Defendant's motion for an order dismissing the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL 170.30(1)(a),(f), and (g) is granted to the extent that the accusatory instrument is dismissed as facially defective (see CPL 170.30[1][a]).

Defendant is accused by information of violating section 64-4(a) of Nassau County's Local Law — commonly referred to as the "Social Host Law" — which provides that:

"[i]t shall be unlawful for any person over the age of eighteen who owns, rents, or otherwise controls a private residence, to knowingly allow the consumption of alcohol or alcoholic beverages by any minor on such premises or to fail to take reasonable corrective action upon learning of the consumption of alcohol or alcoholic beverages by any minor on such premises. Reasonable corrective action shall include, but not be limited to: 1) making a prompt demand that such minor either forfeit and refrain from further [*2]consumption of the alcoholic beverages or depart from the premises; and 2) if such minor does not comply with such request, either promptly reporting such underage consumption of alcohol i) to the local law enforcement agency or ii) to any other person having a greater degree of authority over the conduct of such minor."

By the factual part of the information (see CPL 100.15[3]), which otherwise indicates that Defendant was 19 on May 15, 2009, the complainant (see CPL 100.15[1]), Nassau County Police Officer Sean C. Mulligan, attests that, on May 15, 2009 at 3325 Colony Drive, Baldwin New York at 10:45 p.m.,

"your deponent states defendant Reale did knowingly allow minors under the legal drinking age of 21 to consume alcoholic beverages within a premises that he did exercise control over. Defendant is 20 years of age.

"This statement is based on information and belief the source of said information and belief is personal observation by your deponent of numerous empty beer cans and bottles in the residence, verbal statements from Nicholas Laplante and Jack Ragonesi both 20 years of age, that they consumed alcohol in the premise and verbal statement from Brian Reale that he had a party at his house and everybody (under 21 years of age) was drinking."

The People have served a "710.30" notice advising of their intention to use at trial an oral statement they attribute to Defendant to the effect that "his mother, Arlene Reale, is the owner of the home and wasn't there. His mother is on vacation in Italy."

Defendant, who through counsel asserts that he was 19 on May 15, 2009, now moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument. He asserts, first, that the Social Host Law was enacted to target adults who permit underage drinking in their homes, and that "it was never intended to hold one teenager criminally responsible for the actions of another teenager." He submits lengthy legislative materials to support his point, including documentation indicating that, as originally debated, the law was to apply to persons 21 and older, not to those merely over 18. He also asserts that the premises where the underlying incident occurred belong to his parents, and urges that, therefore, he does not own, rent or "otherwise control" them within the meaning of the legislation. Although he cites statutory sections pertaining thereto in his notice of motion, Defendant makes no mention of any claim that the accusatory instrument is defective (see CPL 170.30[1][a]), or that dismissal in the interests of justice is called for (see CPL 170.30[1][g]).

The People in opposition assert that, regardless of pre-enactment debate, the Social Host Law as finally enacted applies to persons over 18, and that the circumstances [*3]of the underlying incident, which, they posit, include fights resulting in physical injury, demonstrate that the scope of the legislation properly extends to more than overly indulgent adults. They also respond to Defendant's unaddressed challenge to the facial sufficiency of the information, blithely positing that there are non-hearsay attestations supporting every element of the offense charged. They next assert that the only aspect of the accusatory instrument Defendant contests is that of "control" over the premises, and, in that regard, they go outside the four corners of the information to point to Defendant's statement that his mother was on vacation in Italy on the date of the incident, and to assert that Defendant "came to the door of the house when the police arrived and gave them permission to enter the premises," whereupon they argue that Defendant's "expression of apparent authority over the premises . . . is sufficient to establish that Defendant had control' of the remises and thus make[s] out this element of the crime."

Defendant, apparently as a result of the People's contention that the information is facially sufficient, asserts in reply that reliance on the hearsay statements of Nicholas LaPlante and Jack Ragonesi, as set forth in the information, is "impermissible," and that there is no evidentiary demonstration that Defendant exercised "control" over the premises. He also repeats his argument that it was not the intention of the County Legislature when it enacted the Social Host Law that it apply to teenagers having parties while their parents are away.

Defendant has failed to make any showing that he is entitled to the extraordinary relief of dismissal in the interests of justice (see CPL 170.30[1][g]; see also CPL170.40; and see People v. Rickert, 58 NY2d 122, 459 NYS2d 734 [1983]). Insofar as dismissal on account of "some other jurisdictional or legal impediment" is concerned (see CPL 170.30[1][f]), as the parties must be well aware, it is not the function of any court to legislate, or to sit in review of any legislative body to discern its wisdom, or to rule on the propriety of its actions (see McKinney's Statutes § 73). A court's function regarding legislative acts — unless they are unconstitutional — is to apply them, an obligation that often includes the function of "construing" them as well (see McKinney's Statutes § 71). Where, however, the words of a legislative enactment are free from ambiguity, "resort may not be had to other means of construction" (McKinney's Statutes § 76). Thus, while it may strike some as far wiser to have the Social Host Law apply only to people who are 21 or older, or only to people who do not live with their parents, the words "any person over the age of eighteen" used by the Nassau County Legislature could not be more clear: the legislation applies to someone who, as Defendant appears to be, is 19 (or 20). There is obviously a judicial obligation to construe the term "or otherwise controls a private residence" (see McKinney's Statutes § 71), but I decline to do so in a vacuum, which, because the accusatory instrument is so poorly drafted, would be required were I to do so now. Thus, whether the facts underlying this case can sustain a conviction is not currently [*4]before me, but based on the presentations made on this motion, I conclude that there is no jurisdictional or legal impediment to a prosecution of Defendant other than the failure to file a valid accusatory instrument. And while Defendant by his initial application made virtually no reference to quality of the allegations in the accusatory instrument now pending against him, he nonetheless put the People one notice that its facial sufficiency would be at issue (see CPL 170.30[1][a]), and the People in opposition responded accordingly. I therefore elect to turn to that accusatory instrument.

A long form information is sufficient if it provides reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged, and contains sworn, non-hearsay allegations supporting every element of that offense, and the defendant's commission thereof (see CPL 100.15, 100.40[1]). Concrete, non-hearsay factual allegations are sufficiently supportive of an element of the offense charged if they give rise to a reasonable inference that the named defendant committed that particular element or acted with the requisite mental culpability (see People v. Henderson 92 NY2d 677, 685 NYS2d 409 [1999]; People v. Li, 192 Misc 2d 380, 745 NYS2d 683 [Nassau Dist Ct, 2002]), but conclusory statements, unsupported by "facts," are inadequate (cf. People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 506 NYS2d 319 [1986]; see also Matter of Jahron S., 79 NY2d 632, 584 NYS2d 748 [1992]). The information thus must demonstrate the existence of a prima facie case (People v Henderson, supra ), but the prima facie case requirement "is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (id. at 680, 685 NYS2d at 411). When ruling on the sufficiency of an information, a court must accept the factual allegations as true (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 717 NYS2d 88 [2000]; People v Henderson, supra ), but it is limited to reviewing the facts as they are set forth in the four corners of the accusatory document (see People v. Voelker, 172 Misc 2d 564, 658 NYS2d 180 [Crim Ct, New York County, 1997, Morgenstern, J.]; cf. CPL 100.40[1]).

The defects in the accusatory instrument filed here are many. Starting first with Defendant's age, there is no non-hearsay attestation that supports Officer Mulligan's conclusion that he is "20." Next, because Officer Mulligan refers to the place of the incident only as "premises," there is no non-hearsay attestation that the premises at 3325 Colony Place, Baldwin, New York are a "private residence," a defect that is not cured by Defendant's admission — an admission Officer Mulligan does not attest Defendant made to him directly — that he had a party at "his house." Nor, as suggested above, are there any facts in the accusatory instrument to support Officer Mulligan's conclusion that Defendant exercised "control" over the "premises," and I decline, also as suggested above, to issue dicta about whether authorizing police entry and having a party in one's parents' home while one's parents are away can constitute "control" within the meaning of the Social Host Law. Moreover, as Defendant notes in reply, the "verbal statements" of Nicholas LaPlante and Jack Ragonesi on which Officer Mulligan relies are blatant [*5]hearsay. Finally, even if I were to construe Officer Mulligan's attestations about Defendant's admission as giving rise to an inference that Defendant made it in his presence, that admission might establish that Defendant's conduct was "knowing," but it does nothing to demonstrate prima facie that anyone, let alone "everyone" who was drinking, was under 21 (cf. People v. Clinkscales, 3 Misc 3d 333, 774 NYS2d 308 [Nassau Dist Ct, 2004]). Thus, the accusatory instrument fails to contain non-hearsay attestations that support any of the elements of the crime Defendant is accused of committing. It is therefore defective and is accordingly dismissed.

So Ordered.