| People v Diop |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 50052(U) [30 Misc 3d 1212(A)] |
| Decided on January 5, 2011 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, New York County |
| Nervo, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
The People of the State
of New York,
against Mama Diop, Defendant. |
Defendant, charged with violations of Penal Law § 165.71, trademark
counterfeiting in the third degree and New York City Administrative Code § 20.453,
unlicensed general vending, moves to dismiss the information on the ground of facial
insufficiency. He also seeks a Sandoval hearing. The court previously ordered
Dunaway, Mapp and Huntley hearings.
Officer Andre Reyes signed a complaint dated October 10, 2010, the date defendant
was arrested, stating that he was informed by officer Christopher Davis that Davis " ... observed
the defendant
display and offer for sale counterfeit Gucci, Coach, Burberry and Louis Vuitton
handbags. At the time of the above officer's observations, defendant was not displaying a license
issued by the Department of Consumer Affairs and could not produce one when asked."
Continuing , Reyes alleges that Davis saw defendant holding an open shopping bag
containing the merchandise and that two people approached defendant, examined the
merchandise and engaged him in conversation.
Reyes states that he examined the merchandise and that based on his training and
experience, the [*2]merchandise bears counterfeit Vuitton,
Coach, Burberry and Gucci trademarks. He alleges that the items are "...substantially the same as
the genuine trademark except that the counterfeit items have poor-quality material, stitching and
hardware, and the genuine items have a high quality material, stitching and hardware." He
concludes by saying that "An affidavit signed by William Ryan, a representative of the
trademark, states that the trademarks are in use and registered."
Officer Davis's supporting deposition states that "I saw defendant display and offer a
black bag containing a handbag." Continuing, Davis alleges that "I saw defendant holding an
open bag...and the above described merchandise was inside. The defendant never put the
merchandise down." Finally, he alleges that "I saw 2 people approach the defendant, examine the
merchandise and engage in conversation with the defendant."
William Ryan, an investigator and representative of Burberry, Gucci, Vuitton and
Coach, submits eight affidavits of authenticity and eight District Attorney's Office Trademark
Counterfeiting Manufacturer's Affidavits, one for each of the brands he represents. Each
document is identical, except for the brand name. Ryan states that each item is not consistent
with the authentic brand item's color, grain, stitching and manufacturing quality and that "... the
packaging labels and tags are not the same as that affixed to an authentic handbag." Each
trademark affidavit states that the trademark is currently in use and is registered with the United
States Patent Trademark Office.
Defendant contends that as none of the supporting depositions state that their authors
observed defendant displaying or offering for sale any Gucci, Coach, Burberry and Vuitton items,
Reyes's allegations are uncorroborated hearsay and are therefore facially insufficient.
Next, defendant asserts that the accusatory instrument is jurisdictionally defective
because it fails to describe the allegedly counterfeit trademarks or that the goods in question bore
these trademarks. He contends that Ryan's affidavits merely describe the poor quality of the
merchandise's workmanship but not the characteristics of the workmanship.
Finally, defendant argues that "The overriding defect in this accusatory instrument is
that, [sic] as shown by there are no allegations identifying the merchandise Mr. Ryan examined
as that which the complaint alleges the defendant offered for sale. He opines that merely because
Mr. Ryan's affidavits were served and filed at defendant's arraignment does not prove that he in
fact examined the merchandise referred to in the complaint."
The complaint and the affidavits inform defendant of the nature of the charges
against him and the acts constituting them so that he can prepare for trial and protect himself
from being tried twice for the same offense. Therefore, the complaint and affidavits form an
information that is legally sufficient. ( People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360;see also
People v. Miles, 64 NY2d 731)
Davis's statement, coupled with the allegations in the complaint, that defendant
displayed a bag and engaged in conversation with two individuals is a legally sufficient basis for
the charge of [*3]unlawful general vending. ( see People v.
Chen, 20 Misc 3d 128 (A) ) Davis's affidavit recites the elements of the crime and shows that
there was probable cause for the arrest.
The complaint alleges that Reyes knows that the merchandise is counterfeit because
of his training and experience ( People
v. Kalin, 12 NY3d 225) The investigator's supporting depositions corroborate Reyes's
allegations.Further, the investigator's affidavits show that the trademarks are in use. The Reyes
and Ryan documents, read together, constitute a legally sufficient basis for the trademark
counterfeiting charge, and no further factual recitation, such as a description of the trademark is
necessary; rather, the description of how the counterfeit item differs from authentic merchandise
is legally sufficient. ( People v. Sraman, 27 Misc 3d 144(A)
The factual differences between Davis's affidavit and the other affidavits does not
render the information insufficient. Defendant's argument goes to the weight of the evidence, a
matter to be resolved at trial, not on a motion for facial insufficiency.Because "...the prima
facie case requirement [for an accusatory instrument] is not the same as the burden of proof
required at trial" ( People v. Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680), the People are not required
to plead the particulars of the evidentiary matters they mus prove at trial. ( People v. Miles,
id.) There is no requirement for "precise factual symmetry between the complaint and the
supporting depositions..." ( People v. Palmer, 24 Misc 3d 1218(A)
The branch of the motion for a Sandoval hearing is granted to the extent that
the trial court will conduct the hearing prior to trial.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the branch of the motion to dismiss is denied, and it is further
ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking a Sandoval hearing is
granted to the extent that the trial court will conduct the hearing prior to trial.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: January 5, 2011
ENTER:
__________________________
JCC