Defendant's motion for an order dismissing the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency is granted to the extent that counts one and two are dismissed.Defendant is accused by four simplified traffic informations filed under this docket of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, operating an uninsured motor vehicle, driving 75 miles per hour in a 55-miles-per-hour zone, and making an unsafe lane change (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 511[1], 319[1], 1180[b], 1128[a]). One supporting deposition is attached to the accusatory documents. It pertains to the speeding charge, denominated count three. By it, the issuing state trooper attests that he observed Defendant drive 75 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, that the charge is based on his direct observation, and that he verified Defendant's speed by Stalker Dual radar. All charges stem from an incident that is alleged to have occurred on February 1, 2009. The accusatory documents were filed on March 12, 2008, and Defendant first appeared and was arraigned on March 16, 2009. Prior thereto, by written demand dated March 11, 2009 and received by the court on March 13, 2009, Defendant requested that supporting depositions be served and filed with respect to what are denominated counts one, two and four. No such supporting depositions, or proof of their service, have been filed with the court.

Defendant now moves to dismiss all four simplified traffic informations for facial insufficiency. Although, as noted, no demanded supporting depositions have been filed with the court (but see CPL 100.25), Defendant concedes that supporting depositions were "timely" served on the date of incident, February 1, 2009. He submits copies on the motion. By the supporting deposition that supports count one — aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree — the issuing trooper attests to such facts as the date, time, and place of the occurrence, the nature of the offense, and the direction Defendant was traveling, but with respect to the particular charge, he attests only that it is based on "direct observation." He makes virtually identical attestations by the supporting depositions that support count two, the driving-an-uninsured-motor-vehicle charge, and count four, the unsafe-lane-change charge. Defendant asserts that the conclusory assertions of each of the supporting depositions are inadequate, and thus that each of the four simplified traffic informations must be dismissed as facially insufficient. The People in opposition acknowledge that the issuing trooper's obviously computer-generated language is not "effusive," but urge that since he attests that each charge is based on "direct observation," each count is sufficient. They also, oddly, and without benefit of either a cross-notice or supporting authority, request that the court "stay" any decision granting Defendant's motion so that they have time to "consider" any "lawful response" to it.

A simplified traffic information is a peculiar form of accusatory instrument — an unverified one (see CPL 100.30[1][d]) — that is authorized in limited, statutorily specified cases as an alternative to prosecution by long form information (see CPL [*2]100.10[2][a]; People v. Green, 192 Misc 2d 296, 745 NYS2d 656 [Nassau Dist Ct, 2002]; People v. Quarles, 168 Misc 2d 638, 639 NYS2d 661 [Rochester City Ct, 1996, Byrnes, J.]). Prosecutions by simplified traffic information are governed by standards somewhat different from those applicable to prosecutions by long form information, the most notable being that pleading requirements are far less factually demanding (see People v. Nuccio, 78 NY2d 102, 571 NYS2d 693 [1991]; People v. Baron, 107 Misc 2d59, 438 NYS2d 425 [App Term, 2d Dept. 1980]; People v. Green, supra; People v. Quarles supra). The requirements for facial sufficiency of a simplified traffic information thus are merely that the accusatory instrument be in brief, simplified form in accordance with the directives of the commissioner of motor vehicles (see CPL 100.10[2][a], 100.40[2]). Where, however, a supporting deposition has been provided, or timely served in accordance with a timely demand therefor, there must be verified allegations of fact, which allegations must provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged (CPL 100.25 [2]). And while amendment of an "irregularity" in a simplified traffic information is permissible (see CPL 170.35[1][a]; People v. Kreismann, 162 Misc 2d 726, 619 NYS2d 253 [Village of Kensington Justice Court, 1994, Taub, J.]), neither the process of conversion (see CPL 170.65[1]), nor the discrete process of supersedure (see CPL 100.50) applicable to more formal accusatory instruments is available to cure a defect where the prosecution is premised on a simplified traffic information (see People v. Green, 196 Misc 2d 993, 768 NYS2d 157 [Nassau Dist Ct, 2003]).

The issuing trooper's attestations, deemed to be true for present purpose (cf. (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 717 NYS2d 88 [2000]; People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 685 NYS2d 409 [1999]), that he directly observed Defendant driving faster than 55 miles per hour and that his observations are confirmed by radar demonstrate that it is "reasonably likely" (see CPL 60.10[2]) that Defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(b). Although just barely, the same "direct observation" attestation that Defendant "moved from [his] lane unsafely" also satisfies the "reasonably likely" standard applicable to the pleadings in this case. Thus, neither count three nor count four is facially insufficient. The same cannot be said of counts one and two.

More than direct observation of Defendant's driving is required to demonstrate that it is reasonably likely he has violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(1) (cf. People v. Clinkscales, 3 Misc 3d 333, 774 NYS2d 308 [Nassau Dist Ct, 2004]). Since, for instance, the issuing officer does not attest that he conducted a computer check of Department of Motor Vehicle records to get even hearsay indication that Defendant's license to drive had been suspended, there is no attestation that gives rise to an inference that it was (id.). Nor is there any attested-to fact that demonstrates that it is reasonably likely that Defendant knew that his license was suspended (id.). Count one is therefore facially insufficient. Similarly, more than direct observation of Defendant's driving is required to demonstrate that the car he was driving was uninsured. Again, there is no indication that the issuing [*3]officer conducted a computer check of Department of Motor Vehicle records to determine whether notification of a cancellation of insurance had been lodged (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 318[1]), and he does not attest that Defendant failed to produce an insurance card (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §319[3]). There are thus no attestations of fact demonstrating that it is reasonably likely that the car Defendant is alleged to have been driving was uninsured on the date in question. Count two is thus also facially insufficient and both these counts must be dismissed.

The People's request for a "stay" of this decision is denied. Apart from the fact that the request has not been properly noticed (cf. CPLR2215; see also CPL170.35[1][a]), the defects in counts one and two are not mere irregularities capable of amendment (cf. People v. Kreismann, supra; People v. Green, supra). Indeed, even where the filing of successive, curative pleadings is statutorily authorized, if the People wish to prevent dismissal for facial insufficiency, they are obligated to examine their case and the applicable law and demonstrate to the court that they have the ability to cure extant defects (cf. People v. Colon, 59 NY2d 921, 450 NYS2d 136, [1983]; see People v. Clinkscales, supra; People v. Cibro Oceana Terminal Corp., 148 Misc 2d 149, 559 NYS2d 782 [Crim Ct, Bronx County, 2003, Tallmer, J.]). I am aware of no authority for the People's tacit assertion that they are entitled to forego that obligation until after the court has made its ruling (cf. CPL 170.35[1][a])

So Ordered.