| Lucas v Masetta |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 50219(U) [30 Misc 3d 1226(A)] |
| Decided on February 18, 2011 |
| City Court Of Rochester |
| Sciortino, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected in part through March 8, 2011; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Robert Lucas, Plaintiff,
-vs- Steven Masetta and Steve's Empire Collision, Defendants.
|
I.STATEMENT OF FACTS:
On or about June 10, 2010 Robert Lucas ("plaintiff") and Steven Masetta/Steve's
Empire Collision ("defendants") entered into an agreement on an Invoice, whereby the
defendants would provide the service of painting certain areas of the plaintiff's 1967 Chevy
Corvette Coupe. After the work was completed and paid for, the plaintiff was not satisfied with
the service provided, and filed a small claim.
II.LEGAL ANALYSIS:
The purpose of a small claims procedure is to do substantial justice between the
parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law. See, New York Uniform
City Court Act § 1804. This Court is bound by this standard; a standard which has been
supported throughout many terms of this Court and others similarly situated throughout New
York State. Accordingly, the goal of this Court throughout this entire proceeding is to ensure that
substantial justice is done between the parties relying on the sound principles of statutory case
law. This Court is required to deliberate upon the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to a
reimbursement of the amount paid to defendants due to a breach of the agreement the parties
entered.
[*2]
Courts have long adhered to the principle that in
the construction of contracts, where the language is clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous, the
courts should interpret a contract by its own language. See, R/S Assoc. v. N.Y Job
Dev. Auth., 98 NY2d 29 (2002). In this case, the parties recorded their agreement in a clear
and complete document of which the court could enforce by its own writing according to its own
terms. See id. Specifically, the Invoice, received as Defendant's Exhibit A, specifies in
detail the exact work to be completed and the payment to be received. Through his own
testimony, plaintiff raised a question with regard to the validity of the Invoice acting as the
agreement based upon a verbal discussion he had with the defendants simultaneously with the
creation of the Invoice, which would then in effect, modify the terms of work to be completed by
adding additional services to be performed. This argument of an alleged oral agreement
modifying the terms of the written agreement is controlled by the Statute of Frauds, which is
codified in General Obligations Law.
Oral agreements are limited by the Statute of Frauds, § 5-701 of the General
Obligations Law. The requirements of a "writing" to satisfy the General Obligations Law are set
out in § 5-701(b)(3)(d):
3. There is sufficient evidence that a contract has been made if:
***
(d) There is a note, memorandum or other writing sufficient to indicate
that a contract has been made, signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought or by its authorized agent or broker.
To satisfy the Statute of Frauds, a writing must identify the parties, describe the
subject matter, state all the essential terms of the agreement, and be signed by the party to be
charged. See Durso v. Biasch, 37 AD3d 646, 830 N.Y.S.2d 327 (2d Dep't 2007). The
purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud in the proving of certain legal transactions
particularly susceptible to deception, mistake, and perjury. See Sheehy v. Clifford Chance Rogers & Wells, LLP, 3 NY3d 554,
789 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2004). In order for a written memorandum or note to meet the requirements
imposed by the Statute of Frauds, it must contain substantially the whole agreement, and all its
material terms, and conditions so that one reading it can understand from it what the agreement
is. See HPSC, Inc. v. Matthews, 179 AD2d 974, 579 N.Y.S.2d 474 (3d Dep't 1992). In
this case, the Invoice is a writing which identifies the parties, identifies the subject matter, states
all the essential terms, and is signed by the parties to be charged. Accordingly, the Invoice is a
valid contract, binding upon the parties as an agreement that is clear, unequivocal, and
unambiguous, and should be interpreted by its own language. See, R/S Assoc. v. N.Y
Job Dev. Auth., supra.
Based upon the above legal analysis in the present case before the Court, the
parties have provided the clearest and best evidentiary proof available and the testimony of the
parties. Based upon the proof as submitted between the parties, this Court concludes that the
principles and rules of substantive law along with the purpose of substantial justice compel this
Court to find for the defendants. The parties had a valid contract detailing all the work to be done
on the said 1967 Corvette Coupe. Defendants preformed all work detailed on the Invoice and
work order (Defense Exhibit A). Furthermore, plaintiff paid for the work that was done and
accepted the job as complete. Specifically, plaintiff signed the work order and took possession of
the 1967 Corvette deeming the contract between both parties as completed. Defendant's Exhibit
A clearly states in the bottom left corner that upon customers signature "Customer is completely
[*3]satisfied with all work, with no recourse whatsoever per
customer agreement". As a result, the Court finds for the defendants.
III.CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT plaintiff's claim is dismissed for failure
to prove a cause of action, upon which relief may be granted.
This constitutes the Decision, Order, and Final Judgment of the City Court in the
City of Rochester, County of Monroe, State of New York.
DATED: February 18, 2011________________________________
HON. Michael A. Sciortino**
Acting City Court Judge
Rochester City Court
** Hon. Michael A. Sciortino, Town Justice in the Town of Parma, is serving as
Acting City Court Judge in the City of Rochester pursuant to designation of the Hon. Thomas M.
VanStrydonck, Administrative Judge of the Seventh Judicial District.