[*1]
| V.Z.V. v K.P.V. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 51329(U) [28 Misc 3d 1215(A)] |
| Decided on July 29, 2010 |
| Supreme Court, Queens County |
| Siegal, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau
pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be
published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on July 29, 2010
Supreme Court, Queens County
V.Z.V., Plaintiff,
against
K.P.V., Defendant.
|
287 2010
Plaintiffs Attorney
Molander & Associates
Garth Molander, Esq.
4875 Sunrise Hwy., Suite 300
Bohemia, NY 11716
631-256-8495
Defendants Attorney
A. Camila Popin, Esq.
108-18 Queens Blvd, Ste. 806
Forest Hills, New York 11375
718-261-1208
Bernice D. Siegal, J.
BACKGROUND
The parties were married on July 27, 1996, and separated in October 2009,
when Defendant left the marital residence. There are two children of the marriage: P. V. (11
years of age) and M. V. (7 years of age). Both children currently reside with Plaintiff in Rego
Park, New York. Previously, M.V. had been living in Bulgaria with his maternal grandmother
until January 2010, when Plaintiff brought him to New York. P.V. has always resided in New
York. The Defendant lives in Bronx, New York and both parties hold dual-citizenship in the
United States and Bulgaria. Plaintiff maintains that since leaving the marital home in October
2009, Defendant has provided only $600 toward the support of the children. Plaintiff is
employed as a housekeeper, and earned $30,725 in 2009; Defendant is employed as a security
officer, and earned $57,355 in 2009. As reported in her Net Worth Statement, Plaintiff's monthly
expenses for her and the two children total $3,495. Plaintiff's sister, M. N., submitted an affidavit
stating that she lends Plaintiff between $700 and $800 per month to provide for basic needs.
Neither party has significant assets, though Defendant claims that the Plaintiff has $7,000 in a
bank account. According to Defendant, over $30,000 in marital debt is owed on various credit
cards and loans, toward which only he makes payments.
Plaintiff reports a history of violent behavior on the part of Defendant, and has
submitted copies of Orders of Protection from February 2006, April 2006, and July 2006
(Criminal Court: Queens County, Docket No. 2006QN007947). A Temporary Order of
Protection was issued in October 2009 by the Family Court: Queens County (Docket No.
O-22152-09), but the parties concede that it was withdrawn by Plaintiff and subsequently
dismissed. No proof of dismissal was provided.
With respect to the children, Plaintiff alleges that the parties' daughter is fearful of
Defendant. Defendant disagrees and claims that Plaintiff is alienating their daughter from him.
He further alleges that Plaintiff has a history of psychological problems, self-medicates, and is
incapable of caring for the children.
On November 26, 2009, Defendant allegedly filed a divorce proceeding in Bulgaria
(Case No. 13802/2009). On January 6, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Summons with Notice bearing the
caption "Action for Divorce" in this court (Index No. 287/10). The present motion, filed on
February 11, 2010, is a request by Defendant to defer to the divorce proceeding in Bulgaria that
was filed, and to dismiss Plaintiff's divorce action. In her cross-motion, Plaintiff claims that she
was not served with the Bulgarian divorce action properly, according to Bulgarian law, and as
such, the action must fail [*2]for lack of jurisdiction. In addition
to her request for an order dismissing Defendant's motion, she asks that this court award her
temporary custody, child support, unreimbursed medical expenses for the children, and for
Defendant to obtain a life insurance policy to insure these financial obligations. Defendant
maintains that the issue of jurisdiction is for the Bulgarian court to decide.
HOLDINGS:
Defendant's motion to dismiss the divorce and custody proceedings on the grounds
that New York is an improper venue is denied.
A hearing is ordered to determine temporary custody of the two marital children.
Defendant is ordered to pay child support in an amount calculated under the New
York State Child Support Standards Act, and childcare. Defendant is ordered to pay $14,338.75
in annual child support ($275.75 weekly).
The court reserves its decision on whether or not to order Defendant to obtain a life
insurance policy.
Defendant is ordered to provide his pro rata share of full hospitalization insurance,
major medical, optical and dental insurance coverage for the children to such time that they
become legally emancipated and un-reimbursed medical, optical, and dental expenses; and full
hospitalization insurance, major medical and dental insurance coverage for the Plaintiff until the
entry of judgment of divorce.
Defendant is ordered to pay $2,000 in counsel fees, which should provide for
Plaintiff's legal expenses until the parties' financial circumstances can be examined more closely
at trial.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Defendant moves to dismiss this action, insisting that the court allow the
Bulgarian action to run its course, but fails to cite any support for such proposition. The question
before this court is whether New York is an appropriate venue for this divorce action and
custody proceeding. If Bulgaria is the more appropriate venue for the divorce proceedings, then
the New York action can be stayed or dismissed pending the resolution of the divorce
proceedings in Bulgaria. (CPLR Rule 327; see also VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotels and
Casinos, Inc., 70 NY2d 948, 949 [1988]). However, this is not true for the custody
proceedings. Rather, the Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) will dictate
whether or not New York is an appropriate venue for the custody action.
As defendant failed to specifically state the basis for its motion to dismiss, plaintiff
assumed that Defendant is relying on CPLR § 3211(a)(4). CPLR § 3211(a)(4) is only
applicable when pending litigation exists either in another court within New York, a sister state
or the Federal System. (CPLR § 3211(a)(4) ["[A] party may move for a judgment
dismissing . one the grounds that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States."]); see L-3 Communications Corp. v. SafeNet,
[*3]Inc., 45 AD3d 1, 7 [1st Dep't 2007]). Dismissal
pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(4) is not applicable when the pending litigation is in a foreign
tribunal. (See CPLR § 3211(a)(4); L-3 Communicaptions Corp., 45 AD3d
at 7; see e.g. Abkco Industries Inc. v. Lennon, 85 Misc 2d 465, 471 [1975]). Since
pending litigation is located in Bulgaria, CPLR § 3211 (a)(4) does not apply, and
Defendant's motion to dismiss necessarily fails.
When the pending litigation is in a foreign tribunal, a party may move for dismissal
pursuant to CPLR §327 Forum Non Conveniens. (Abkco Industries Inc., 85
Misc 2d at 471.) Pending litigation in a foreign tribunal is not dispositive of Forum Non
Conveniens applicability. (Id.). CPLR §327(a) states that a dismissal or stay is
appropriate when "the interest of substantial justice" would be served if the action were heard in
another forum. In making such a determination, the court must exercise discretion in considering
and balancing various relevant factors. (Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 NY2d
474, 478-84 [1984]). Defendant bears the burden of showing "relevant private or public interest
factors" rendering the forum inappropriate. (Id). Some factors to consider
include the burden on the New York courts, hardship to Defendant, availability of an alternative
forum, locus of the cause of action, and residency of the parties. (Id.). "No one factor is
controlling." (Id.) If a substantial nexus exists between the claim and the jurisdiction, then
Defendant has not proven that the forum is inappropriate. (See Id.; see also Silver v. Great
American Ins. Co., 29 NY2d 356, 361 [1972]).
In the within action, the parties currently reside in New York, they lived in New
York while married, and any rulings made in Bulgaria would place the burden of enforcing the
decision on the New York courts. Additionally, there is no evidence in Bulgaria, and the only
witnesses in Bulgaria are the parties' parents. Any burden imposed on the parties' parents by
conducting the proceedings in New York is far outweighed by the benefits of having all parties,
other witnesses, and relevant information within the same jurisdiction. Further, any financial
information relevant to the proceedings will be in New York since that is where the parties lived
during their marriage. Accordingly, the court finds that there exists a substantial nexus between
New York and the subject marriage. Defendant's rationale for deferring to the Bulgarian
proceeding is that he knows the Bulgarian system better and much of their lives are tied to
Bulgaria, where they will probably return one day. Preferring the Bulgarian system does not
create a significant enough inconvenience to warrant a dismissal for Forum Non
Conveniens, nor does the possibility of Defendant moving back to Bulgaria permanently one
day make it a more appropriate venue. Because New York is an appropriate venue, and there
appears to be no venue more appropriate, Defendant's argument to dismiss or stay the
matrimonial action in New York is denied.
Additionally, even if New York lacked a substantial nexus with this action and the
Forum Non Conveniens factors weighed in favor of a dismissal, this court has no
authority to order a dismissal pursuant to CPLR § 327 sua sponte. (See VSL
Corp., 70 NY2d at 949; see also Carr v. Integon General Ins. Corp., 185 AD2d 831,
832 [2d Dep't 1992]). One of the parties must move for a dismissal pursuant to CPLR Rule 327
or such relief cannot be granted. (VSL Corp., 70 NY2d at 949). For the foregoing
reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss the matrimonial action commenced by Plaintiff is denied.
Custody
Defendant argues that
this entire action, including the custody hearing should be dismissed to allow similar litigation in
Bulgaria to finish. Whether New York has jurisdiction [*4]over
the custody proceedings is determined by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (1997) (UCCJEA), which dictates that jurisdiction be determined based on the
child's home state (Domestic Relations Law, § 75-d, subd 1, par [a]) or in a state that was
the child's home state before being removed at some point in the past six months by one of the
parties (Domestic Relations Law, § 75-c, subd 5). Paulina's home state is New York
because she has lived in Queens with her parents for over six months. New York also has a
jurisdictional predicate that allows a court to assume jurisdiction if it is in the best interest of the
child, that is, Domestic Relations Law, § 75-d, subd 1, par [b] states in relevant part:
(I) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one party have a significant
connection with the state and (ii) there is within the jurisdiction of the court substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships "
(Domestic Relations Law, § 75-d, subd 1, par [b]).
Even though New York is not M.V.'s home state having only returned to New York
January 2010, it still might be in his best interest to hold the custody proceedings in New York.
Both parents live in New York, as does M.V.'s sister, establishing their significant connection to
the jurisdiction. The evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training,
and personal relationships with regard to the parents exists entirely in New York. While M.V.
did reside in Bulgaria with his grandmother until January, such a personal relationship comes
second to the relationship between a child and his parents, and a brother and sister. Whatever the
result of the proceedings, the protection and care decisions will come from New York, even if
the grandmother in Bulgaria ultimately carries them out. Defendant opposed M.V.'s removal
from Bulgaria because M.V. was in the middle of school and it would disrupt his education.
Even if this was a legitimate concern at the time, M.V. has been in New York for over five
months and has already suffered this disruption. Defendant's argument that the New York
custody proceedings be stayed or dismissed is rejected.
In her cross motion, Plaintiff seeks temporary custody of the two marital children.
Currently both children are in New York residing with Plaintiff, who has made allegations of
violence against Defendant. When there are conflicting allegations or affidavits relevant to a
parent's fitness as a parent, such as the case here, the court should hold a hearing to determine
temporary custody. (See Carlin v.
Carlin, 52 AD3d 55, 76 [2d Dep't 2008]; see also Biagi v. Biagi, 124 AD2d 770,
770 [2d Dep't 1986]). A hearing is not required if the parties agree on the factual issues related to
the parents' fitness. (Carlin, 54 AD3d at 76. See also Asteinza v. Asteiza, 173
AD2d 515, 516 [2d Dep't 1991].
Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendant is violent and that he cut her with broken glass
in 2006, for which she sought emergency medical care. Defendant, however, claims that he has
never hurt Plaintiff nor the children. He claims that in 2006, he did not hit Plaintiff with glass,
but that the glass shattered on its own during an argument. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that their
daughter is scared of Defendant, because of his alleged violent behavior. Defendant claims that
he and his daughter have a loving relationship and that the mother tries to alienate his daughter
from him. Furthermore, Defendant claims that the Plaintiff forged his signature in order to take
their son to the United States from Bulgaria, while his Plaintiff claims that Defendant's signature
[*5]was not required in order to bring their son to the United
States. Lastly, it is disputed whether or not Plaintiff is taking prescription medicine for
psychological problems. Therefore, as in Biagi, the several disputed issues would best be
resolved at a hearing. (Biagi, 124 AD2d at 770).
Furthermore, a common practice in matrimonial proceedings where two or more
children are involved is to appoint a single attorney to represent the multiple related children,
provided the interests of the children coincide. (Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 261 AD2d 623,
624 [2d Dep't 1999]). But when the children have divergent interests, the appointment of a single
attorney for the children is an improvident exercise of the court's discretion. (Corigliano v.
Coriglian, 297 A.DF.2d 328, 329 [2d Dep't 2002]). In the within action, the parties daughter
has been residing in Queens for the past ten years, however, their son was born and raised in
Bulgaria and only resided in Queens from 2008 to 2009. Therefore, this situation warrants the
assignment of separate attorneys for the children to represent each of the children's conflicting
interests. (Id.).
Accordingly, a hearing shall be ordered to determine custody of the two children on
September 13, 2010 and an attorney for each child shall be appointed by separate order.
Child Support
Plaintiff's cross
motion also seeks temporary child support as calculated under The Child Support Standards Act
(CSSA). Child support is ordinarily determined by the guidelines set forth in The CSSA
(Ryan v. Ryan, 186 AD2d 245, 246 [2d Dep't 1992]). The Act requires that child support
be paid and determines the amount based on percentages of the parties' gross income (Domestic
Relations § Law 240). The Act indicates an appropriate percentage of gross income based
on the number of children to be supported. However, when the court awards pendente
lite relief it is not bound to the guidelines. (See Ryan, 186 AD2d at 246). Rather, it
is in the discretion of the court to use those standards appropriately in the context of the record
before it. (Ryan, 186 AD2d at 246; see Asteinza, 173 AD2d at 516). The
predominant consideration in determining whether to use the statutory guidelines to determine a
pendente lite award of child support is the financial needs of the party making the
application. (Cooper v. Cooper, 7
AD3d 746, 747 [2 Dep't 2004]; Shanon v. Patterson, 294 AD2d 485, 48 [2d Dep't
2002]). However, the husband's financial needs and obligations must be taken into consideration
as well. (DeNicola v. Denicola, 108 AD2d 745, 746 [2d Dep't 1985]). Specifically, the
noncustodial parents' ability to live and manage debts should be taken into consideration.
(See Id.).
The CSSA dictates that each parent shall pay their pro rata share of the appropriate
percentage of the gross income reflected on the parties' most recent Federal Income Tax Return
(DRL § 240 [1-b][b][5]). The Act provides that when there are two children from a
marriage, the non-custodial parent shall pay his pro rata share of 25% of the parties' gross
income (DRL § 240 [1-b][b][3]). Defendant's undisputed income in 2009 was $57,355, as
reflected on his 2009 Net Worth Statement. Plaintiff's undisputed income for 2009 was $30,725,
as reflected on her 2009 Net Worth Statement. The gross income of the parties' in 2009 was
$88,080. Defendant's pro rata share of 25% of that income is $14,338.75 annually, or $275.75
weekly.
Currently, Defendant claims he is responsible for marital debt in excess of $30,000, which
is supported by his 2009 Net Worth Statement, but fails to provide the information regarding
exact payments owed. In order to consider Defendant's current financial obligation, the court
would need to know the monthly payment amounts toward the balance. Conversely, [*6]Plaintiff has provided monthly expenses and an affidavit from her
sister supporting her assertion that she is borrowing money to meet these expenses. Because the
financial needs of the party seeking relief are the predominant factor in awarding child support,
and Defendant has failed to provide sufficient information regarding his financial needs and
obligations, the pendente lite award of child support will be determined following the
guidelines set forth in the CSSA.
Based on the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's request for pendente lite relief is granted
and Defendant is ordered to pay $14,338.75 in annual child support ($275.75 weekly).
Life Insurance
Additionally,
Plaintiff's cross motion seeks an order by the court directing Defendant to obtain a life insurance
policy in the amount of $200,000, naming his children as the beneficiaries and Plaintiff as trustee
in the event of Defendant's death. The court has the authority to order a party to obtain a life
insurance policy as a means of securing future support (Domestic Relations Law § 236
[B][8][a]). However, DRL § 236 does not require the court to make such an order. (DRL
§ 236 (B)(8)(a) ["The court may also order a party to purchase insurance on the life of
either party."]. When the court does order a party to obtain life insurance, the policy should be in
an amount comparable to the amount of child support payments to be paid in the future. (Penna v. Penna, 29 AD3d 970,
972 [2d Dep't 2006]. Further, the policy should permit reduction in the amount of benefits by the
amount of support actually paid over time. (See Moran v. Grillo, 44 AD3d 859, 861 [2d Dep't 2007]).
Here, Defendant argues that he is responsible for the marital debt and has not been earning
the same income that he did in 2009. Further, even if Defendant earns a similar income, once
child support and legal fees are subtracted, Defendant's disposable income will be minimal.
Defendant's financial abilities are presently unclear, and thus an order that Defendant obtain a
life insurance policy is inappropriate until Defendant's financial circumstances are resolved at
trial. (DGM Partners-Rye v. Board of Architectural Review of City of Rye, 176 AD2d
875, 876 [2d Dep't 1991]). Accordingly, the court reserves its decision on whether or not to order
defendant to obtain a life insurance policy until that time.
Medical, Dental, and Hospitalization
Expenses
Plaintiff further seeks an order by the court directing Defendant
to provide his pro rata share of hospitalization insurance, major medical, optical and dental
insurance coverage for the children to such time that they become legally emancipated, and
un-reimbursed medical, optical, and dental expenses; and full hospitalization insurance, major
medical and dental insurance coverage for Plaintiff until the entry of the judgment of divorce.
DRL § 240 (1-b)(c)(4) provides that all health insurance expenses will be pro rated in
proportion to each party's share of the gross income. DRL § 240 also provides that each
parent pay their pro rata share of any reasonable health care expenses not reimbursed by
insurance (DRL § 240 [1-b][c][5]). Defendant is therefore ordered to pay Plaintiff for his
share of the children's unreimbursed medical expenses in addition to his pro rata share of any
expenses associated with maintaining Plaintiff's health insurance plan. Defendant's pro rata share
is based on his portion of the gross income, approximately 66%.
Counsel Fees
Lastly, Plaintiff's
cross motion seeks an order awarding counsel fees in the amount of $5,500. Plaintiff has $3,499
in monthly expenses and alleges that she is currently borrowing [*7]money from her sister to meet these expenses. She has already paid
her attorney $3,000, which has allowed for the commencement of this action, but alleges that she
will be at a disadvantage if she is not granted $5,500 in counsel fees.
When determining whether to award counsel fees and expenses, the court must look
to the financial circumstances of both parties. (See DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70
NY2d 879, 881 [1987] [quoting DRL § 237]; Assini v. Assini, 11 AD3d 417, 418 [2d Dep't 2004]). Counsel fees
may be awarded when the applicant spouse is financially needy and the other spouse has the
resources to pay them. (Cinnamond v. Cinnamond, 203 AD2d 229, 230 [2d Dep't 1994]).
The applicant spouse does not have to be indigent or out of resources to receive an award of
counsel fees. (Lieberman v. Lieberman, 187 AD2d 567, 567 [2d Dep't 1992]). But the
court must also consider Defendant's ability to pay. (Cinnamond, 203 AD2d at 230).
When the applicant spouse has the resources to pay the fees, and the other spouse is financially
insecure, the court has often denied the application. (Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d 348,
348 [2d Dep't 2002]). If both the financial situations of the parties' are relatively equal the
application is usually denied as well. Kavanakudiyil v. Kavanakudiyil, 203 AD2d 250,
251 [2d Dep't 1994] [holding that the Supreme Court erred in awarding counsel fees to Plaintiff
when neither party had assets greater than, nor earning power far superior to the other, and the
husband was unemployed and in substantial debt at the time of the trial]). Similarly, where the
party whom relief is sought against is burdened by significant debt, as is the case here, an award
of counsel fees may not be appropriate. (Popelaski v. Popelaski, 22 AD3d 735, 738 [2d Dep't 2005]).
Here, Defendant claims he is currently responsible for over $30,000 in marital debt.
Defendant being responsible alone for the marital debt is a factor that weighs against granting
Plaintiff counsel fees. (Id). Additionally, Defendant will be paying Plaintiff $275.70 in child
support which should alleviate the burden on Plaintiff imposed by the children's expenses. The
payments will also decrease Defendant's spendable income by $14,448.75 annually. Once this
amount is subtracted from Defendant's gross income as it was reflected on his 2009 tax return,
Defendant's income is $42,906.25. This leaves approximately a $12,000 disparity between the
parties' incomes. The low disparity in the parties' incomes, which might ultimately disappear
once the parties' finances are examined more closely, also weighs against granting Plaintiff's full
relief. (Kavanakudiyil v. Kavanakudiyil, 203 AD2d at, 251 [2d Dep't 1994].) In the
interest of this action going forward without either party suffering a disadvantage, Defendant is
ordered to pay $2,000 in counsel fees which should provide for Plaintiff's legal expenses until
the parties' financial circumstances can be examined more closely at trial.
ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss the divorce and custody
proceedings on the grounds that New York is an improper venue is denied.
ORDERED that a hearing shall be held on September 13, 2010 to
determine temporary custody of the two marital children.
ORDERED that Defendant pay child support in an amount calculated
under the New York State Child Support Standards Act, and childcare. Defendant is ordered to
pay $14,338.75 in annual child support ($275.75 weekly).
[*8]ORDERED that Defendant provide his
pro rata share of hospitalization insurance, major medical, optical and dental insurance coverage
for the children to such time that they become legally emancipated and un-reimbursed medical,
optical, and dental expenses; and full hospitalization insurance, major medical and dental
insurance coverage for the Plaintiff until the entry of judgment of divorce.
ORDERED that Defendant pay $2,000 in counsel fees, which should
provide for plaintiff's legal expenses until the parties' financial circumstances can be examined
more closely at trial.
A copy of this order has been mailed to the parties and/or their respective counsel.
Dated: July ____, 2010
BERNICE D. SIEGAL
J.S.C.