.

The arbitration panel, inter alia, reviewed petitioner's work performance, fee schedule, billing history and services rendered to respondent and heard the testimony of the parties, determining that petitioner had met his burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of his fee for the services rendered. Under the circumstances, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the award lacked evidentiary support, such that the panel exceeded its powers and so as to justify judicial interference or vacatur of its award (see CPLR 7511 [b] [1] [iii]).

Although an attorney's failure to provide itemized bills at least every 60 days will preclude collection of a fee for services rendered in connection with a matrimonial matter (see Julian v Machson, 245 AD2d 122 [19997]), where there has been "substantial

compliance' with the rules, recovery of fees has been allowed (see Flanagan v Flanagan, 267 AD2d 80 [1999]). Given that, in respondent's words, "all of this was presented to the Arbitration Panel", it was within the power of the arbitrators to determine that petitioner's disregard of the applicable rules was neither "complete, nearly complete or flagrant" (see Sherman v Sherman, 34 AD3d 670 [2006]). Accordingly, petitioner's application is granted and the arbitration award herein is confirmed.

The foregoing constitutes the decision, order and judgment of this court.

E N T E R, [*3]

J. S. C.