[*1]
Ruiz v Summit Appliance Div.
2009 NY Slip Op 52045(U) [25 Misc 3d 1212(A)]
Decided on October 9, 2009
Supreme Court, Bronx County
Thompson, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on October 9, 2009
Supreme Court, Bronx County


Maria Ruiz, Petitioners,

against

The Summit Appliance Division, Felix Storch, Inc., Brown Stoveworks, Inc., and 3001 Valentine Realty, LLC, Respondents.




8847/05



BARTON, BARTON & PLOTKIN, LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiff

420 Lexington Avenue

New York, New York 10170

(212) 687-6262

(212) 697-3043 (f)

RENDE, RYAN & DOWNES, LLP

Attorneys for Defendant

BROWN STOVEWORKS, INC.

202 Mamaroneck Avenue

White Plains, New York 10601

(914) 681-0444

(914) 681-0875 (f)

MARGARET G. KLEIN & ASSOCIATES

Attorneys for Defendant

3001 VALENTINE REALTY, LLC

200 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10016

(212) 683-9700

(212) 779-1499

Kenneth Thompson, J.



Plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR §§ 4404(a) & 5015 granting her judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for an order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial, presents the unique question of whether a jury's finding that one Defendant's negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff injuries—on two separate verdict sheets—entitles Plaintiff to either a directed verdict on the issue of substantial factor or a new trial. This Court finds that based on the facts of this matter, Plaintiff is entitled to neither. Thus, her application is denied.

The Facts


This case was on trial before this Court from November 12, 2008 to November 26, 2008. It involved serious burn injuries sustained by Plaintiff MARIA RUIZ while she was a tenant in the building of Defendant 3001 VALENTINE REALTY, LLC ("3001 VALENTINE") on June 11, 2008, due to an allegedly negligently maintained stove in her apartment. Plaintiff further alleged that this stove, manufactured by Defendant BROWN STOVEWORKS, INC., was not reasonably safe and defectively designed. Plaintiff and both Defendants presented extensive expert testimony during the course of the trial. On November 26, 2008, the jury returned two verdicts.

The first verdict contained the following findings: 1) Defendant 3001 VALENTINE was negligent; 2) Defendant 3001 VALENTINE'S negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's injuries; 3) Plaintiff was negligent; 4) Plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of her own injuries; 5) Defendant 3001 VALENTINE was 38.3% [*2]at fault in causing Plaintiff's injuries; 6) Plaintiff was 61.7% at fault in causing her own injuries; 7) Plaintiff was entitled to $450,000 for her past pain and suffering; 8) Plaintiff was entitled to $0 for her future pain and suffering; and 9) Plaintiff was entitled to $0 for her future medical expenses. The jury further found in this first verdict that Defendant BROWN STOVEWORKS, INC., did not defectively design the stove. The jury, however, answered the substantial factor question, "NO" despite instructions to not answer that question should they find no negligence as to that Defendant.

After receiving this verdict, the Court gave additional instructions to the jury regarding the need to resolve the inconsistency between their finding that Defendant 3001 VALENTINE's negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's injuries and their assignment of a portion of fault to that Defendant regardless, and sent them back for further deliberations.

After further deliberation, the jury returned a second verdict, which contained the following findings: 1) Defendant 3001 VALENTINE was negligent; 2) Defendant 3001 VALENTINE's negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's injuries; 3) Plaintiff was negligent; 4) Plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of her own injuries; 5) Plaintiff was entitled to $450,000 for her past pain and suffering; 6) Plaintiff was entitled to $0 for her future pain and suffering; and 7) Plaintiff was entitled to $0 for her future medical expenses. The jury found for the second time that Defendant BROWN STOVEWORKS did not defectively design the stove at issue, however, this time the jury did not answer the question as to substantial factor. Most pertinent for the purposes of this application, however, is that the jury did not allocate percentages of fault to Plaintiff or either of the two Defendants in their second verdict.

Decision of the Court


The second verdict clearly indicates that the jury did not believe that 3001 VALENTINE's negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's injuries on June 11, 2004. A finding of fact solidified by their not allocating a percentage of fault to them or to the other Defendant BROWN STOVEWORKS, INC. The fact that the jury in both verdicts went on to find that: 1) Plaintiff was negligent; 2) her negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries; and 3) she was entitled to $450,000 in past pain and suffering was mere surplusage and not an inconsistency such to warrant a new trial, especially given the plethora of evidence adduced by the parties at trial. See Mayer v. Goldberg, 241 AD2d 309 (1st Dept. 1997) (holding that "[h]aving found that no party proximately caused the injury, the jury should have proceeded no further"); Pavlou v. City of NY, 21 AD3d 74 (1st Dept. 2005) (holding that "the jury should not have apportioned liability . . . , or fixed an amount of damages, once it determined [no] proximate cause . . . . The fact that the jury attempted such an award is a superfluous act that does not require a new trial"); see also Mateo v. 83 Post Ave Associates, 12 AD3d 205 (1st Dept. 2004) (holding that "[o]n reconsideration [of its verdict], the jury was free to substantively 'alter its original statement so as to conform to its real intention', and was not bound by the terms of its original verdict ").

Accordingly, Plaintiff's application for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for an order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial is denied.

The foregoing shall constitute the decision and order of this Court. [*3]

Dated:10/09/09 _________________________ J.S.C.

APPEARANCES:

BARTON, BARTON & PLOTKIN, LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiff

420 Lexington Avenue

New York, New York 10170

(212) 687-6262

(212) 697-3043 (f)

RENDE, RYAN & DOWNES, LLP

Attorneys for Defendant

BROWN STOVEWORKS, INC.

202 Mamaroneck Avenue

White Plains, New York 10601

(914) 681-0444

(914) 681-0875 (f)

MARGARET G. KLEIN & ASSOCIATES

Attorneys for Defendant

3001 VALENTINE REALTY, LLC

200 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10016

(212) 683-9700

(212) 779-1499