Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Maureen A. Healy, J.), entered January 10, 2007. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,495.

Judgment reversed without costs and action dismissed.

Plaintiff commenced the instant small claims action against defendant automobile dealership to recover amounts he was allegedly overcharged by defendant. Plaintiff testified at trial that when he had purchased a vehicle from defendant, he had also been charged for the installation of a Lojack device, a remote start, a passive remote alarm, and $3,495 for a VIN etching program, as well as an additional sum for an extended warranty, which he was ultimately able to cancel. He further testified that it was not until he had returned home after signing the paperwork in defendant's office that he had looked at the agreement and realized that he had contracted for the above-mentioned items, which, he alleged, had not been explained to him. The contract of sale introduced into evidence bore his signature and indicated that he had initialed the boxes next to the above-mentioned items. The Civil Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,495, representing the cost of the VIN etching program. This appeal by defendant ensued.

The standard of review on appeal of a small claims judgment is whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807). A small claims judgment may not be reversed absent a showing that there is no support in the record for the court's conclusions, or that the court's determination is otherwise so clearly erroneous as to deny substantial justice (see Forte v Bielecki, 118 AD2d 620 [1986]; see also Blair v Five Points Shopping Plaza, 51 AD2d 167 [1976]).

A person "who executes a contract is presumed to know its contents and to assent to [*2]them" (Moon Choung v Allstate Ins. Co., 283 AD2d 468 [2001]). In the absence of fraud, duress, or some other wrongful act by a party to a contract, the signer of an agreement is deemed to be conclusively bound by its terms whether or not he or
she read the agreement (see Maines Paper & Food Serv. v Adel, 256 AD2d 760 [1998]). The paperwork that plaintiff signed in defendant's office was a clearly denominated agreement, and plaintiff placed his initials next to the items which he now claims he never wanted or ordered.

Although plaintiff claims to have been defrauded by defendant, plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving the elements of fraud in the inducement, i.e., that defendant made a "misrepresentation or a material omission of fact, which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely on it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury" (Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 421 [1996]). In any event, since plaintiff admitted that he had failed to read the paperwork, including the description of the VIN etching program, prior to signing the agreement, although he had had a full opportunity to do so, he may not claim that he was fraudulently induced to enter into the agreement (see Maines Paper & Food Serv., 256 AD2d at 762; see also Dunn v Northgate Ford, Inc., 16 AD3d 875 [2005]; Dunkin' Donuts of Am. v Liberatore, 138 AD2d 559, 560 [1998]).

In view of the foregoing, the Civil Court's award of judgment in favor of plaintiff for the cost of the VIN etching program did not render substantial justice between the parties (see CCA 1807). Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the action is dismissed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 29, 2009