In this owner's-use occupancy proceeding, petitioner seeks to recover possession of 163 West 73rd Street, Apartment 3, in New York County. Respondent moves for summary judgment under CPLR 3211 to dismiss the petition. According to respondent, the predicate notice is insufficient on its face and, therefore, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this proceeding. In the alternative, respondent moves for leave to conduct limited disclosure and for a jury trial. Petitioner cross-moves to compel respondent to pay use and occupancy pendente lite. For the reasons below, respondent's motion to dismiss is denied, and his motion for disclosure is granted in part. Respondent's motion for jury trial is denied. Petitioner's cross-motion for use and occupancy is granted at the stabilized rental rate of $1341.39 a month. Respondent must pay rent accrued since the beginning of this proceeding within two weeks of today's date, and future rent must be paid pendente lite.

BACKGROUND

Respondent is the record tenant of a rent-stabilized apartment under a written rental agreement dated February 1, 2000, between respondent and petitioner's predecessor as extended by a renewal lease agreement dated October 22, 2008, for a term expiring on January 31, 2010. In accordance with the terms of the parties' most recent rental agreement, respondent agreed to pay rent at $1341.39 a month.

On June 30, 2009, petitioner became the owner of a five-story, fifteen-unit apartment building containing the subject apartment. A combined predicate termination and nonrenewal notice (Golub notice) dated September 11, 2009, declared petitioner's intent to recover respondent's apartment as part of her plan to convert the entire building into a single-family home to be used, allegedly, as her primary residence together with her husband, Alan Lipkin, and her [*2]twin daughters. The notice states her intention to recover the remaining apartments in the building and to serve nonrenewal notices on the other tenants in the building as their lease terms expire. Petitioner currently resides in a duplex apartment located on 58 West 83rd Street in New York County.

DISCUSSION

Predicate Notice

Respondent contends that the predicate notice is insufficient.

Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] (RSC) § 2524.4 (a) (1) provides that an owner is not required to offer a lease renewal to a stabilized tenant if the owner seeks to recover possession of the housing accommodation for personal use and occupancy as a primary residence in New York City. Before an owner may lawfully exercise the power to decline to renew a lease under RSC § 2524.4 (a) (1), the owner must provide adequate notice in writing at least 90 and not more than 150 days before the lease term expires. (RSC § 2524.2 [c].) As RSC § 2524 (a) explains, the predicate notice to a tenant to surrender possession of a housing accommodation for an owner's personal use must state both the basis on which owner relies for removal as well as the facts necessary to establish the existence of that ground.

A notice that does not comply with RSC § 2524.2 must be dismissed. (See Hirsch v Stewart, 63 AD2d 74, 82 [1st Dept 2009].) A notice that merely states the ground for nonrenewal without supporting factual evidence is also deficient. (Berkeley Assocs. v Camlakides, 173 AD2d 193, 194 [1st Dept 1991].) In evaluating whether the facts in a notice are sufficient to establish the existence of stated grounds, the standard "is one of reasonableness in view of all attendant circumstances." (Hughes v Lenox Hill Hosp., 226 AD2d 4, 17 [1st Dept 1996].)

The question before the court is whether a Golub notice is reasonable if it states the owner's intention to use the entire building as a primary residence and sets forth renovation plans to do so but does not explicitly state when renovations are to begin. The court finds under the circumstances of the current dispute — in which the majority of the apartments in the subject building are already in petitioner's possession and renovations could arguably begin immediately — that it is. Whether the notice honestly reflects petitioner's good-faith intentions is an issue for trial, not dismissal at this stage.

Respondent argues that the Golub notice is improper because it does not set forth sufficient facts indicating when petitioner will either begin to occupy the apartment or alternatively begin renovations to the apartment in her larger plan to convert the building into a single-family residence. Respondent relies heavily on a case in which this court found insufficient a notice that alleged the owner's intention to repossess without concrete evidence of when actual occupancy would begin. (See Rudd v. Sharff, 27 Misc 3d 860, 863, [Hous Part, Civ Ct, NY County 2010].) Although the Golub notice in the current dispute contains essentially the same information as the Golub notice in Rudd v Sharff, the circumstances surrounding the two are different. [*3]

Petitioner alleges, and respondent does not dispute, the following: all but three apartments in the building are already in petitioner's possession; the tenant of one of the remaining apartments was served an identical Golub notice at the same time respondent did; and the last remaining apartment — the basement apartment — has been slated to become vacant by June 1, 2010. (See Bauchman Aff. ¶ 4 [alleging in affidavit dated April 1, 2010, that "the basement apartment will become vacant within two months"].) Unlike in Rudd, in which the outcome turned in part on a public-policy concern forbidding an owner from warehousing units for an unreasonable or indefinite time period, here the renovations on the apartment could begin immediately without warehousing any apartments. Whether any warehousing might in fact take place is an issue for trial. In light of the circumstances here, the notice to respondent is sufficient. Respondent's motion to dismiss is denied.

Disclosure RequestRespondent moves for limited disclosure under CPLR 408 requesting information relevant to where petitioner resides and other property she owns to assess whether it is reasonable to believe that petitioner will actually live in the subject building, whether petitioner has sought other apartments for personal use, and whether petitioner is able and in good faith intends to convert the building into a single-family residence.

Disclosure is appropriate when the moving party has demonstrated ample need. (Antillean Holdings Co. v Lindley, 76 Misc 2d 1044, 1047 [Civ Ct, NY County 1973].) A party is entitled to limited disclosure when relevant information is solely within the opposing party's knowledge. (Cambridge Development, LLC v McCarthy, 2003 NY Slip Op 51433 [U], *2 [Civ Ct, NY County Nov. 19, 2003].) Respondent's full request is too broad in scope. Respondent's request for information regarding whether petitioner has sought other apartments for personal use and whether she is able to convert the property into a single-family residence are granted. In addition to the documents that petitioner has already agreed to disclose, petitioner must disclose the following: Exhibit C No.4 (request for all notices to vacate reflecting petitioner's desire to use property since 2000 but limited to 2007) and #11 (electrical plans). Disclosure requests regarding petitioner's current residence at 58 West 83rd Street, including contacts of sale since 2003, leases since 2001, and agreements, documents, and bills concerning 58 West 83rd Street, are denied due to the tenuous relationship of this information to the current dispute.

Regarding information requested from Alan Lipkin, petitioner's husband, the document request is denied. Lipkin is a non-party, and the information sought regarding his other real-estate holdings is irrelevant. Respondent's request to examine Lipkin before trial is granted. Although petitioner argues that Lipkin might present unique information, the examination before trial (EBT) is not burdensome. This denial of respondent's request is without prejudice to respondent's moving for documents from Lipkin after an EBT, if new and relevant information surfaces following the EBT.

Jury Request

The lease provides at Paragraph 17 that both parties waive their right to a jury trial in any action or proceeding brought by either. Respondent's motion for a jury trial is denied. [*4]

This proceeding is marked off calendar pending disclosure.

This opinion is the court's decision and order.

Dated: June 30, 2010

J.H.C.