[*1]
| Parkes v Ahmad |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 50872(U) [23 Misc 3d 1120(A)] |
| Decided on May 6, 2009 |
| Supreme Court, Kings County |
| Miller, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Michael C. Parkes,
Plaintiff,
against Mohammed A. Ahmad, Cajamarca Limo Services, Norman Epstein and New York City Transit Authority, Defendant. (s) New York City Transit Authority, Third-Party Plaintiff, Odetta P. Morrision Third-Party Third-Party Defendant. Jorge Chiquillo, as Proposed Administrator of the Estate of Lilia Chiquillo, and Jorge Chiquillo Individually, Plaintiff, Mohammed A. Ahmad, Cajamarca Limo Service, Michael Parkes, Odetta Morrision Norman Epstein and New York City Transit Authority Defendants. Jorge Chiquillo, as Proposed Administrator of the Estate of Lilia Chiquillo, and Jorge Chiquillo Individually, Plaintiff, against Mohammed A. Ahmad, Cajamarca Limo Service, Michael Parkes, Odetta Morrision Norman Epstein and New York City Transit Authority Defendants. |
This case involves the tragic death of a pedestrian Lilia Chiquillo who was
killed as result of a multiple car collision of vehicles driven by Mohamad A. Ahmad (Ahmad) in
a car owned by Cajamarca Limo Service (Cajamarca), a car driven by Michael Parkes (Parkes)
and owned by Odetta Morrison (Morrision) as well as a New York City Transit Authority
(NYCTA) bus driven by Norman Epstein (Epstein). On January 30, 2006, Parkes filed suit in
Action #1 against the defendants Ahmad, Cajamarca, Epstein and the NYCTA. The NYCTA
instituted a Third- Party Action against Morrision.
On November 28, 2006, the Estate of Lilia Chiquillo filed suit in Action #2 against the defendants Ahmad, Cajamarca, Parkes, Morrision, Epstein and NYCTA .
Both cases have been consolidated for a joint trial.
There are multiple motions for summary judgment pending before the Court. In Action #1, plaintiff Parkes moves for summary judgment against the defendants Ahmad and Cajamarca. Third-party defendant in Action #1 and the defendant in Action #2, Morrision moves for summary judgment dismissing NYCTA's third-party complaint as well as Chiquillo's complaint. The defendants NYCTA and Epstein move for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint in both actions.
In Action # 2, plaintiff Estate of Chiquillo moves for summary judgment against all defendants in that action and defendant Parkes move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
The primary basis of all of the summary judgment motions is an undated decision by
Administrative Law Judge Myles Cunningham of the New York State Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV). ALJ Cunningham had conducted a hearing to "investigate a fatal accident and
to
determine if any action should be taken against the driving privileges of the
respondents". The respondents were Parkes, Epstein and Ahmad. Parkes and Epstein attended
the hearings and were represented by counsel. Ahmad attended a part of the hearing without
counsel.
The Estate of Chiquillo, Cajamarca and Morrision were not present or represented at the
hearing. The disposition by ALJ Cunningham was that Ahmad "failed to obey the red traffic
signal and such violation contributed to the fatality". Ahmad's license was revoked. The matter
was
"closed" as to Parkes and Epstein.
The moving parties rely on Ryan v NY Telephone Co, 62 NY2d 494 [1984] for the proposition that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable to quasi judicial determinations of administrative agencies. This is a correct statement of a general principal of law. However, [*2]the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been given a full and fair opportunity in the administrative process as the Ryan court noted:
A determination whether the first action or proceeding
genuinely provided a full and fair opportunity requires
consideration of the "the realities of the [prior] litigation',
including the context and other circumstances which***
may have had the practical effect of discouraging or deterring
a party from fully litigating the determination which is now asserted
against him". (People v Plevy, 52 NY2d 58, 65.) Among the
specific factors to be considered are the nature of the forum and
the importance of the claim in the prior litigation, the incentive
and initiative to litigate and the actual extent of litigation, the
competence and expertise of counsel, the availability of new evidence,
the difference in the applicable law and the foreseeabililty of future
litigation.
A cursory review of the transcript of the October 6, 2005 administrative proceeding makes
clear that Ahmad was not given a " full and fair opportunity" to contest the allegations against
him. The hearing commenced at 9:30 a.m. Ahmed was not in attendance. The attorneys for
Parkes appropriately requested an adjournment. It was denied. The hearing proceeded without
Ahmad. Parkes was examined for approximately 28 pages of transcript, Epstein was next
examined for approximately 10 pages of testimony. At page 37, the hearing was "closed".
Apparently, Mr. Ahmad than arrived at the
hearing explaining that he was late because he took the wrong train. The hearings
were than reopened and Ahmad was sworn. He was not advised of his right to counsel and he
was not present for the testimony of Parkes and Epstein and thus had no opportunity to cross
examine them. By any standard, the hearing did not meet the standard set forth by the Ryan
court. The DMV's findings are not dispositive of the issues in these actions. In addition, not
all parties in these actions were part of the DMV proceedings. (Fratangelo v. Benson,
294 AD2d 88 [4th Dept 2002]; Martin v.Zoslasky, 172 Misc 846 [Kings County 1997]).
The Estate of Chiquillo also moves for summary judgment arguing the fact that there is clear liability for the death of a pedestrian. However, since the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not being applied, there are material issues of fact as to whether Ahmad , Parkes or Epstein caused the accident or to what degree each of them may have caused the accident.
Accordingly, all of the motions for summary judgment are denied.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and Order of the Court. [*3]
_______________________
Robert J. Miller
J.S.C.
May 6, 2009