People v Williams (2011 NY Slip Op 50215(U))

People v Williams (Annis)

2011 NY Slip Op 50215(U) [30 Misc 3d 138(A)]

Decided on February 16, 2011

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Annis Williams, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Mary R. O'Donoghue, J.), rendered November 26, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of harassment in the second degree.

Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). Her contention on appeal that the judgment of conviction should be reversed because the People failed to provide her with certain materials in violation of People v Rosario (9 NY2d 286 [1961]) is unpreserved for appellate review, as defendant failed to seek any relief for the Rosario violation after the Criminal Court had granted her request for an adverse inference (see People v Jacobs, 71 AD3d 693 [2010]). In any event, defendant's contention has no merit since the court acted well within its discretion in limiting the relief it granted to the drawing of an adverse inference (see People v Coley, 33 AD3d 383 [2006]), and reversal is not warranted because defendant did not show that there was a reasonable possibility that the nondisclosure materially contributed to the result of the trial (see CPL 240.75).

Defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of harassment in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 [1987]). Upon a review of the record, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.