Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Leslie J. Purificacion, J.), entered April 15, 2008, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered June 26, 2008 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the April 15, 2008 order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint.

Judgment affirmed without costs.

Plaintiffs commenced the instant action to recover damages for personal injuries and loss of consortium resulting from a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by defendant's negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she was not liable for the accident. Plaintiffs submitted opposition papers, and, by order entered April 15, 2008, the Civil Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The instant appeal ensued. The appeal is deemed to be from the judgment that was subsequently entered pursuant to the order (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

"A driver who fails to yield the right-of-way after stopping at a stop sign controlling traffic is in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a) and is negligent as a matter of law . . . A driver is required to see that which through proper use of his or her senses he or she should have seen, and a driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the other motorist will obey the traffic law requiring him or her to yield" (Klein v Crespo, 50 AD3d 745, 745 [2008] [citations omitted]). Here, defendant demonstrated, prima facie, her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by submitting evidence establishing that plaintiff Joseph Nola, who was faced with a stop sign at an intersection, negligently entered the intersection without yielding the right-of-way, and that Mr. Nola's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Klein, 50 AD3d 745; Gergis v Miccio, 39 AD3d 468 [2007]; Friedberg v Citiwide Auto Leasing, Inc., 22 AD3d 522 [2005]). [*2]

In opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from an accident reconstruction expert, who averred that defendant was either inattentive or distracted while driving, leaving her insufficient time to avoid the collision, or she was speeding. We find that said affidavit was speculative and conclusory in nature and, therefore, insufficient to defeat defendant's motion for summary judgment (see Youthkins v Cascio, 298 AD2d 386 [2002], affd 99 NY2d 638 [2003]; Exime v Williams, 45 AD3d 633 [2007]; McCain v Larosa, 41 AD3d 792 [2007]; Terwillinger v Dawes, 204 AD2d 433 [1994]; Levitt v County of Suffolk, 145 AD2d 414 [1988]). Consequently, the Civil Court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 29, 2009