On June 5, 1990, the defendant, D.D.G., entered a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (see, CPL 220.15) to the crime of Murder in the Second Degree. It was alleged that on June 17, 1988, the defendant caused the death of his cousin by shooting her in the back with a loaded weapon.^[FN1] On August 30, 1990, a commitment order, pursuant to CPL 330.20[6], was issued and the defendant was remanded to the care and custody of the State Commissioner of Mental Health. He was subsequently confined in a secure facility pursuant to CPL 330.20. The defendant was transferred to Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, from Binghamton Psychiatric Center, in November of 2001. Since the defendant has been in the custody of the Commissioner, several orders of retention (see, CPL 330.20[8] and [9]) have issued.^[FN2] The defendant is currently still a patient, and resident, of Creedmoor.

The Commissioner has filed an application, dated October 25, [*2]2008, for a subsequent two- year retention order.^[FN3] The defendant is opposed to retention and is seeking his conditional release.^[FN4] Since the parties involved ^[FN5] in this case were unable to work out a settlement as to this issue,^[FN6] the matter was adjourned for the [*3]Court to conduct the instant retention hearing (see, CPL 330.20[9]). The hearing was conducted over several dates, November 5, 2009, January 29, 2010, and March 19, 2010. The defendant's entire medical record, including many reports written about him, were deemed admitted into evidence for each side to use in questioning the witnesses and in making argument to the Court.

At the hearing, the State called Dr. Stuart Taylor, and the defense called Dr. Roy Lubit. The Court finds both of the witnesses to be credible. The Court will now summarize the relevant testimony elicited at the hearing.

The first witness called by the State, and questioned by the Assistant New York State Attorney General, was Dr. Stuart Taylor. Dr. Taylor testified that he is a psychiatrist at Creedmore Psychiatric Center, and was the supervising psychiatrist on the ward where the defendant was being treated, from 2003 to 2008. The doctor stated that he examined the defendant regarding this matter on November 4, 2009. The doctor testified that the defendant suffers from schizo-affective disorder and alcohol abuse, and that both diseases are in institutional remission, that is, that he is in remission because he is in the hospital. Dr. Taylor elaborated that he has based his opinion upon the defendant's history, records, his experiences with the defendant, and his recent interview of him. The doctor continued that the defendant has a flat affect, that he does not get involved with things on the ward, or people very much, that he does not seem motivated or engaged. The doctor testified that the defendant is paranoid, and that his paranoia is of a delusional proportion, such that he believes things that could not be true, such as that his family and the hospital are conspiring against him. The doctor continued that the defendant had twice attempted suicide in the past, one time in 1992,^[FN7] and one time in 2008.

Dr. Taylor testified that it is his opinion that the defendant has no insight into the nature of his mental illness, and does not believe that he is sick. The doctor stated that he believes the defendant is seriously sick. The doctor continued that when he was the defendant's supervising psychiatrist, the defendant attempted suicide, and that recently the defendant [*4]threw a chair.^[FN8] Dr. Taylor explained that throwing a chair impacts his diagnosis of the defendant by demonstrating that the defendant is impulsive and has a tendency towards violence, which tendency the doctor indicated goes back to the defendant's childhood. Dr. Taylor stated that the defendant has a history of alcohol abuse, and that he drank six beers on the eve of the events which culminated in the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.

Dr. Taylor testified that it is essential that the defendant remain in the hospital. The doctor explained that the defendant has an amenable illness, that he does not understand much about his illness, that despite the defendant's indications that he would take medication if he were released, the defendant did not indicate at all why that is important. Dr. Taylor stated that the defendant does not think anything is wrong with him, that he has never been sick, and that he is not sick now. He stated that the defendant has a history of not wanting to take medications in the hospital, and that the doctor believes that the defendant will not take his medications if he were to be released. Dr. Taylor testified that if the defendant's mental illness were not treated, he would become psychotic and dangerous, to himself and others, very quickly.^[FN9] He continued that it is his opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that if the defendant were not retained, his presence in the community would pose a danger to himself or others. Dr. Taylor stated that the issuance of a retention order is consistent with both the welfare of the community and the defendant.

Upon questioning by the Queens County Assistant District Attorney, Dr. Taylor testified that schizo-affective disorder involves having symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions or amotivation [sic], flat affect, and psychosis, for a period of time. Additionally, there could be periods when a patient is depressed or manic, and the doctor stated that the defendant has a tendency to get depressed. Dr. Taylor continued that the [*5]defendant is on four medications, two anti-psychotic medications, a mood stabilizer, and an anti-depressant. The doctor stated that the medications help the defendant's mental condition. When asked if the defendant was currently in remission, or partial remission, the doctor indicated that he did not know. Dr. Taylor stated that although the defendant's symptoms have improved, he is not free of mental illness. The doctor elaborated that the defendant still has concrete thinking, still has negative symptoms of amotivation [sic], is still paranoid, but he is better than when he was totally isolative [sic] and trying to commit suicide. Dr. Taylor said that if the defendant were to stop taking his medications, his mental disease would worsen, that he would become psychotic, that his paranoid delusions might become bizarre and he might have hallucinations as he did early on after the commission of the instant offense. Dr. Taylor testified that although the defendant indicates that he will take his medications, he also says that he has no mental illness at all. The doctor explained that he has no reason to believe that the defendant would want to take the medications since he has resisted taking them at various times in the past, and that it was his expert opinion that, if he were released into the community, given the defendant's beliefs as to his mental illness, it is likely that he would not take his medications.

Upon cross-examination by the defense, Dr. Taylor testified that the defendant's schizo-affective disorder is depressive. The doctor stated that during his exam of the defendant, conducted on November 4, 2009, the defendant exhibited depression, in that he displayed a kind of hopelessness, that nothing is going to go his way, which the doctor stated is tied to his beliefs that everybody is against him.

Dr. Taylor continued that the defendant's alcohol abuse is in remission because he is in an institutional setting, although alcohol could be smuggled into the hospital. The doctor stated that the defendant, to the doctor's knowledge, has never been observed in the hospital under the influence of alcohol. Dr. Taylor testified that the hospital has not, to his knowledge, ever brought an action in court to medicate the defendant over his objection.

Dr. Taylor testified that the defendant was not taking his medications at the time of his suicide attempt.^[FN10] At that time, the doctor testified that the defendant told him he was despondent about the fact that he felt he was being held in the [*6]hospital without privileges.^[FN11] The doctor stated that he did not remember if he examined the defendant after this suicide attempt, and he did not remember if the defendant required medical attention growing out of that attempt. Dr. Taylor also stated that regarding the incident where the defendant threw a chair, he did not recall on what date that occurred, and does not recall any other altercation the defendant had with a staff member. The doctor conceded that to the best of his knowledge, the defendant has comported [sic] with the staff, and the institution.

Dr. Taylor continued that when he examined the defendant on November 4, 2009, he asked the defendant pointed questions, and although the defendant became irritated, he did not threaten the doctor. The doctor testified that as a resident in the institution at this time, and based upon his examination of the defendant and review of his medical chart, the defendant is not a danger to himself or others at this moment. The doctor continued that if the defendant were released, and complied with his treatment, "he would probably be reasonably safe" (see, the minutes, dated November 5, 2009, page 51, lines 16-17).^[FN12]

At the conclusion of Dr. Taylor's testimony, the State rested it's case. The defense then called Dr. Roy Lubit, a psychiatrist in private practice. Dr. Lubit indicated that he filed a report with the court, dated October 27, 2009, which reflects his thinking concerning the condition of the defendant. The report is contained in the court file.

Dr. Lubit testified that he examined the defendant, at the hospital, on July 16, 2009, and also spoke to him on at least four occasions in the courthouse, including the morning of his testimony, January 29, 2010. Dr. Lubit stated that when he [*7]interviewed the defendant in July, 2009, the defendant's mental status did not show any clear psychiatric pathology. The doctor indicated that the defendant was able to speak with him, answer questions appropriately, and that the defendant's affect, or his emotional expression, was not particularly remarkable. The doctor did state that the defendant's affect is blunted, which can be a sign of emotional problems. However, the doctor said this may be caused from the defendant's life in the hospital and his being on medications, and not necessarily due to any psychiatric illness. The doctor continued that at no time when he interviewed or talked with the defendant did the defendant ever report to the doctor that he was having delusions or hearing voices. Furthermore, the doctor stated that in his meetings with the defendant, he did not see any signs or symptoms of mental illness.

Dr. Lubit stated that he has not made a clear diagnosis of the defendant, due to inconsistencies in the defendant's medical chart. Dr. Lubit testified that in reviewing Creedmore's reports on the defendant, he found conflicting statements about the symptoms that the defendant suffered. The doctor also testified that he has doubts as to the reliability of certain reports on the defendant, which he reviewed, which prevents him from comfortably relying upon them. Therefore, the doctor indicated that he was unable to conclude that the defendant is mentally ill.

Dr. Lubit testified that when he examined the defendant he found no evidence of delusions, and that the defendant advised him that he had no delusions. The doctor stated that upon his review of the defendant's medical chart, he noted reports of altercations between the defendant and the staff at Creedmore, in May of 2008 and in May of 2009. However, Dr. Lubit testified that there was no report that the defendant assaulted anyone.The doctor continued that the defendant's medical chart indicated that at the time of one of those incidents, the defendant was having difficulty getting erections because of cameras on the ward. Dr. Lubit stated that when he asked the defendant about this symptom, the defendant denied having it. Dr. Lubit also noted that though this issue relating to the cameras might be a bizarre thought, he was unable to conclude that this represents a psychotic episode, in that the doctor indicated that the defendant's chart, again, contained numerous inconsistencies. Furthermore, given the fact that there is a language barrier between the staff at the hospital and the defendant, Dr. Lubit opined this may have led to miscommunications between them, which may have been reflected in the defendant's chart.

Dr. Lubit continued that the defendant did indicate to him that he heard voices for a brief period of time when he was [*8]hospitalized in Kings County,^[FN13] but the doctor felt since the voices were after an incident where the defendant was assaulted, that was not an indication of a long-term psychiatric problem, but perhaps a brief reactive psychosis to a traumatic event. Dr. Lubit stated that he interviewed the defendant's family and found that the defendant did not have any underlying psychiatric condition, or alcohol problem, when he was younger.

Dr. Lubit testified that he did not come to any definitive diagnosis of the defendant, due to the unreliability and uncertainty of the information which would point to a chronic psychiatric illness. The doctor stated that when he examined the defendant he did not show any symptoms of schizophrenic disorder, except for the decrease of affect, which is consistent with schizophrenia, but could also be consistent with normal behavior, especially given the years the defendant has spent in the hospital and on medications. The doctor stated that he found no unequivocal sign of mental illness.

Dr. Lubit testified that, at the time of the hearing, he does not believe that the defendant is a danger to himself or others. Furthermore, he indicated that he would like to see the defendant released on an order of conditions, living in an appropriate residence, with appropriate medications, monitoring, and follow-up.

Upon cross-examination by the Assistant Attorney General, Dr. Lubit testified that he examined the defendant once, at Creedmore, and has spoken to him on five occasions in the courthouse, checking on his mental status and asking about his symptoms. Dr. Lubit continued that the defendant thinks he should be on medications given that he has been on them for so long, and because he appreciates that he got depressed and upset at the hospital, and tried to hurt himself, and perhaps the medications are helping that. Dr. Lubit stated that if the defendant were discharged, he probably would not be dangerous even if he stopped his medications, but to be as safe as possible, it is better that he takes them. The doctor elaborated by explaining that although he was unable to corroborate the reports in the defendant's case about the defendant being psychotic, the reports may be true. Therefore, given that the defendant may be psychotic, and that he was accused of committing a violent crime many years ago, it is better to be safe.

Dr. Lubit testified that although the defendant does not think he has ever been psychotic, he feels he needs to be on medications. The doctor continued that since the defendant thinks he should be on medications, it is of no significance that [*9]he may not have insight into his mental illness. Dr. Lubit explained that insight can help people if they think they are healthy and do not want to take medication, but since the defendant wants to take his medications, insight is not an issue. Dr. Lubit testified that if someone starts to become psychotic, he is not fully aware of what is happening to him. Having people around to monitor the defendant's thinking is more important than insight.

Dr. Lubit stated that in his report of October, 2009, he indicates that in the past the defendant tried to cut his wrists and heard voices. The doctor continued that at those moments he was having psychiatric problems, but it does not mean that he has a problem currently. Dr. Lubit stated that it is possible that the defendant suffers from schizophrenia, but the doctor said he does not have adequate data to label the defendant with a diagnosis of chronic psychotic illness. Furthermore, the doctor stated that the facts in his report indicating that the defendant has in the past tried to hurt himself, as well as hurt others in the hospital, may be an indicator of mental illness, or may be an indication of simply a frustrated individual. It is also possible that the facts made known to the doctor regarding these incidents are not reliable. Dr. Lubit continued that it is remarkable that the defendant's records indicate that the defendant has not been involved in many incidents, given the extreme stress he faces. The doctor stated that in 2007 there was an incident where the defendant was severely provoked and he walked away, exhibiting important control.

Dr. Lubit testified that a person who tried to kill himself a number of times in the past is at a greater risk, perhaps, of being a danger to himself. The doctor indicated that the defendant has not tried to hurt himself, or spoken about it, in a long time. He continued that everyone, under enough stress, could try to hurt themselves, but they should not be in a hospital for the rest of their lives. Dr. Lubit testified that the defendant believes he has been stuck in a hospital for almost 20 years for a crime he did not commit,^[FN14] which the doctor continued, could be a cause of great frustration. Furthermore, the doctor continued, the defendant is now on a ward with a doctor who speaks English very poorly, has a mental health worker discussing treatment with him for alcohol abuse when he has not [*10]abused alcohol for years, and is working with staff that call him paranoid because he does not trust them. Dr. Lubit stated these factors could certainly add to the defendant's frustration.

The ultimate legal issue before the Court is whether the application of the Commissioner of Mental Health seeking a subsequent retention order of the defendant pursuant to CPL 330.20 should be granted. The defendant is opposed to that application and is seeking his conditional release.

At a hearing on an application for retention, CPL 330.20[9] states that "the commissioner must establish to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder or is mentally ill". Furthermore, the statute states that "if the court finds that the defendant does not have a dangerous mental disorder and is not mentally ill, it must issue a release order and an order of conditions pursuant to subdivision 12 of this section". CPL 330.20[12], entitled "Release order and order of conditions", delineates the course of action that must be taken before, and during, a defendant's release, and the responsibilities of the parties involved. It must be noted, that should a defendant be released, the Commissioner's responsibility for, and his supervision over, the defendant would not be terminated. The order only ends the defendant's in-patient status (see, People v. Mooney, 20 Misc 3d 1131(A) [2008]). The defendant would be subject to an order of conditions (see, CPL 330.20[12]), which must issue, and which will guarantee that the defendant will be supervised for years to come, unless the time comes, if ever, when the defendant earns the right to absolute discharge (see, CPL 330.20[1][n] and [13]). Furthermore, a violation of the order of conditions will subject the defendant to recommitment to the hospital and to the custody of the Commissioner (see, CPL 330.20[14]). The burden of proof for the application for retention is on the State, and it must establish that the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder or is mentally ill, by a preponderance of the evidence (see, Leon R. V. Palmer, 266 AD2d 218 [1999]; In re Jerriell O., 288 AD2d 313 [2nd Dept 2001]).

Statutorily, the terms "dangerous mental disorder" and "mentally ill" have their own meanings in relation to CPL 330.20. A dangerous mental disorder, defined in CPL 330.20[1][c], "means (i)that a defendant currently suffers from a "mental illness" as that term is defined in subdivision twenty of section 1.03 of the [*11]mental hygiene law,^[FN15] and (ii) that because of such condition he currently constitutes a physical danger to himself or others". Mentally ill, defined in CPL 330.20[1][d], "means that a defendant currently suffers from a mental illness for which care and treatment as a patient, in the in-patient services of a psychiatric center under the jurisdiction of the state office of mental health, is essential to such defendant's welfare and that his judgement is so impaired that he is unable to understand the need for such care and treatment".

The parties are in agreement that the relevant statute in this case is CPL 330.20[1][c], and that the Court must determine if the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder. The parties have further narrowed that issue by agreeing that the Court must focus, not so much on the first branch of that definition, whether the defendant suffers from a mental illness, but on the second branch, whether or not the defendant is a danger to himself or others (see, the minutes of oral argument, dated March 19, 2010).

During the course of this retention hearing, the Court heard testimony from two very competent and very compelling doctors. Upon careful review of their testimony, the Court has concluded that the People have not met their burden of showing that the defendant suffers from a dangerous mental disorder as that term is defined statutorily in CPL 330.20.

Despite the discrepancy between the testimony of Dr. Taylor, who opines that the defendant suffers from schizo-affective disorder, and Dr. Lubit who testified that he saw no definitive signs of mental illness in the defendant, the Court finds that it is more likely than not that the defendant is chronically mentally ill in the broader, psychiatric, sense of the term. However, that factor alone clearly fails to meet the requirements for a defendant's in-patient treatment as provided by statute. See, CPL 330.20[1] [c] and [d]. As to whether or not the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder within the meaning of the law, there has been no significant and compelling evidence presented that the defendant constitutes a physical danger to himself or others.

The New York State Court of Appeals has stated "that generally a finding of a defendant's current dangerousness for purposes of CPL 330.20[1][c][ii] must be based on more than [*12]expert speculation that he or she poses a risk of relapse or reverting to violent behavior once medical treatment and supervision are discontinued.^[FN16] The prosecution may meet its burden of proving that a defendant poses a current threat to himself or others warranting confinement in a secure environment, for example, by presenting proof of a history of prior relapses into violent behavior, substance abuse or dangerous activities upon release or termination of psychiatric treatment, or upon evidence establishing that continued medication is necessary to control defendant's violent tendencies and that defendant is likely not to comply with prescribed medication because of a history of such noncompliance or because of threats of noncompliance" (see, In the Matter of David B., 97 NY2d 267, 277 [2002], quoting from In the Matter of George L., 85 NY2d 295 [1995]).

The State has attempted to demonstrate that the defendant is a danger to himself, by presenting evidence of two suicide attempts, and that the defendant is a danger to others by presenting evidence, in the form of testimony and reports, of a small number of altercations between the defendant and others at the hospital. However, the Court finds that these few isolated events over such a long period of hospitalization do not warrant further confinement.

Initially, the Court notes that the evidence presented by the State regarding altercations between the defendant and others in the hospital, does not demonstrate that he has a history or tendency to relapse into violent behavior. The incidents have been few and far between when considered in light of the defendant's nearly 20 years of hospitalization, and as Dr. Lubit stated, it is remarkable that there have not been more incidents. Furthermore, the Court credits the testimony of Dr. Lubit explaining that these few incidents were likely due to frustration on the part of the defendant, on his lack of privileges outside of the hospital after so many years. They do not prove that the defendant would be violent while in the community.^[FN17] In fact, as Dr. Lubit pointed out, there was no [*13]evidence presented that the defendant actually assaulted or injured anyone, despite his outbursts. Additionally, regarding the issue of substance abuse, as mentioned supra in David B., the Court notes that the only evidence presented by the State regarding alcohol abuse on the part of the defendant was that the defendant drank numerous beers on the eve of his crime. The Court does not find this to be a compelling factor in support of retention.

The Court also does not find compelling the evidence set forth by the State in its attempt to demonstrate that the defendant would fail to take his medications upon release. Although Dr. Taylor testified that the defendant has refused taking medications in the past, that testimony was not supported with details explaining the circumstances under which the events may have occurred, the number of times they may have occurred, and the years in which they may have occurred. Furthermore, Dr. Taylor stated that it was not necessary for the defendant to be medicated against his will, implying to the Court that the length of time the defendant was not medicated could not have been significant. Additionally, the Court notes again Dr. Lubit's testimony, wherein he indicated that the defendant informed him that he will continue taking his medications and that he knows that it helps him. It must also be noted that should the defendant be released on an order of conditions, a support system would be in place making sure he is complying with his treatment.

The State submits that the defendant is a danger to himself due to his two suicide attempts, one in 1992 and one in 2008. The Court is cognizant of the seriousness of these attempts, and does not consider them insignificant. However, as stated by Dr. Lubit, the Court does not find that these two attempts are a basis for the indefinite confinement of the defendant. Especially in light of the facts, as articulated by Dr. Lubit, that the defendant has not spoken about hurting himself for a long time, and how his frustration and stress regarding his current lack of hospital privileges could have compounded any suicidal ideation. Also, the Court heard no testimony as to why the defendant could not be treated regarding this issue on an out-patient basis.

The Court has also consideredthe testimony of both Dr. Taylor and Dr. Lubit in regards to their respective opinions on the issue of whether or not the defendant would be a danger to the community if he was released on an order of conditions, and basically, the doctors are in agreement. Dr. Lubit testified [*14]that the defendant would not be a danger to the community if he were released, and Dr. Taylor conceded that if the defendant continues with his treatment, the defendant would "probably" not be a danger. The Court finds this evidence persuasive, that the community, as well as the defendant, would be safe with the defendant receiving treatment while conditionally released and being supervised on an order of conditions.

The Court is well aware that the usual practice is for a defendant to be granted escorted and then unescorted furloughs before achieving conditional release. However, the record is utterly devoid of any sign that either of these furloughs, or any other increase of privileges for the defendant, will be forthcoming. After more than eight years of in-patient hospitalization at Creedmoor, the defendant has not received any privileges which would ordinarily precede his ultimate release. Furthermore, the State has not presented any evidence to explain this, nor any commitment to change this.^[FN18]

The Court has considered the statement in In the Matter of David B., 97 NY2d 267, 279 [2002], that retention "may also be supported by the need to prepare for a safe and stable transition from . . . commitment to release". However, since the State has not granted the defendant any privileges which would help transition him into the community, and has offered no compelling reasons for those denials, the Court is unpersuaded that release of the defendant upon an order of conditions should only take place after the defendant has been granted a transitional phase in which he receives escorted and then unescorted off-grounds furloughs, inasmuch, as those options have never been granted to him. See, People v. Mooney, 20 Misc 3d 1131(A)[2008].

The Court of Appeals in In the Matter of David B., 97 NY2d 267, 279 [2002], stated that when considering retention, "in addition to recent acts of violence and the risk of harm to the defendant or others that would be occasioned by release from confinement, a court may consider the nature of the conduct that resulted in the initial commitment, the likelihood of relapse or a cure, history of substance or alcohol abuse, the effects of medication, the likelihood that the patient will discontinue medication without supervision, the length of confinement and treatment, the lapse of time since the underlying criminal acts and any other relevant factors that form a part of an insanity acquittee's psychological profile". This Court has considered these factors very carefully. Looking to the testimony adduced at the hearing, the Court notes that there was no evidence of [*15]recent acts of serious violence on the part of the defendant against another individual, and no solid evidence beyond conjecture of the risk of harm to the defendant or others were the defendant to be released upon an order of conditions. There was testimony that the defendant's release would be consistent with public safety, the welfare of the community, and the well-being of the defendant himself. Furthermore, the Court has looked to Dr. Lubit's testimony about how "in all likelihood, [the defendant]. . . could leave the hospital, live with family members, be on no medication, have no monitoring, and be fine ^[FN19] (see, the minutes, dated January 29, 2010, page 102, lines 13-17), which speaks to a low risk of the defendant relapsing, and to testimony about how the defendant would continue his medications. Looking to the entire body of testimony elicited at the hearing, and after much reflection about it, the Court agrees with the opinion of the defense expert that the time has come for the defendant to be conditionally released from the hospital.

The Court finds that the defendant, despite committing a violent act back in 1988, more than 20 years ago, qualifies for greater autonomy. CPL 330.20 will guide the Court and the hospital to provide the defendant with the support he needs and a framework for assistance and continued treatment. Clearly, the testimony proffered by the defense, as well as some aspects of the State's case, supports this Court's finding that the defendant does not meet the definitions delineated in CPL 330.20 of having a dangerous mental disorder. For all of these reasons, retention of the defendant at this point in time is not warranted.

Accordingly, the State's application for a subsequent retention order is denied. The defendant will be conditionally released upon the Court's signing of an order of conditions. The parties are directed to formulate a written service plan in a proposed order of conditions (see, CPL 330.20[12]) that must, upon its approval by the Court, be complied with by the defendant. The Court orders that the plan should include medical providers who are able to communicate with the defendant in his own native tongue.

The parties are also directed to inform themselves, to the maximum extent permitted under the circumstances, of the intentions of the INS with respect to the potential deportation of the defendant. In the event that the defendant is taken into [*16]custody by the INS, the parties shall immediately provide the INS, to the maximum extent permitted by law, with the psychiatric history, needs, and psychiatric documentation relating to the patient, such that the INS, and any foreign jurisdiction to which the defendant might be deported, will have a sufficiently particularized database on which responsible treatment planning on behalf of the patient could be promulgated.

The issue regarding the substance of the order of conditions will be heard by the Court with all deliberate speed.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to distribute copies of this decision and order to the attorneys representing the parties.

.............................WILLIAM M. ERLBAUM, J.S.C.