| People v Louisseize |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 51091(U) [27 Misc 3d 1237(A)] |
| Decided on June 9, 2010 |
| Just Ct, Vil. Of Westbury, Nassau County |
| Liotti, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
The People of the State
of New York, Plaintiff,
against Stanley Louisseize, Defendant. |
This Court had before it a defendant twice charged and once convicted of driving at high speeds, both at 102 mph in 55 mph zones in violation of New York State's Vehicle and Traffic Laws, thus subjecting him to a possible fine of $450.00 and a surcharge of $85.00; the revocation of his license and fifteen days in the Nassau County Jail. After at first bench warranting in this Court and being returned on that warrant, the defendant, age 18, appeared with his mother who posted $500.00 in bail on his behalf. The defendant was then released on bail but the Court strongly encouraged the defendant to secure counsel before his next court appearance. This Court rejected the plea bargain as proposed by the prosecutor. The defendant indicated that he was unemployed, indigent and could not afford counsel. After that arraignment and before his next court appearance, the defendant was arrested on alleged gang related felony charges. Those charges were pending in Nassau's District and County Courts. The defendant was produced in this court in shackles by the Nassau County Sheriff's Department. He appeared with his mother and still without counsel. He was represented on the felony charges by either Legal Aid or 18-B counsel, but they were not assigned to represent him on the charges before this Court.
Between court dates in this court, I contacted Nassau's Assigned Counsel Defender Plan Administrator to determine whether I could assign 18-B counsel to the defendant. The [*2]Administrator, a distinguished attorney, former prosecutor and a Professor of Law, informed this Court that it (the Court) was not authorized under Article 18-B to assign counsel in a violation case. This then posited with me a serious constitutional question in this Court and a case of first impression statewide. It has wide reaching implications for this Court, but also for all other courts with violation cases before them where the possibility of jail is among the penalties that may be imposed. See Morris, et al., A Practice Guide to Village, Town and District Courts in New York", (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company, Rochester, New York (now Thompson West, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1995-Present).[FN1] This Village Justice is a co-author of the aforementioned treatise.
In a previous opinion and order, this Court directed the Attorney General of the State of New York to appear before it and show cause why Article 18-B of the County Law should not be declared unconstitutional. The full opinion and order were published in the New York Law Journal on June 4, 2010. See New York Law Journal, Decisions in the News, People v. Louisseize, New York Law Journal, June 4, 2010 at 46 and Joel Stashenko, A.G.'s Office Declines to Defend Law That Prevents Appointment of Counsel in Serious Traffic Offenses, New York Law Journal, June 4, 2010 at 1 and 5.
Having been placed on notice of this Court's intentions, the Attorney General responded as follows:
Dear Judge Liotti:
I write in response to the Court's order dated May 10, 2010, which directed the Attorney General to show cause why County Law article 18-B should not be declared unconstitutional.
The Attorney General respectfully declines to respond to the order for two independent reasons. First, there is no longer any live case pending before the [*3]Court. The Court's memorandum indicates that the underlying traffic violation was resolved last month by a guilty plea and fine. The parties to the case therefore no longer have a stake in the constitutional question the Court has raised.
Second, the Attorney General was not a party, and could not have been joined as a party, when the case was pending. As the Appellate Division recently explained:
[W]hen the constitutionality of a statute is challenged in an action or proceeding to which the State is not a party, the Attorney General may, upon notification of the challenge, choose to intervene in support of its constitutionality if he or she be so inclined (see CPLR 1012[b][1], [3]; Executive Law § 71). There is no authority, however, for the Supreme Court to compel the Attorney General to intervene, or to join the State as a party in such case.
Matter of Walsh v. Katz, 66 AD3d 1052, 1055-56 (2d Dep't 2009). Moreover, while the Court's order seems to contemplate issuing a declaratory judgment, no plaintiff has sued the Attorney General or the State for a declaratory judgment seeking such a declaration.
The issues raised by the Court are serious ones that deserve careful attention from all branches of government. This Court's memorandum will no doubt contribute to the public discourse on the matter. But this case does not present an appropriate vehicle for a judicial ruling on the constitutionality of article 18-B. Should the question arise again in a proper procedural posture, there will be ample opportunity for the courts to address the matter then.
Sincerely,
Benjamin N. Gutman
Deputy Solicitor General
Unfortunately, while the Attorney General's response may, in some respects, be viewed as a
concession that the law is unconstitutional or that my memorandum decision and order may have
an affect regarding public policy statewide, it also skirts the issue of the unconstitutionality of
the law statewide. It purportedly hangs its hat on procedure which either deprives the Court of
deciding the question or limits the impact of the decision to this Village alone. That response
does nothing to address the issue. It appears to be, at least in this Court's view, a political cop-out
by an Attorney General seeking election as Governor and a State Legislature engulfed in a State
budget deficit of over $9 billion - the worst state of affairs in this State's history. While school
budgets and other matters may appear to be a higher priority for most of the public and elected
representatives, in this Court's opinion, there can be no higher priority than the Bill of Rights and
the oath which this Court has taken to uphold it. This Court does not preside over budgetary or
legislative matters, it presides over the Constitution and in this case, the Sixth Amendment's
provisions regarding the right to counsel are of paramount importance. This Court will not
ignore this issue for political or other reasons and respectfully suggests that this State's [*4]and this nation's dire financial condition has, in large measure, been
created due to decision making for political purposes rather sound business judgments and sound
public policies. This Court does not have the luxury of deferring constitutional questions to
another time and place. That buck stops here in this Court and in every other charged with the
inherent responsibility of judicial review, an unquestioned obligation bestowed upon us as a
constitutional premise and foundation of our form of government since Chief Justice John
Marshall decided it more than two hundred years ago in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803). It is not the function of this Court to determine the cost effectiveness of its rulings or
what is politically popular. It is the function of this Court to determine the constitutionality of the
laws that come before it. In doing so, the Court must look to the words of the Constitution in
hac verba, the original intent of our Founders in that regard and prior decisions that have
interpreted a particular provision of the Constitution, in this case, the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
The legal question then is whether Article 18-B of the County Law is constitutional. More specifically where that law provides for the assignment of counsel to an indigent defendant who is accused of a crime, such as misdemeanors or felonies, it does not allow for the assignment of counsel in the case of violations where there is a possibility of jail and other serious penalties.
While this is a Local Criminal Court, the Village Courts of Nassau County do not preside over misdemeanors or felonies.[FN2] We are not Courts of Record and we do not conduct jury trials. We do not have the benefit of Probation Reports or the power to sentence someone to probation. While all of the Village Justices and Associate Village Justices in Nassau, more than one hundred twenty of us in the sixty two villages here, are attorneys, we are not by law required to be.[FN3] We are part-time jurists, some of us are paid and others are not. Yet, throughout this State non-lawyer Village and Town Justices, approximately fifteen hundred in all, preside over felony arraignments and exams; misdemeanors and violations. If an indigent defendant comes before [*5]these judges and is charged with a crime, then they are eligible for the assignment of counsel, in other words, a free lawyer to represent their best interests. An indigent defendant charged with one or more violations of State or Local Laws where they may be facing fifteen days on each violation, is ineligible for the assignment of counsel.
Article 18-B § 722-a of the County Law provides:
§ 722-a. Definition of crime
For the purpose of this article, the term "crime" shall mean a felony, misdemeanor, or the breach of any law of this state or of any law, local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state,[FN4] other than one that defines a "traffic infraction," for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment is authorized upon conviction thereof.
It was created in the aftermath of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which mandated that any indigent defendant charged with a crime shall be eligible for the assignment of counsel. The Supreme Court of the United States made its ruling binding upon the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Clarence Gideon with little more than a pencil and paper, writing from a jail cell in Florida, has shaped the right to counsel in state and federal courts to this day. The venerated holdings in Gideon, supra and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), did more to insure fundamental fairness in the criminal law than the Founders did in enacting the Bill of Rights in the first place.[FN5] Laws can have all the accoutrements of fairness attached to them but they will be of no avail if judges do not have the courage and foresight to review them.[FN6]
Since the holding in Gideon, we have learned that counsel must also be effective.
See, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Jenkins v. Coombe, 821 F.
2d 158 (1987) and
Lopez v. Scully, 58 F.3d 38 (2d Cir.1995).It is apparent that a system
that relies upon pro bono publico defense counsel or one with underpaid lawyers who
cannot match the pay and resources [*6]of prosecutors, is
inherently dysfunctional.[FN7] A Legislature or Executive Branch of [*7]Government that ignores these realities is dysfunctional in itself.
The mandate of Gideon cannot be met unless all courts are able to provide effective legal
representation to the poor in any case where there is a mere possibility of jail. See, Alabama
v. Shelton, 122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002).
Notwithstanding the holding of Gideon and its progeny, the State's response to it has been lackluster at best, providing inadequate funding for Publico Defenders, Legal Aid attorneys and assigned counsel statewide. In the forty five years since its enactment, Article 18-B has served as little more than a band aid solution to a justice system hemorrhaging with a panoply of endemic, vexing, societal problems which become even more critical in times such as these where the recession, a failing economy, budgetary deficits, wars and environmental disasters compete for funding with the justice system. But again, while many of these issues may have been unforeseen circumstances, unplanned events, emergencies or necessaries, the Constitution is with us each and every day, in good times and bad. It is our highest priority and the corners of it should never be cut. This is truly our greatest legacy as a nation. We are a nation of laws where freedom, liberty and due process are our highest priorities.
Pandering politicians have answered the call for real reforms in the justice system with harsh sentences and more jails. As we have seen in the case of the so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, their solutions have not been solutions at all to the causes of crime within our society. On the other hand, they have ruined countless lives and burdened taxpayers with insanely high taxes.[FN8] [*8]
In light of the oath which I have taken to uphold, protect
and defend the Constitutions of the United States and New York State, I must declare Article
18-B unconstitutional and I therefore do so. Since I am merely a Village Justice from a small
Long Island community, my words may not resonate anywhere else. Nonetheless, it is my
obligation to write them.
Dated:Westbury, New YorkSO ORDERED:
June 9, 2010
______________________________
Hon. Thomas F. Liotti
Village Justice