| Matter of Weitz v Auriemma |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 51224(U) [28 Misc 3d 1208(A)] |
| Decided on July 2, 2010 |
| Supreme Court, Rockland County |
| Weiner, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
In the Matter of the
Application of Fred Weitz, Petitioner,
against Frank V. Auriemma, as Superintendent of the Pearl River School District, John Morgano, as Deputy Superintendent of the Pearl River School District, the Pearl River School District, and the Pearl River Board of Education, Respondents. |
Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking a judgment declaring Respondent's July 29,
2009 resolution terminating Petitioner's employment as a probationary elementary principal null
and void on the grounds that the determination was arbitrary, capricious, and in violation of
applicable statutes and regulations.
Notice Pursuant to Education Law �3031
[*2]
In support of its application, Petitioner asserts
that Respondents failed to provide notice that Respondent Superintendent Frank V. Auriemma
(hereinafter "Dr. Auriemma") was going to recommend that Petitioner's employment as a
probationary principal not be continued beyond Petitioner's first year. Petitioner contends that
the June 26, 2009 letter from Dr. Auriemma failed to provide adequate notice pursuant to the
applicable statutory provisions mentioned therein. The letter states, in pertinent part, that "I [Dr.
Auriemma] will be submitting my recommendation and a resolution to the Board of Education
for their review and consideration at the Board of Education meeting on July 29, 2009, which
may result in the termination of your probationary period."[FN1]
In response to Petitioner's submissions, Respondents highlight that the June 26, 2009
letter followed an evaluation dated June 19, 2009 in which Dr. Auriemma expressed "very
serious concerns" regarding Petitioner's judgment, professional decision making, and ability to
serve as principal.[FN2] In
subsequent correspondence dated July 14, 2009, Dr. Auriemma responded to Petitioner's letter
requesting his "...reasons for recommendation the termination of your probationary employment
with the District to the Board of Education."[FN3] This correspondence explicitly identified the
nature of Dr. Auriemma's recommendation to the Board of Education regarding Petitioner's
continued employment.
New York Education Law Section 3031, provides, in pertinent part, that "...boards of
education...shall review all recommendations not to appoint a person on tenure, and, teachers,
administrators and supervisors employed on probation by any school district or by any board of
cooperative educational services, as to whom a recommendation is to be made that appointment
on tenure not be granted or that their services be discontinued shall, at least thirty days prior to
the board meeting at which such recommendation is to be considered, be notified of such
intended recommendation and the date of the board meeting at which it is to be considered."
"It must be assumed that the Legislature in enacting [Education Law] section 3031
had in mind that the District Superintendent would advise the teacher of the reasons for his
recommendation so that in turn the teacher might be able to make a reasonable and logical reply.
Once the mandated procedural aspects of the District Superintendent's giving of reasons and
either a response is filed or the time has passed, the power of the Board of Education to
terminate the employment is not affected by section 3031." Rathbone v. Board of Ed. of
Hamilton Central School Dist., Madison, 47 AD2d 172 [1975], affd 41 NY2d 825
[1977]. "[T]he statute was conceived as a procedural device to force the superintendent to lay
bare the reasons for his recommendation so that the probationer could ascertain whether any
[reasons] were constitutionally or statutorily impermissible." [*3]Merhige v. Copiague School Dist., 76 AD2d 926, 928 [2d Dept
1980] [internal citations omitted].
Correspondence between the parties and their respective counsel subsequent to the
June 26, 2009 letter evidences Pettioner's opportunity and election to make a reasonable and
logical reply to Dr. Auriemma's recommendation that his probationary employment not be
continued. By correspondence dated July 8, 2009, Petitioner's counsel requested "a written
statement giving the reasons for your recommendation to the Board of Education..."[FN4] Such a request is explicitly
authorized by Education Law �3031(a) and this request and Petitioner's subsequent reply to the
Dr. Auriemma's written statement were made within the timeframes set forth in �3031(a).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the June 26, 2009 correspondence
from Dr. Auriemma to Petitioner satisfied the notice requirements of Education Law �3031.
Petitioner's Claim that Respondents' Actions Were "Arbitrary and
Capricious"
Petitioner further asserts that Respondents' actions were arbitrary, capricious, and
done in bad faith. In support of this assertion, Petitioner cites feedback he received from parents
and staff indicating that he was performing his job in a "completely satisfactory manner" and
presents a petition calling for his reinstatement as principal of Lincoln Avenue Elementary
School signed by parents of children attending the school.[FN5]
In response, Respondents contend that "...the petitioner's first year probationary
employment was terminated because of his demonstrated lack of judgment as an elementary
school principal in performing his administrative duties and in maintaining appropriate
interpersonal relations with other administrators and his staff".[FN6]
"The Court of Appeals defined the arbitrary and capricious' standard in Matter of
Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck,
Westchester County (34 NY2d 222 [1974]), characterizing the standard as relat[ing] to whether
a particular action should have been taken or is justified . . . and whether the administrative
action is without foundation in fact'. Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is
generally taken without regard to the facts..." Ador Realty, LLC v. Division of Housing and Community Renewal, 25
AD3d 128 [2d Dept 2005] [internal citations omitted]. "In applying the arbitrary and
capricious' standard, a court inquires whether the determination under review had a rational
basis. Under this standard, a determination should not be disturbed unless the record shows that
the agency's action was arbitrary, [*4]unreasonable, irrational or
indicative of bad faith'". Halperin v.
City of New Rochelle, 24 AD3d 768, 770 [2d Dept 2005].
The Pearl River Board of Education resolution not to continue Petitioner's
probationary employment was based upon the recommendation of Dr. Auriemma, which in turn
was based upon specific occurrences during Petitioner's first year as principal of Lincoln Avenue
Elementary School. Given this, Respondents' action had a rational basis and was neither
arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational, nor indicative of bad faith.
Accordingly, Petitioner's application is hereby denied.
Dated:New City, New York
July 2, 2010