Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Philip S. Straniere, J.), entered January 8, 2008. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,325 and dismissed defendants' counterclaim.

Judgment reversed without costs and judgment directed to be entered dismissing plaintiff's claim and awarding defendants the principal sum of $1,325 on their counterclaim.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover for damage to an apartment defendants had rented from plaintiff. Defendants counterclaimed for the return of their $1,325 security deposit. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court found that plaintiff had failed to establish any damage to the apartment beyond normal wear and tear. However, the Civil Court also found that defendants were not entitled to the return of their security deposit because plaintiff had established that he had lost one month's rent as a result of defendants' failure to return an additional set of keys to the premises immediately upon vacating the apartment. Consequently, the court, according to its decision after trial, awarded plaintiff a net judgment of $25. However, the judgment which was entered pursuant to the decision dismissed the counterclaim and awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,325.

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see e.g. Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see e.g. Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of the trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference as the court has the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, thereby affording the trial court a better perspective from which to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses (see e.g. Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).

The Civil Court's finding that defendants had not damaged the apartment beyond normal wear and tear is supported by the record, and so will not be disturbed on appeal. However, there [*2]is no support in the record for the Civil Court's conclusion that plaintiff was unaware that defendants had, in fact, timely vacated at the expiration of their lease or that plaintiff lost any rent as a result of defendants' four-day delay in returning the additional set of keys to the apartment. Accordingly, to the extent the Civil Court dismissed defendants' counterclaim for the return of their security deposit, the judgment did not provide the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (CCA 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams, 269 AD2d at 126).

Therefore, the judgment is reversed and judgment is directed to be entered dismissing plaintiff's claim and awarding defendants the sum of $1,325 on their counterclaim.

Weston, J.P., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 14, 2009